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CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW:
LEGISLATIVE CHOICE IN AN
ERA OF PARTY AUTONOMY
William J. Woodward, Jr.*
The foundation upon which our system of government rests is the pos-
session by the states of the right, except as restricted by the Constitu-
tion, to exert their police powers as they may deem best for the
happiness and welfare of those subject to their authority. The whole
theory upon which the Constitution was framed, and by which alone,
it seems to me, it can continue, is the recognition of the fact that differ-
ent conditions may exist in the different states, rendering necessary the
enactment of regulations of a particular subject in one state when such
subject may not in another be deemed to require regulation; in other
words, that in Massachusetts, owing to conditions which may there
prevail, the legislature may deem it necessary to make police regula-
tions on a particular subject, although like regulations may not obtain
in other states.
-Mr. Justice White, dissenting, in Fauntleroy v. Lur,
210 U.S. 230, 240 (1908). 1
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I. INTRODUCTION
USTICE White's powerful Civics I statement expresses bedrock val-
ues underlying our federal system. There are countless expressions
of these ideas throughout our history and that history is replete with
examples of State governments exercising their legal authority in unique
ways. Texas, for example, established itself as a debtors' haven by creat-
ing generous debtors' exemptions from execution on judgments. Its his-
tory includes substantial migration of debtors from the Northeast
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attempting to avoid their debts.2 Florida has more recently done much
the same thing by creating a regime of debtors' exemptions widely per-
ceived to be unfair by those to whom the money has been owed.3 In the
less distant past, California attracted families by offering a very high qual-
ity public education,4 Delaware has become the choice for incorporating
many businesses, and New York may be the jurisdiction of choice for
litigating commercial law cases.5
Indeed, the perceived importance of state sovereignty and federalism is
linked to the idea that one state might, through enlightened legislation or
judicial decisions, create a more hospitable regime for its inhabitants and
thereby create for them benefits not presently available to citizens of
other states. Obviously, in its traditional form in the United States, creat-
ing hospitable or inhospitable environments is the business of State gov-
ernments. An individual's desire for different limits on creditor
remedies, a different public school structure, different tax statutes, or
other different rules traditionally calls for political action or physical
relocation.
Since at least the 1930s, however, individual choice has played a slightly
larger role in determining the legal regime that would apply to some of
one's activities. 6 Since that time, individual parties to contracts have had
limited power to choose from among the different governing laws that
might arguably apply to their contract. The development of this power
was controversial well before that;7 but, recently, this limited power to
select applicable law has been relatively uncontroversial.
When contracting parties or the subjects of their contracts are located
in different states, it is not obvious which law ought to govern their rela-
2. See, e.g., James W. Paulsen, Introduction: The Texas Home Equity Controversy in
Context, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 307, 310 (1995).
3. Florida provides for 47 different exemptions available to debtors. The Florida
homestead exemption, which denies creditors access to a debtor's home, is found in article
X section 4 of the Florida Constitution. The exemption protects up to one half of an acre
within a municipality and 160 acres outside a municipality regardless of the value. This
exemption can seem particularly unfair to creditors. Donna Litman Seiden, There's no
Place Like Home(stead) in Florida - Should it Stay that Way?, 18 NOVA L. REV. 801, 809-
817, 837 (1994); see also Lawrence J. Goodrich, How Much Debt Should Creditors Forgive?
Rise in personal bankruptcies may prompt Congress to stiffen laws, CHRISAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Nov. 6, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 2805070 (telling the horror story of a
multimillionaire who bought a mansion in Florida and then declared bankruptcy).
4. State statutes give some of the flavor of these reforms. See CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 66052(a), (b) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that the Legislature intends the University of
California and the California State University to adopt and enforce procedures in order to
ensure that quality teaching is an essential criterion when evaluating faculty for appoint-
ment, retention, promotion, or tenure).
5. Cf. EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18.6, at 872 (3d ed. 2000):
"[Authorizing parties to select unrelated New York law was said] to afford parties the
opportunity to select a sophisticated body of commercial law and a judicial system with
substantial experience as well as to enhance the importance of New York as an interna-
tional commercial center."
6. JOESPH BEALE, TREATISE ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 1173 (1935).
7. See Joseph Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 HARV. L. REV.
260, 260 (1910) (stating that choice of law give parties "permission to do a legislative act").
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tions. Uncertainty about applicable law creates commercial problems of
predictability for those who draft contracts. To reduce that uncertainty,
courts began giving parties limited power to choose from among the legal
systems that the adjudicating court might have chosen in the absence of
party choice. Since courts selected applicable law based on the "con-
tacts" contending legal systems had with the contract, it naturally fol-
lowed that parties could choose only from among those states.
Recently, driven by international models and by the rhetoric of party
autonomy, there has developed a movement to substantially alter this es-
tablished approach by deleting the limitation that parties can choose only
the "related" law that an adjudicating court might otherwise have chosen
in the absence of party choice. This movement started slowly, first being
limited to large contracts by sophisticated parties8 where substantial
money was at risk. The trend inched into the Uniform Commercial Code
in 1989 for large contracts among specialists. 9
The movement took a giant step when the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") promulgated the
Uniform Computer Information and Transactions Act ("UCITA").
Animated by ideas that high-tech contracts really had no situs, propo-
nents of this proposed statute 10 asserted that an analysis based on pre-
existing State "interests" was inappropriate."' The idea takes another big
step in a pending proposal for Article 1 of the UCC that parties to com-
mercial contracts-large and small-should be able to choose the law of
any State regardless of that State's interest in, or connection with, the
parties or their contract. 12 These changes are important because, by per-
mitting parties to choose law, whether or not "related" to the contract,
8. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1646.5 (2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2708 (1999); N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (McKinney 2000); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51 (West
Supp. 2000).
9. See U.C.C. §§ 4A-507, 5-116, 8-110 (2000). UCC § 4A-507 was the first, promul-
gated in 1989.
10. UCITA has been adopted in Virginia and Maryland. See 68 U.S.L.W. 2532. In
Virginia the legislation has delayed the effective date of the new statute until July 1, 2001,
pending the outcome of a study by the Joint Commission on Technology and Science and
the implementation of its recommendations. Sarah K. Wiant, UCITA Enacted in Virginia,
4 AALL SPECTRUM 32, 32 (May 2000). In Maryland, it was adopted with amendments
extending Maryland's consumer protection statute to UCITA contracts involving consum-
ers. 2000 MD. LAWS CH. 11 (H.B. 19), amending MD. COM. LAW I § 13-101.1. Issues here
are difficult enough without unnecessary complexity in the text. So, to make the text easier
to understand, the UCITA provision will be referred to as a "proposal" since it is merely a
"proposal" for enactment in all States except Maryland and Virginia.
11. The Official Comment is quoted infra in note 22.
12. A difficulty with this project is the changing nature of the proposed black letter
and comments in the Article 1 project. The proposal changes from meeting to meeting,
and the comments (which in this situation are critical to understanding the implications of
the black letter) are even more unstable. The fluid nature of the process makes it virtually
impossible to offer useful, specific commentary on a NCCUSL Proposal until the proposal
has proceeded through the approval process and is offered to legislatures.
The reader should thus understand these difficulties that come with commenting on a
project in development. They imply a high likelihood that parts of the Article 1 proposal
will not appear in the precise form discussed in this Article at later points in time. Except
as noted here, the overall thrust and implications of the proposal have not, however,
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the proposals may affect at a core level the very notion that States have
"interests" in (and control or "jurisdiction" over) contracts that affect
their residents or the property within their borders.
It may be that the complexity of the subject has kept commentary on
these changes to a minimum and, indeed, it is very difficult to unpack the
potential impact of these changes. This Article hopes to fill that void by
explicating the conflict of laws context within which these proposals will
operate, and the impact that the changes may have both on commercial
predictability and on states' legislative and judicial power to influence
contracting parties despite their contrary wishes. In so doing, this Article
hopes to give State legislatures and other policy makers the information
they need to make informed choices about the proposals that may come
before them. Gathering and quoting many of the sources, along with ef-
forts to make the subject accessible to non-experts has contributed to the
Article's length, and that, in turn, has made it necessary on occasion to
reiterate points that have come up earlier. It is hoped, however, that by
approaching the subject this way, I will have made the job less burden-
some for others and thereby assisted policy makers in coming to their
own judgments about the worth of the proposals.
This Article will show that State enactment of these new choice of law
provisions will erode-perhaps substantially-the power States tradition-
ally have had to enact legislation to benefit their constituents. The pro-
posals will erode that State lawmaking power because an ordinarily
applicable state statute or judicial precedent will have to be characterized
"fundamental policy" before it will be recognized as effective if parties
otherwise subject to it have chosen different law in their contract. The
magnitude of this effect on state lawmaking is an empirical question that
depends on how often contracting parties will avail themselves of the new
power and, of course, on what otherwise applicable state laws are se-
lected and deselected by party choice. Policy makers will have to forecast
and balance these effects against whatever improvement they perceive
these proposals will bring to commercial law.
But, because of the peculiar way the law governing contractual choice
of law works, the issues are more complex than that. Enactment of the
proposals in any one state can have substantial effects on persons in other
jurisdictions who are ordinarily governed by the law of other states. As a
result, it will not do for state legislatures simply to reject the proposed
changes. States which view the proposals as unsound may need to con-
sider positive action to neutralize the effects in non-enacting states of
other states enacting the proposals.
changed substantially over time and will likely be the same (and subject to the same obser-
vations) even if the text or comments change.
While there was a December 2000 ALI Council Draft, that draft has not been made
widely available. At this writing, the last publicly available draft and accompanying notes




At their core, the proposals may substantially alter traditional views of
state government and federalism, views captured by Justice White's state-
ment in Fauntleroy. A full understanding of the implications of the pro-
posals and the justifications advanced for their enactment will, one hopes,
better allow legislatures to consider the magnitude of the effects they
might have on a state's governing functions and make informed judg-
ments about whether to enact them. Such an understanding will also al-
low non-enacting states to better understand the effects that enactment in
other states can have on the citizens and governmental functions of the
non-enacting states.
The approach will be primarily descriptive and will proceed as follows:
Part 1 will introduce the counterintuitive way that conflict of laws princi-
ples work in the narrower context of contractual choice of law. This Part
will serve as an essential foundation for the remaining Parts. Part 2 will
then trace the development of contractual choice of law from the older
regime of no permissible choice to the current rules permitting a limited
choice of "related" law and the justifications for the movement from one
to the other. Then Part 3 will sample some of the problems courts have
confronted under current law and the limits courts and legislatures have
imposed on parties' choices, even when their choices have been limited to
"related" law. Parts 2 and 3 form a historical background for understand-
ing the core of the Article which begins in Part 4. That Part looks at the
proposals and their expected operation in detail and considers the argu-
ments mustered to support them. Finally, Part 5 will consider, in light of
these developments, the implications for legislative and judicial lawmak-
ing of the change from the current rules to the proposed rules.
II. PART 1: CONFLICTS RULES AND CONTRACTUAL
CHOICE OF LAW
Choice of law by contract is an area governed by conflict of laws princi-
ples.13 This is a subject that many find to be impenetrable and the discus-
sion here will penetrate it only insofar as is necessary to understand the
proposals. Conflict of laws principles tell the court hearing a case-re-
ferred to here as the "forum court" or "adjudicating court"-what sub-
stantive law it ought to apply in deciding the merits of the case. These
rules can be seen as "pointers" which direct the forum court to the sub-
stantive law that the court ought to apply in the litigation before it. Con-
flict of laws principles are made necessary by the existence of multiple
legal regimes and by the fact that, on occasion, the forum court will be
faced with a dispute involving a matter where it recognizes that a differ-
ent jurisdiction's rules, for one reason or another, ought to control the
outcome. In the absence of a substantive law that is uniform across dif-
13. There is no intent here to explicate conflict of laws principles generally. The pur-
pose here is to describe the legal regime governing choice of law by contract so the reader
can understand the issues that will face policy makers if a change in the pre-existing legal
regime comes before them.
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ferent jurisdictions, a uniform conflict of laws rule can reduce forum
shopping because the pointers in all courts will (theoretically) point to the
same substantive law to govern a given dispute. This explains why an
early project in the development of the European Union was the creation
of a choice of law rule for use by all member States.1 4
Unfortunately, we do not have a uniform rule in the United States.
Rather, it is fundamental that, at the state level, 15 conflict of laws rules
are matters of state law.16 As is the case with other matters of state law,
states can-and do-differ in various ways in their conflict of laws rules.
For purposes here, it is essential to recognize that each forum court, in
effect, has its own pointer, that is, it looks to its own conflict of laws rules
to point to the substantive law that will apply to a controversy before it.
Thus, in a controversy between citizens of New York and California, the
physical location of the litigation-California, New York or elsewhere-will
define the relevant pointer and how it works in deciding which substan-
tive law that should be applied to the dispute.
In a close case where the available fora differ on their conflict of laws
rules, forum selection can become critically important and a matter of
potential tactical advantage. Suppose, for example, the substantive law of
states X and Y differ in a controlling way for purposes of a given contro-
versy. In the best of worlds, the pointers in New York and California
should point to state X. But in our federal system, those pointers would
be irrelevant if the plaintiff could bring suit and sustain the court's juris-
diction in a different state with a pointer that directed the court to the law
of state Y. State conflict of laws principles even apply in Federal Court
diversity cases. 17 Conflict of laws rules exhibit what we can awkwardly
call "forum-centricity," that is, the content of the rules is critically depen-
dent on the forum in which litigation takes place.
A. IMPLICATIONS OF FORUM-CENTRICITY I: "RELATED" VERSUS
"UNRELATED" LAW
Forum-centricity has several implications for contractual choice of law
that can make their way into the decisions. First, the power of the parties
to agree to a particular jurisdiction's law can vary with the choice of law
14. See European Communities Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations, opened for signatures June 19, 1980, art. 7, 1980 O.J. (L.266) 1 [hereinafter
Rome Convention].
15. Conflicts between Federal and State law are a different matter entirely, involving,
among other things, the Constitution's Supremacy Clause and the interrelationship be-
tween Federal and State law under the Erie doctrine. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938).
16. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941). This histori-
cal fact is not, however, uncontroversial. Professor Douglas Laycock has argued that con-
flict of laws rules ought to be federal law so as to avoid constitutional problems endemic to
the current regime. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States:
The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992).
17. See, e.g., Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496; Wright-Moore Corp. v. Ricoh Corp., 908 F.2d
128 (7th Cir. 1990).
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rules to which the court looks. In theory, at least, one state could permit
no contractual choice of law while the state next door could permit un-
limited choice. This potential for radical state diversity has, to date, been
somewhat difficult to see because states generally do not subscribe to ei-
ther extreme.
Rather, states have generally limited the parties' choices of law to juris-
dictions which have some relationship either to the parties or to their
transaction.' 8 As suggested above, to the extent that states have similar
conflict of laws rules, forum shopping is a relatively small problem. 19 The
diversity in state conflict of laws rules has, however, changed dramatically
with the recent effort to introduce UCITA into state legislatures and its
enactment (in modified form) by two states. 20
UCITA has a very permissive choice of law provision, one that differs
substantially and fundamentally from the contractual choice of law rules
generally applicable throughout the rest of the United States. UCITA's
provision, quoted in the margin,2' empowers parties to any contract
within its scope to select any State's or country's law to govern their com-
puter information contract even if they or their contract has no contact or
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1971) (amended 1989)
provides in part:
The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights
and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties
could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed
to that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice,
or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fun-
damental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the
chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which, under
the rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of
an effective choice of law by the parties.
Similarly, U.C.C. § 1-105 provides, in part:
§ 1-105. Territorial Application of the Act; Parties' Power to Choose Appli-
cable Law.
(1) Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears a
reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation the par-
ties may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or nation
shall govern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement this Act applies
to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state.
U.C.C. § 1-105 (1995).
19. The potential for forum shopping is, nonetheless, recognized by conflict of laws
experts as a problem. See, e.g., Russell J. Weintraub, Comments on Roundtable Discussion
of Choice of Law, 48 MERCER L. REV. 871, 881 (1997) ("Any method of choice of law,
unless uniformly applied by all possible forums, will lead to forum shopping").
20. See supra note 10.
21. U.C.I.T.A. § 109 (2000), provides in part:
(a) The parties in their agreement may choose the applicable law. However,
the choice is not enforceable in a consumer contract to the extent it would
vary a rule that may not be varied by agreement under the law of the juris-
diction whose law would apply under subsections (b) and (c) in the absence
of the agreement.
(b) In the absence of an enforceable agreement on choice of law, the follow-
ing rules determine which jurisdiction's law governs in all respects for pur-
poses of contract law:
[Vol. 54
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relationship with the law they chose. 22 The enactment of UCITA thus
creates a sharp difference in conflict of laws rules between UCITA-enact-
ing states and non-enacting states, a difference of a magnitude that may
not have previously existed in the United States. [1766] UCITA's pointer
directs the court solely to the parties' contractual choice. The prevalent
law elsewhere may begin with the parties' choice, but the court will en-
force that choice only if it has some relationship with the parties or their
transaction.
A state enacting UCITA has embraced a conflict of laws rule that, like
other conflict of laws rules, operates in its own state courts. This is thus
not like ordinary legislation in the sense that the rule applies to the state's
citizens, residents, taxpayers, or even those who do business in the enact-
ing state. Rather, by creating a statutory choice of law rule, an enacting
legislature is enacting a rule for anyone in the world who happens to ap-
pear before its courts.23 Even if no other lawmaking jurisdiction saw the
wisdom of the UCITA choice of law rule, it would apply to such "foreign"
citizens in all cases litigated in the UCITA-enacting state.24 Obviously
the sharp difference between this rule and the rule in other jurisdictions
creates new forum shopping opportunities. The potential extraterritorial
effect of state conflict of laws rules also raises serious problems of feder-
alism developed later in this Article.
(1) An access contract or a contract providing for electronic delivery of a
copy is governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the licensor was
located when the agreement was entered into.
(2) A consumer contract that requires delivery of a copy on a tangible
medium is governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the copy is or
should have been delivered to the consumer.
(3) In all other cases, the contract is governed by the law of the jurisdic-
tion having the most significant relationship to the transaction.
(c) In cases governed by subsection (b), if the jurisdiction whose law governs
is outside the United States, the law of that jurisdiction governs only if it
provides substantially similar protections and rights to a party not located in
that jurisdiction as are provided under this [Act]. Otherwise, the law of the
State that has the most significant relationship to the transaction governs.
22. Official Comments to UCITA § 109 make this clear:
Subsection (a) does not follow UCC § 1-105 (1998 Official Text) which en-
forces contract choices only if the selected State's law has a "reasonable rela-
tionship" to the transaction. In a global information economy, limitations of
that type are inappropriate, especially in cyberspace transactions where phys-
ical locations are often irrelevant or not knowable. Also, in global com-
merce, parties may appropriately wish to select a neutral forum because
neither is familiar with the law of the other's jurisdiction. In such a case, the
chosen State's law may have no relationship at all to the transaction.
U.C.I.T.A. § 109 cmt. 2a (2000).
23. Under the same principle, the enacting state's own citizens are governed by the
choice of law rules in the courts of their own state or of other states in which they choose
to litigate.
24. UCITA also has a very liberal choice of forum provision. Section 110 provides in
part: "[tihe parties in their agreement may choose an exclusive judicial forum unless the
choice is unreasonable and unjust ... " U.C.I.T.A. § 110 (2000). This seems designed and
guaranteed to bring the parties into an enacting state where, under UCITA's choice of law




B. IMPLICATIONS OF FORUM-CENTRICITY II: MANDATORY RULES AND
FUNDAMENTAL POLICY
An important feature of forum-centricity is the fact that nearly all con-
tractual choice of law rules limit the effect they will give to the contrac-
tual choice made by the parties, even when their contract is "related" to
the chosen law. Most choice of law rules provide, in one way or another,
that some provisions of the law that ordinarily would be applicable will
continue to apply despite the parties' choice of the law of a different juris-
diction. Most obviously, parties to a contract ought not to be able to
contract out of normally-applicable criminal law provisions or, more gen-
erally, out of otherwise applicable laws (like environmental regulations)
that protect non-parties to the contract. 25
Laws that parties cannot ordinarily contract around are referred to as
"mandatory rules" in international parlance 26 and a broad version of that
term will be used here.27 They are to be distinguished from "default
rules," that is, rules that govern the parties contract unless they make
25. A curious exception is a recently-enacted conflict of laws statute in Texas which
reads, in pertinent part:
Except as [otherwise] provided [], if the parties to a [] transaction [with an
aggregate value in excess of $1,000,000] agree in writing that the law of a
particular jurisdiction governs an issue relating to the transaction, including
the validity or enforceability of an agreement relating to the transaction or a
provision of the agreement, and the transaction bears a reasonable relation
to that jurisdiction, the law, other than conflict of laws rules, of that jurisdic-
tion governs the issue regardless of whether the application of that law is
contrary to a fundamental or public policy of this state or of any other
jurisdiction.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51(b) (West Supp. 2000). The Texas statute would
appear to permit the parties to a covered transaction to choose one "related" state's law in
order to avoid criminal or environmental limits on their conduct imposed by another "re-
lated" jurisdiction. Whether courts in Texas would enforce such a choice is unknown; if the
party resisted enforcement managed to get the litigation started in a state other than Texas,
the provision (being a choice of law statute) would not apply.
26. Article 7 of the 1980 Rome Convention, for example, provides:
Mandatory rules
1. When applying under this Convention the law of a country, effect may be
given to the mandatory rules of the law of another country with which the
situation has a close connection, if and in so far as, under the law of the latter
country, those rules must be applied whatever the law applicable to the con-
tract. In considering whether to give effect to these mandatory rules, regard
shall be had to their nature and purpose and to the consequences of their
application or non-application.
2. Nothing in this Convention shall restrict the application of the rules of the
law of the forum in a situation where they are mandatory irrespective of the
law otherwise applicable to the contract.
Rome Convention, supra note 14, art. 7.
27. Apparently, there has emerged no real convention in how to make reference to
rules that cannot be avoided by contract (referred to here as "mandatory rules") and the
subset of those rules that survive a valid choice of a different jurisdiction's law (called here
"fundamental policy" rules). Compare SCOLES ET AL., supra note 5, §§ 18.3-18.4 with
Trevor C. Hartley, Mandatory Rules in International Centrals: The Common Law Ap-
proach, RECUEIL DES COURS, COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 345-49 (1997). The mandatory rules nomenclature in the text roughly
follows Hartley; the use of "fundamental policy" comes from the proposals which use this
idea.
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different arrangements in their contract. "Mandatory rules," as the term
will be used broadly here, include everything from rules appearing in a
state's criminal code and environmental regulations, through direct limits
on commercial activity such as usury laws,28 to regulatory provisions of a
state's contract law such as the Statute of Frauds,29 limitations on liqui-
dated damages,30 and restrictions on unconscionable contracts. 31 As used
here, mandatory rules are those rules that parties cannot avoid by a sim-
ple provision in their contract. For example, if the state's usury law pro-
hibits loans in excess of 25% interest, the parties cannot agree in their
loan contract to "waive" that rule and set the interest rate at 30%.
Surprisingly, perhaps, many mandatory rules are avoidable by choosing
a different state's law, but the power of parties to avoid this wide range of
"mandatory rules" through the vehicle of a contractual choice of law is
somewhat limited nearly everywhere. 32 In the United States the limita-
tion manifests itself in the rule, found in the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws, that parties to a contract cannot contract around the
subset of otherwise applicable mandatory rules that constitute "funda-
mental policy."'33 As will be developed in more detail in Part 3, many
28. See infra Part IV.B.2.
29. E.g., U.C.C. § 2-201 (2000).
30. E.g., U.C.C. § 2-719 (2000).
31. E.g., U.C.C. § 2-203 (2000).
32. See, e.g., 2 DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1161-90 (Collins ed.
1987); JOHN P. KARALIS, INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE § 5.53
n.2 (1992) ("Other nations similarly respect the express or implied contractual choice of
parties, unless application of the chosen law would violate certain other laws or regulations
of the state"). Texas is an apparent exception. See supra note 25.
33. The sources use both "fundamental policy" and "fundamental public policy" to
refer to this subset of mandatory rules and the former may be slightly broader than the
latter. For purposes here, it makes little difference; and for consistency sake, I will refer to
the idea as "fundamental policy." The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 187 cmt. g (1989) develops the fundamental policy idea extensively:
g. When application of chosen law would be contrary to fundamental public
policy of the state of otherwise applicable law.
Fulfillment of the parties' expectations is not the only value in contract law;
regard must also be had for state interests and for state regulation. The cho-
sen law should not be applied without regard for the interests of the state
which would be the state of the applicable law with respect to the particular
issue involved in the absence of an effective choice [of law] by the parties.
The forum will not refrain from applying the chosen law merely because this
would lead to a different result than would be obtained under the local law of
the state of the otherwise applicable law. Application of the chosen law will
be refused only (1) to protect a fundamental public policy of the state which,
under the rule of §188, would be the state of otherwise applicable law, pro-
vided (2) that this state has a materially greater interest than the state of the
chosen law in the determination of the particular issue. The forum will apply
its own legal principles in determining whether a given policy is a fundamen-
tal one within the meaning of the present rule and whether the other state
has a materially greater interest than the state of the chosen law in the deter-
mination of the particular issue. The parties' power to choose the applicable
law is subject to least restriction in situations where the significant contacts
are so widely dispersed that the determination of the state of applicable law
without regard to the parties' choice would present real difficulties.
No detailed statement can be made of the situations where a "fundamen-
tal" policy of the state of the otherwise applicable law will be found to exist.
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courts use the tests provided in the Restatement when considering
whether the particular mandatory rules of a non-selected state should
override the law chosen by the parties.
Like all other issues of choice of law, the articulation and breadth of
the public policy exception is a matter for the forum's conflict of laws
principles, and therefore, of course, the degree to which a given jurisdic-
tion will recognize another jurisdiction's "fundamental policy" can vary
from state to state. No doubt, different judicial attitudes toward the ap-
propriate breadth of the "fundamental policy" exception are reflected in
states' decisions, and such diversity complicates an already difficult prob-
lem of predictability. 34 It is, however, of some comfort that many courts
begin with the Restatement provision and, at least in that sense, are be-
ginning with the same basic set of conflict of laws rules.
An important consideration is the extent to which the significant contacts are
grouped in this state. For the forum will be more inclined to defer to the
policy of a state which is closely related to the contract and the parties than
to the policy of a state where few contacts are grouped but which, because of
the wide dispersion of contacts among the several states, would be the state
of the applicable law if effect were to be denied the choice of law provision.
Another important consideration is the extent to which the contacts are
grouped in the state of the chosen law. The more closely this state is related
to the contract and to the parties, the more likely it is that the choice-of-law
provision will be given effect. The more closely the state of the chosen law is
related to the contract and the parties, the more fundamental must be the
policy of the state of the otherwise applicable law to justify denying effect to
the choice of law provision. To be "fundamental," a policy must in any event
be a substantial one. Except perhaps in the case of contracts relating to wills,
a policy of this sort will rarely be found in a requirement, such as the statute
of frauds, that relates to formalities. Nor is such policy likely to be repre-
sented by a rule tending to become obsolete, such as a rule concerned with
the capacity of married women, or by general rules of contract law, such as
those concerned with the need for consideration. On the other hand, a fun-
damental policy may be embodied in a statute which makes one or more
kinds of contracts illegal or which is designed to protect a person against the
oppressive use of superior bargaining power. Statutes involving the right of
an individual insured as against an insurance company are an example of this
sort. To be "fundamental" within the meaning of the present rule, a policy
need not be as strong as would be required to justify the forum in refusing to
entertain suit upon a foreign cause of action under rule of § 90.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. g (1989). This comment has
been used, both implicitly and explicitly, in resolving cases involving fundamental policy.
See Warren Bros. Co. v. Cardi Corp., 471 F.2d 1304 (1st Cir. 1973) (stating that Massachu-
setts' courts would invalidate an arbitration clause which chose law that contradicted fun-
damental policy); MGM Grand Hotel, Inc. v. Imperial Glass Co., 65 F.R.D. 624, 630-33 (D.
Nev. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1976) (applying Nevada conflicts
law, the court held that the Nevada statute protecting the public from unlicensed contrac-
tors was an expression of fundamental policy invalidating the choice of another state's
law); Solman Distrib. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 888 F.2d 170, 172 (1st Cir. 1989) (declining
to apply the law of California as chosen by the parties because Maine's public policy would
be affected); National Glass, Inc. v. J. C. Penney Prop., Inc., 336 Md. 606 (1994) (invalidat-
ing choice of Pennsylvania law because there was a strong public policy in Maryland
against allowing parties to waive mechanics liens).
34. See Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 322 (1990)
(having all of the states apply the author's canons of conflicts law, instead of different
approaches in different states, would decrease forum shopping and increase predictability);
Weintraub, supra note 19; SCOLES ET AL., supra note 5, § 18.4 at 864-65.
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The already-hard problem of predictability will get much harder as
state legislatures increasingly articulate statutory choice of law provisions
for various kinds of cases. 35 For unless state legislatures speak in unison,
diversity in choice of law rules-and therefore forum shopping-will be
the result. We currently find legislative pronouncements on contractual
choice of law in several of the recently-amended Articles of the Uniform
Commercial Code that deal with a narrow range of specialized, sophisti-
cated business transactions. 36 UCITA is quite different in that respect.
In contrast with the relatively restricted scope of the current UCC provi-
sions, UCITA states a rule, unlimited in the black letter, for a vast num-
ber of very diverse contracts that are within its scope. Given its
controversial nature,37 it seems unlikely that UCITA will be enacted by
all States. However, enactment by some-but not all-States will vastly
increase the number of situations in which the choice of law rule-and
therefore the choice of the forum-may be critical.
UCITA's black letter provision on contractual choice of law provides
only this explicit exception to the mechanical enforcement of the parties'
choice of any law to govern their contract: "[T]he choice is not enforcea-
ble in a consumer transaction to the extent it would vary a rule that may
not be varied by agreement under the law of the jurisdiction whose law
would apply under subsections (b) and (c) in the absence of the agree-
35. Until comparatively recently, conflict of laws principles were generally articulated
by courts, not by legislatures.
36. See U.C.C. §§ 4A-507, 5-116, 8-110 (2000).
37. The statute began as Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code but, because of
the controversial nature of its provisions, the UCC's co-sponsor, the American Law Insti-
tute withdrew from participation. See 1999 A.L.I. Proc. 405. UCITA has continued to
engender a firestorm of controversy. See, e.g., David P. Neboyskey, A Leap Forward: Why
States Should Ratify the Uniform Computer Information and Transactions Act, 52 FED.
COMM. L.J. 793 (May 2000); Cem Kaner, Why You Should Oppose UCITA, 17 No. 5 COM-
PUTER LAW 20 (May 2000). See generally Pratik A. Shah, The Uniform Computer Informa-
tion and Transactions Act, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 85 (Winter 2000); Pamela Samuelson
& Kurt Opsahl, How Tensions Between Intellectual Property Policy and UCITA are Likely
to be Resolved, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES 753 (1999).
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ment. ' '38 Elsewhere, as a substantive matter,39 the UCITA authorizes a
court to enforce fundamental policy generally without indicating which
state's fundamental policy is to be enforced.40
Other recent statutes governing contractual choice of law do not articu-
late a fundamental policy exception as such.41 Courts have not begun to
wrestle with the "fundamental policy" question in cases arising under
these recent legislative pronouncements and one can only speculate
whether they will use a traditional analysis (which, as developed in Part 3,
depends heavily on the connections the chosen and non-chosen law have
38. The provision thus requires the forum court to defer to the otherwise mandatory
rules in consumer contracts; it is silent with respect to the issue in other contracts. How-
ever, the Official Comment to UCITA § 109 states:
b. Limitations. Agreed choices of law [terms] are subject to [this Act's gen-
eral] limitations such as in the doctrine of unconscionability. . . . Section
105(b); Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., 61 Cal. App. 4th 881,
72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). Compare Lowry Computer Prod.,
Inc. v. Head, 984 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Mich. 1997). Subsection (a) further
provides that, in a consumer contract, the agreed choice of law cannot over-
ride an otherwise applicable rule that could not be altered by agreement
under the law of the state whose law would apply in the absence of the con-
tractual choice. The policy of freedom of contract should not permit overrid-
ing the consumer rule if a state, having addressed the cost and benefits
determines that the consumer rule is not variable by contract.
U.C.I.T.A. § 109 cmt. 2b (2000). The Official Comments do not otherwise elaborate the
extent to which the forum state should respect the policy-fundamental or otherwise-of
the state which would otherwise have an interest in the contract and related matters.
39. It is possible, although perhaps unlikely, that the forum will use UCITA's permis-
sive choice of law rule, but that the parties' contract will have selected the law of a jurisdic-
tion that did not enact UCITA (and therefore, did not enact UCITA section 105's general
public policy exception). While this possibility could supply lawyers with a statutory issue
to litigate ("is there a fundamental policy exception at all"), it is likely that all courts will
deny enforcement of contract terms that violate fundamental policy whether or not a stat-
ute gives them explicit authorization.
40. U.C.I.T.A. § 105(b) provides:
If a term of a contract violates a fundamental public policy, the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, enforce the remainder of the contract without
the impermissible term, or limit the application of the impermissible term so
as to avoid a result contrary to public policy, in each case to the extent that
the interest in enforcement is clearly outweighed by a public policy against
enforcement of the term.
U.C.I.T.A. § 105(b) (2000).
41. The Delaware and New York Statutes allow for exceptions listed in UCC § 1-
105(2) but do not explicitly recognize a fundamental policy exception. 6 DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 2708 (c)(ii) (2000); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401(1)(c) (McKinney 2000); see
also U.C.C. §§ 4A-507, 5-116, 8-110 (2000). None of these provisions contains a "funda-
mental policy" provision in the black letter. UCC § 4A-507 may reject the exception. In
discussing parties' choice of the law that should govern a funds transfers, comment 3 states,
Subsection (b) deals with choice-of-law agreements and it gives maximum freedom of
choice .... This broad endorsement of freedom of contract is an enhancement of the
approach taken by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(b) (1971). The
Restatement recognizes the basic right of freedom of contract, but the freedom granted the
parties may be more limited than the freedom granted here. Under the formulation of the
Restatement, if there is no substantial relationship to the jurisdiction whose law is selected
and there is no "other" reasonable basis for the parties' choice, then the selection of the
parties need not be honored by a court. Further, if the choice is violative of a fundamental
policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state, the selection
could be disregarded by a court. Those limitations are not found in subsection (b). See
U.C.C. § 4A-507 cmt. 3 (2000).
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with the controversy) or will embark on an entirely new analysis of the
problems. It seems clear that, at some point, most courts will embrace
the otherwise applicable law of an unchosen state as "fundamental pol-
icy" and apply it notwithstanding the parties' choice of different law. 42
Whether they will narrow or broaden the exception under the proposed
legislation will be considered in Part 4.
III. PART 2: DEVELOPMENT OF PARTIES' POWER TO
CHOOSE LAW BY CONTRACT
The idea that parties may choose the law that will govern their rights
and obligations is often captured under the broad heading of party auton-
omy.43 The idea of party autonomy in contractual choice of law is not a
modern development. 44 However, a dominant theme in the history of
choice of law-and a counterpoint to party autonomy-is one of state
sovereignty and territoriality. While party autonomy to choose the appli-
cable law for one's contract has gained wide acceptance in the United
States, this development has implicitly been balanced against state sover-
eignty and the power of lawmakers to make binding rules.45
The historical development was evolutionary.46 The French scholar
Dumoulin first articulated the idea that parties' intentions should govern
the validity of their contract in the 16th century.47 The first recognition
of party autonomy in a common law country occurred in the case of
Robinson v. Bland.48 There, Lord Mansfield stated that there could be an
exception to the traditional lex loci rule when the parties at the time of
making the contract had a view to a different kingdom.49 Joseph Story
brought the idea of party autonomy to America in his influential trea-
tise. 50 Story largely followed the ideas of Ulrich Huber, a Dutch com-
mentator from the early 18th century.51 While the American conflict of
42. One can, for example, scarcely imagine a court in a chosen state enforcing a baby-
selling contract where vendor, customer, and baby are in a jurisdiction that makes such
contracts illegal. Perhaps, instead of wrestling with "fundamental policy," a court would
simply opine that the contract was not subject to the UCC and, therefore, the parties could
not select the law of an "unrelated" state to govern their contract.
43. See, e.g., SCOLES ET AL., supra note 5, at 856-77.
44. One commentator has suggested that the concept of parties choosing the law that
would apply to those agreements may have been accepted in Greece as early as 120 B.C.
Fredrich K. Juenger, A Page of History, 35 MERCER L. REV. 419, 421 (1981).
45. See generally Kathleen Patchel, Choice of Law and Software Licenses: A Frame-
work for Discussion, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 117 (2000).
46. This brief history is based on the treatments given the subject in Patrick J.
Borchers, The Internationalization of Contractual Conflicts Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 421 (1995); Edith Friedler, Party Autonomy Revisited: A Statutory Solution to a Choice-
of-Law Problem, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 471, 475 (1989); and Friedrich K. Juenger, A Page of
History, 35 MERCER L. REV. 419 (1981).
47. See Edith Friedler, Party Autonomy Revisited: A Statutory Solution to a Choice-of-
Law Problem, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 471, 475 (1989).
48. 96 Eng. Rep. 129 (K.B. 1755), 97 Eng. Rep. 717 (K.B. 1760).
49. See Robinson, 96 Eng. Rep. 129 (K.B. 1755) (citing Huber).
50. See Juenger, supra note 44, at 443-44.
51. See id. at 444.
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laws tradition has grown out of the work of the Dutch scholars (largely
via Story), the modern European doctrine has been dominated by the
work of Savigny.52 Although some recent scholarship has focused on the
convergence of European and American conflicts doctrine in the latter
half of the twentieth century,53 during the early 1900s, United States
scholarship was extremely divergent from that of Europe in the area of
party autonomy.
In 1934, the first Restatement of Conflicts of Laws ("First Restate-
ment") rejected the idea of party autonomy.54 In fact, there is no men-
tion of party intention in the entire First Restatement. 55 The courts of
the day were in fact more liberal in their support for party autonomy, and
the Chief Reporter, Joseph Beale has been severely criticized for not in-
corporating the ability of parties to choose the law that would govern
their transaction into the First Restatement.5 6 Despite the First Restate-
ment's failure to recognize contractual choice of law, courts enforced
choice of law clauses.57
The current Restatement and UCC embrace party autonomy by giving
contracting parties the limited ability to choose the law that will govern
their contract. The driving force behind this explicit acceptance in the
mid-20th century seems to be the increase in predictability of result that
these provisions will create. 58 In both formulations, however, the parties'
ability to choose is limited by the requirement that the chosen law relate
to the transaction and, at least in the Restatement provision, that their
chosen law does not contravene the fundamental public policy of the
state whose law would otherwise apply.
The UCITA and UCC Article 1 proposals dramatically expand party
autonomy by deleting the requirement that the chosen law bear some
relation to the agreement. The idea entered the UCC in 198959 and is
now present in other parts of the UCC in Articles that have a very nar-
row scope. Article 4A, governing funds transfers, permits banks to
choose the law that governs a transfer "whether or not the payment order
or the funds transfer bears a reasonable relation to that jurisdiction. 60
52. See Friedler, supra note 47, at 476-77.
53. See Mathias Reimann, Savigny's Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts Cases at the
Close of the Twentieth Century, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 571, 574-79 (1999); Patrick J. Borchers,
The Internationalization of Contractual Conflicts Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 421
(1995).
54. In contrast, party autonomy had been accepted in France since 1864. See Friedler,
supra note 46, at 476.
55. See Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245, 269 (1993).
56. Professor Juenger stated that Beale adopted a "narrower perspective from which
American conflicts law has suffered ever since." Juenger, supra note 44, at 445.
57. See Reimann, supra note 53, at 575.
58. Comment a to the Restatement states that contractual choice of law is the best
method of protecting parties' expectations. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFI'CTS OF
LAWS §187 cmt. a (1971). See also SCOLES ET AL., supra note 5, at 857.
59. U.C.C. Article 4A, with its section 4A-507, was promulgated in 1989.
60. The full provision reads:
If the parties described in each paragraph of subsection (a) have made an
agreement selecting the law of a particular jurisdiction to govern rights and
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Comparable latitude is given to the parties' ability to choose the law that
will govern the transaction in the sophisticated areas of investment secur-
ities61 and letters of credit.62 Similarly, four commercial states have man-
dated that their courts uphold contractual choice of "unrelated" law in
large contracts. 63
Seen against this backdrop, UCITA and proposed UCC section 1-301
are simply the most recent efforts to "disconnect" the parties' choice of
law from a jurisdiction that has some relationship with either the parties
or their transaction. But, in fact, these proposals do not represent "incre-
mental" change. Rather, owing to the broad scope of both the UCC and
UCITA, these provisions will bring to most commercial transactions the
vastly expanded choice of law rule that has heretofore been limited to
narrow specialists usually dealing in very large transactions. Thus, while
technically these proposals are not unprecedented, they represent a strik-
ing expansion of party autonomy. And, because party autonomy is bal-
anced against legislative lawmaking power, the provisions represent a
substantial shift in the balance between party autonomy and legislative
power to enact mandatory rules. As will be discussed in Part 4, the justi-
fications traditionally given for these changes are open to question.64
The movement to give contracting parties more authority over States'
legislative power is somewhat at odds with the work of the traditional
party autonomy theorists. State sovereignty has always been at least an
obligations between each other, the law of that jurisdiction governs those
rights and obligations, whether or not the payment order or the funds trans-
fer bears a reasonable relation to that jurisdiction.
U.C.C. § 4A-507(b) (2000) (promulgated in 1989).
61. The area of investment securities is governed by Article 8, which provides in rele-
vant part:
"Issuer's jurisdiction" means the jurisdiction under which the issuer of the
security is organized or, if permitted by the law of that jurisdiction, the law of
another jurisdiction specified by the issuer. An issuer organized under the
law of this State may specify the law of another jurisdiction as the law gov-
erning the matters specified in subsection (a)(2) through (5).
U.C.C. § 8-110(d) (2000) (promulgated in 1994).
62. See U.C.C. § 5-116(a) (2000) (promulgated in 1995) ("The jurisdiction whose law is
chosen need not bear any relation to the transaction.").
63. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5 (West Supp. 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2708
(1999); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (McKinney 2000); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 35.51(c) (Vernon Supp. 2000) (California, Delaware, and New York allow parties to se-
lect their own law whether or not related; Texas permits parties to select any law).
64. The international agreements that have adopted superficially similar provisions are
more limited, involve sovereign nations, and operate in ways that are fundamentally differ-
ent from the way they would operate in the United States. Others have raised concerns
over looking to international agreements for guidance. Professor Larry Kramer cautioned
against relying on the Rome Convention stating that this agreement was "drafted by and
for participants in the European legal systems-systems that differ from ours in terms of
legal education, the nature of practice, the role of lawyers and judges, and the traditions of
the profession." Borchers, supra note 45, at 435-36 (quoting Letter from Larry Kramer,
Professor of Law, to Harry Sigman 460 (Aug. 4, 1994)). The inappropriateness of using
international conflict of laws norms in the United States is developed infra beginning at
note 230.
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equally influential force in the debate over choice of law.65 "The Dutch
jurists took the idea of territorial sovereignty as the starting point of their
reasoning."'66 Huber espoused the important limitation that "a sovereign
may refuse to recognize 'rights acquired' abroad if they would prejudice
the forum's 'power or rights." 67 This is recognition that the parties' abil-
ity to choose law was subordinate to the power of the state and its public
policy when that court was called upon to enforce that choice. Savigny's
most important contribution to choice of law was his idea that all con-
tracts had a seat, which should govern in absence of party choice. This
seat was determined by the linkage of parties to a territory through cer-
tain contacts.68 Given these underlying ideas, the historical context
seems to limit party autonomy to choices from among jurisdictions that
have contacts with the parties or transaction, but not more.
The power of the parties to choose "unrelated" law was implicitly em-
braced by the Supreme Court in 1972 in MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co.69 In that case, Houston-based Zapata made a contract with a Ger-
man corporation for the latter to tow Zapata's drilling rig from Louisiana
to a point off the coast of Italy. The contract provided "for the litigation
of any dispute in the High Court of Justice in London."'70 Despite the
clause, Zapata sued in Florida for damage that occurred to its rig in wa-
ters near Florida. Reversing the Circuit and District Courts and remand-
ing for further proceedings, the Supreme Court held that the clause was
presumptively enforceable unless it effectively denied Zapata "a mean-
ingful day in court."'71
While the case was technically a choice of forum case, the Court recog-
nized that, under English law, such a choice would be construed also to
be a choice of English law,72 and there was evidence that this was the
actual intent of the parties.73 In supporting the choice of an unrelated
forum (and, implicitly, the choice of unrelated English law), the Court
noted:
It cannot be doubted for a moment that the parties sought to provide
for a neutral forum for the resolution of any disputes arising during
the tow. Manifestly much uncertainty and possibly great inconve-
65. The history of the scholarship concerning State sovereignty in conflicts of law is
too long to be recanted in this article. I will only discuss those parts of the theory, which
have traditionally interacted with and provided the limitations on party autonomy. For a
general description, see generally Juenger, supra note 44.
66. Id. at 434
67. Id. at 435 (citing U. HUBRIS, PRAELECTIONES JURIS RoMANI ET HOIDIERNI lib. 1,
tit. 3 (app.) (2d ed. 1707), reprinted with an English translation in E. LORENZEN, SELECTED
ARTICLES ON CONFLICTS OF LAWS 162-80 (1947)).
68. He considered these contracts like a string that tied the party or legal relationship
to a given jurisdiction. 4 FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUrIGEN ROMI-
SCHEN RECHTS iv, 108 (1849).
69. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
70. Id. at 1.
71. Id. at 19.
72. See id. at 14 n.15.
73. See id. at 13-14.
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nience to both parties could arise if a suit could be maintained in any
jurisdiction in which an accident might occur or if jurisdiction were
left to any place where the Bremen or Unterweser might happen to
be found. The elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing in
advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable
element in international trade, commerce, and contracting.74
The justification, often repeated, is that when parties distrust one
anothers' legal systems, an acceptable solution that permits business to be
done is to allow them to choose the law of a third "neutral" jurisdiction.
The Rome Convention, the first international treaty to give parties the
power to choose unrelated law, built on that idea and it may make a great
deal of sense for international business cases. As will be developed be-
low, because of the fundamentally different contexts, international cases
and treaties may have little precedential value in considering an exten-
sion of party autonomy to choice of law rules that operate within the
United States. No American court to date has upheld the contractual
choice of unrelated state law when the effect of the choice would be to
override a mandatory rule of an unchosen state.75
IV. PART 3: CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW IN THE
COURTS: ILLUSTRATIVE AREAS
Under the rules of the Restatement, two issues arise in connection with
the enforcement of contractual choice of law clauses: 1) whether the cho-
sen jurisdiction has the requisite "relatedness" for the forum court to en-
force the choice the parties made, and 2) whether notwithstanding the
choice, the law of an unchosen jurisdiction ought to control an issue
before the court as "fundamental policy." Perhaps owing to the conflict
of laws rules that have been in place to date, the issues are related in the
cases and, as will be discussed in Part 4, this connection makes it difficult
to predict how courts will analyze "fundamental policy" if the chosen
state has no connection with the transaction.
A. CHOICES OF "UNRELATED" LAW
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 187(2), quoted above,
provides that the parties' choice is not to be enforced if: "(a) the chosen
state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and
there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice .... "76
Similarly, Uniform Commercial Code section 1-105, quoted above as
well, provides, in part: "(1) [W]hen a transaction bears a reasonable re-
lation to this state and also to another state or nation the parties may
agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or nation shall
74. Id.
75. See Richard K. Greenstein, Is the Proposed UCC Choice of Law Provision Uncon-
stitutional?, 73 TEMPLE L. REV. _ - (forthcoming 2001).




govern their rights and duties . . . . 77
Choice of law clauses are rarely invalidated. 78 Perhaps because the
parties do not often choose the law of an "unrelated" jurisdiction, there
are very few cases in which the parties' choice has been rejected for the
lack of a connection between the chosen law and the law that might oth-
erwise govern. 79
Outside the area of usury,80 most decisions that reject a contractual
choice of law are based on the fact that the chosen law contravenes the
public policy of the state with a materially greater interest in the parties
or their contract than the chosen state. As reported by Professor Symeon
Symeonides in his Annual Survey of conflict of laws cases, in 1996 only
six of the more than one hundred cases that discussed contractual choice
of law refused to enforce the choice of law provision and all of these
decisions were based on public policy considerations. 81 In 1999, he re-
ported only one case in the reports that did not enforce a choice of law
because it lacked a reasonable relation to the chosen state.82
There are three related reasons for the dearth of these cases. First,
under the current relatedness requirement, the enforceability of these
clauses is easily predictable. An attorney drafting a contract for a client
can easily know which states have a relationship to the contract. Second,
it is not surprising that several of the few existing cases involve mistakes
or events unforeseeable at the time the contract was drafted. One would
expect these mistakes and unforeseen circumstances to be very rare in
cases involving at least one party with contracting experience. Third, al-
though the courts have disagreed as to whether the selection of a com-
pany's state of incorporation is enough to make that state substantially
related to the contract, more recent cases have upheld the selection of the
business's home state.83 The selection of a corporation's home state is
77. See supra note 17, discussing U.C.C. § 1-105 (2000),.
78. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1996: Tenth
Annual Survey, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 447, 488 (1997).
79. Even in cases where courts have invalidated the choice because the jurisdiction is
not related to the transaction, they will alternatively state that the choice could be invali-
dated because of the public policy exception. See Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Youngblade, 878 F.
Supp. 1224, 1255 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (stating that in alternative to the chosen state not
having a substantial relation the application of its law would also contravene Iowa public
policy); First Nat'l Bank of Mitchell v. Daggett, 497 N.W.2d 358, 363 (Neb. 1993) (stating
that not only is there a lack of sufficient contact to the chosen state, but since Nebraska
real estate implicated, policy requires that Nebraska law govern). See generally Gen. Elec.
Co. v. Keyser, 275 S.E.2d 289, 293 (W. Va. 1981) (although choice of law provisions are
usually not enforced for public policy reasons, "courts also hedge their bets, where facts
permit, by adding language concerning the lack of a substantial relationship to the chosen
jurisdiction.")
80. Usury cases are discussed infra Part IV.B.2.
81. Symeonides, supra note 78, at 488.
82. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1999: One More
Year, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 143, 159 (2000). The case was Sentinel Industries Contracting
Corp. v. Kimmins Industries Service Corp., 743 So. 2d 954 (Miss. 1999).
83. Older cases suggest that if the business has offices in the same state as that in
which it sells, courts will consider that an intrastate transaction precluding any choice of
law by the parties. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 5, at 874 n.11.
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particularly appealing to a large company that is involved in many differ-
ent contracts in many different states. It permits the corporation to limit
the interpretation of its agreements to one body of law, will inevitably
reduce its legal costs, and under the current approach, it will assure the
enforcement of the choice of law clause in its contracts.
When courts invalidate parties' choice of law because the chosen state
is unrelated to the transaction, the reason can often be traced to the oc-
currence of unforeseen consequences or a mistake in the contracting pro-
cess. Such cases are not, as some argue, the product of uncertainty
begotten by the current relatedness requirement; 84 they are the product
of error. In First National Bank of Mitchell v. Daggett,85 for example, the
defendant, a resident of Nebraska, attempted to convey a trust in the
form of real property, also located in Nebraska, to his sons in an effort to
avoid debts he owed the bank. The bank alleged that this questionable
conveyance was void because the defendant failed to name the benefi-
ciaries. 86 The trust contained thirty-four separate provisions each choos-
ing the law that would govern that provision 87 and, in all, the trust
instrument named twenty-three different state jurisdictions and England
to govern the provisions of the trust.88 In one provision, the defendant
selected Georgia law to determine the identity of the beneficiaries. 89 The
defendant was extremely ill-informed. He admitted that he had never
read any of the state laws he selected in the list and the only reason he
included a choice of Georgia law was because he had been so instructed
in a trusts class. 90 The Supreme Court of Nebraska held that the choice
of Georgia law was unenforceable because the trust, the parties, and the
property had absolutely no contact with Georgia. 91 The fact that Ne-
braska real estate was implicated was central to the analysis. The court
went on to say that "[w]ere we to resort to the laws of unconnected,
outside jurisdictions to determine the ownership of Nebraska land, the
certainty of title, marketability, and transferability of land in this State
would be adversely impacted. '92
Cases like Daggett are freak cases which present an unlikely threat to
predictability and certainty. The defendant was obviously not exper-
ienced in writing trust agreements and would have realized with minimal
research that the choice of Georgia law dealing with a Nebraska trust
involving Nebraska real estate would be unenforceable. Defendant con-
ceivably might have won the point had the relatedness requirement not
84. See Erin A. O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of
Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming Fall 2000).
85. 497 N.W.2d 358 (Neb. 1993).
86. See id. at 360.
87. See id. at 362.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 362.





been in place 93 but his failure to satisfy a rule of which he was unaware
scarcely reveals a problem with the rule itself.
In other cases, the choice of law clause was drafted by more sophisti-
cated parties, but unforeseen events made the choice unrelated to the
chosen state.94 The fact that these events were unforeseen by either party
at the time the contract was drafted shows that unpredictability of the
contract's final outcome may have been inevitable. Since the problem
involves a change in circumstances after the contract is formed, unpre-
dictable results could result from the parties' contract under any rule. In
any event, if such problems imperil certainty, they can be solved by mak-
ing a choice of law, valid when made, valid despite later changes in cir-
cumstances. There are ample statutory analogs for constructing such a
rule.9
5
When incorporation in a given state is the only connection with the
contract, there is disagreement in the courts over whether that state is, on
that basis alone, reasonably related to the transaction. Early courts in
two usury cases invalidated such a selection because the chosen state was
not naturally related to the transaction.96 Some more recent decisions
have followed the approach of these cases. 97 For example, in Curtis 1000,
Inc. v. Suess98 an employer sued to enforce a covenant not to compete in
an employment contract. The employment agreement selected Delaware
law, the state of the company's incorporation, to govern the validity of
the covenant. 99 Although Judge Posner believed the application of Dela-
ware law would not contravene Illinois' public policy, he refused to en-
force the choice of law clause because there was an insufficient
connection between the contract and Delaware.100 The company was in-
corporated in Delaware, but it did no other business in the state10 1 and,
93. This is very questionable given the location of the real estate in Nebraska.
94. E.g., LaGuardia Ass'n v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 119
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (invalidating a choice of law in a twenty year franchise agreement select-
ing the law of Tennessee when the defendant had its headquarters in Tennessee when the
contract was signed, but later was bought out and the headquarters moved to Georgia);
Sentinel Indus. Contracting Corp. v. Kimmins Indus. Serv. Corp., 743 So. 2d 954 (Miss.
1999) (holding that a choice of law in a contract between a prime contractor and Exxon
was not related to the chosen State when the contract between the prime and a subcontrac-
tor wanted to incorporate the terms of the contract between the prime and Exxon).
95. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-507 (2000).
96. See, e.g., Brierley v. Commercial Credit Co., 43 F.2d 730, 731 (3d Cir. 1930) (hold-
ing that the stipulation of Delaware, the Defendant's state of incorporation is invalid be-
cause Delaware has no actual relation to the transaction); United Divers Supply Co. v.
Commercial Credit Co., 289 F. 316 (5th Cir. 1923) (rejecting the provision selecting the law
of Delaware when the only relation between the state and the transaction was the defen-
dant's incorporation there in order to avoid usury laws).
97. See Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Youngblade, 878 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (holding
in a no-compete covenant case that the company being incorporated in Delaware is not
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS OF LAW § 187
that the chosen state be substantially related to the transaction).
98. 24 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 1994).
99. See id. at 943.
100. See id. at 948.
101. See id.
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consequently, Delaware was said to have no interest in the case. 10 2
Other courts have held that a choice of company's state of incorpora-
tion is sufficiently related to permit the choice of that state's law. 10 3 This
split in current authority certainly undermines the certainty that the par-
ties' choice will be enforced since, once again, the applicable rule depends
on which forum gets the litigation. However, if certainty (as distin-
guished from seeking the most advantageous legal regime possible) is the
goal, the parties can easily select the state where the company is head-
quartered.10 4 In Suess, for example, Judge Posner said that "[i]f the
choice of law provision in the covenant not to compete had designated
Georgia law we assume the Illinois courts would defer to that designa-
tion, recognizing that Georgia has as much interest in regulating the out
of state operations of 'its' firm as Illinois does in protecting its citizen.
"105
There is a small scattering of cases in which courts have rejected the
parties' choice of New York law because they had no substantial relation-
ship with that state.10 6 The effect of such decisions rejecting New York
law as "unrelated" is to require those businesses to establish a presence in
New York in order to take advantage of whatever New York's law has to
offer.
Reasons for selecting "unrelated" New York law could vary. It could
be that most-but not all-of a business's customers were located in New
York. If courts took a broad view of the matter, such facts might well
102. See id.
103. See Schroeder v. Rynel, Ltd., 720 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Me 1998) (enforcing the choice
of law clause selecting Delaware when the corporation incorporated in Delaware six
months after the employment agreement was signed); Valley Juice Ltd., Inc. v. Evian Wa-
ters of France, Inc., 87 F.3d 604, 608 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding under Massachusetts conflicts
rules that a choice of the law of a party's state of incorporation meets the reasonable
relation requirement of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICrs OF LAW §187); Carlock v.
Pillsbury Co., 719 F. Supp. 791, 807 (D. Minn. 1989) ("A party's incorporation in a state is
a contact sufficient to allow the parties to choose that state's law to govern their
contract.").
104. See e.g., A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Smith, 736 F. Supp. 1030, 1036 (D. Ariz.
1989) (following Arizona choice of law principles the court upheld the selection of Mis-
souri law because the plaintiff having its primary place of business in Missouri made the
state reasonably related to the transaction); see also Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vac-
uum Components, Inc., 968 F.2d 1463, 1467-68 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating that the choice of the
law of the state where one of the parties is incorporated and does a substantial amount of
business is enforceable).
105. Suess, 24 F.3d at 949.
106. See Prows v. Pinpoint Retail Sys., 868 P.2d 809 (Utah 1993) (refusing to enforce
the selection of New York law in an agreement between a Canadian company and its Utah
distributor because all the relevant contacts were located in Utah and New York had no
interest in the litigation); CCR Data Sys., Inc. v. Panasonic Communications & Sys. Co.,
1995 WL 54380, *5 (D.N.H. Jan. 31, 1995) (invalidating the selection of New York law,
although the selection was reasonable because it was aimed at securing a uniform interpre-
tation of dealership agreements, there was no significant relationship between the particu-
lar agreement and the state of New York); see also Trans Meridian Trading Inc. v. Empresa
Nacional De Comercializacion De Insumos, 829 F.2d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 1987) (refusing to
apply the Uniform Customs and Practice Act for Documentary Credit to the exclusion of
California law because the act was not a related "jurisdiction" and California's governmen-
tal interest analysis required that its law govern the transaction).
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constitute a relationship with New York law under the Restatement's per-
missive rule sufficient to justify a court's applying that law to the discrete
contracts of individual customers not located in New York. 10 7 In an era
of increasing mass marketing, it might well make sense to develop a
broader view of the "relatedness" limitation to accommodate such situa-
tions and, if policy makers did so, to suitably tweak the UCC provision to
permit such an approach. 10 8
On the other hand, if comparable facts were missing and New York law
were selected merely because the law there was more favorable to them
than the law of their own location, rejecting the choice might be justifia-
ble as a matter of policy. History suggests that enhanced certainty (as
distinguished from empowering the parties to seek some form of advan-
tage in choosing given law) is the overwhelming reason for permitting
parties to choose law in the first place. If this is so, then simple advan-
tage-seeking offers little reason to change the relatedness rule-certainty
can probably be achieved by the business choosing the law of its own
location. In any event, the question for policy makers is whether this
small scattering of cases presents a compelling reason for a rule change
and, if so, whether the change in the choice of law rules proposed is, on
balance, a satisfactory solution. Narrower solutions are, of course,
possible.109
107. The provision, quoted supra note 18, allows enforcement of a contractual choice of
law unless "there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice."
108. The Permanent Editorial Board of the UCC could, for example, add a Comment
or amend the present Comments to UCC section 1-105 stating an expansive interpretation
of the current rule's "reasonable relation." The drafters could also improve certainty in
this regard by creating a statutory list of situations and defining them as constituting a
"reasonable relation."
Texas, for example, provides the following:
A transaction bears a reasonable relation to a particular jurisdiction if:
(1) a party to the transaction is a resident of that jurisdiction;
(2) a party to the transaction has its place of business or, if that party has
more than one place of business, its chief executive office or an office from
which it conducts a substantial part of the negotiations relating to the
transaction, in that jurisdiction;
(3) all or part of the subject matter of the transaction is located in that
jurisdiction;
(4) a party to the transaction is required to perform a substantial part of
its obligations relating to the transaction, such as delivering payments, in
that jurisdiction; or
(5) a substantial part of the negotiations relating to the transaction, and
the signing of an agreement relating to the transaction by a party to the
transaction, occurred in that jurisdiction.
TEX. Bus & CoM. CODE ANN. § 35.51(d) (Vernon 2000).
109. See supra note 107. In a less serious vein, statutory authorization for the parties to
choose "related law or the law of New York" would also solve the problem and would
yield a measure of uniformity as well, but one senses something politically unappealing
about such a solution. Indeed, if the current relatedness rule has tended to physically bring
businesses into New York to get New York law, New York policy makers might be well
advised to oppose the idea.
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B. CHOICES THAT VIOLATE "FUNDAMENTAL POLICY" OF A
NON-CHOSEN STATE
Under the Restatement's analytical framework, courts are not to en-
force a choice where:
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest
than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and
which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable
law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties. 110
There is no similar statement in the current text or Comments to UCC
section 1-105.
There are several common situations in which one party has argued
that the law chosen in the contract should bow to the "fundamental pol-
icy" of a state that was not chosen. Two of these situations-franchise
contracts and lending contracts raising usury issues-may be within the
scope of the revised Uniform Commercial Code and therefore affected
by the UCC proposal.11' A discussion of cases in these two areas should
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1989).
111. The scope of the provision is in flux at this time. During a meeting of the Drafting
Committee in November, 2000, the suggestion was made to limit the parties to choosing
only UCC rules when they choose the law of a particular jurisdiction. This idea has made
its way into the Reporters' Notes to the December 2000 ALI Council Draft. The equivocal
Note reads in pertinent part:
a. Applicability of section. This section is neither a full Restatement of
choice of law principles nor a free-standing choice of law statute. Rather, it
is a provision of Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial Code. As such, it is
subject to section 1-102, which states the scope of Article 1. As that section
indicates, Article 1, and the rules contained therein, apply to transactions to
the extent that they are governed by one of the other Articles of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Thus, this section does not apply to a transaction outside
the scope of the Uniform Commercial Code such as a services contract or a
contract for the sale of real estate. On the other hand, if the transaction is
within the scope of a substantive Article of the Uniform Commercial Code,
such as in the case of a sale or lease of goods, this section does apply.
In some cases, a transaction is neither completely within the scope of the
Uniform Commercial Code (as in the case of a sale or lease of goods) nor
completely outside the scope of the Uniform Commercial Code (as in the
case of a contract for the sale of real estate). Rather, some aspects of the
transaction are within the substantive scope of the Uniform Commercial
Code while other aspects are not. One example of this phenomenon is an
agreement to loan money in which the borrower's obligation to repay the
loan is secured by a security interest in personal property. The security
agreement, and the security interest created thereby, are clearly within the
scope of Article 9. The loan agreement, on the other hand, is governed not
by the Uniform Commercial Code but by the general law of contracts. An-
other example is provided by a real estate lease in which the lessee's obliga-
tion to pay the stated rent is backed by a standby letter of credit issued by a
bank. The lease is governed by realty law outside the Uniform Commercial
Code, while the letter of credit is governed by Article 5. While this section,
by its terms, only applies to the UCC aspect of such a "mixed transaction," it
is within a court's discretion to decide in a particular case that bifurcation of
the choice of law principles applicable to the transaction is inadvisable and,
accordingly, to apply principles of this section to the non-UCC aspects of the
transaction in order to have the law of the same State or country apply to the
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suffice to illustrate the dynamics of current judicial thinking about "fun-
damental policy" in this context.
1. Franchise Cases
Like much else in the current case law in this general area, a starting
point for the decisions is a comparison of the "contacts" of the chosen
and unchosen states. Whether the court describes an unchosen state's
mandatory rules as "fundamental" seems to depend, critically, on this
comparison.
The paradigm situation is quite simple.1 2 Typically, the franchisee's
state has a "non-waivable" statute limiting how franchisers may contract
with or treat in-state franchisees, but the franchise contract will choose
the law of a different state that also has some connection with the con-
tract. When the franchise relationship collapses, the franchisee asserts
that the franchiser violated a provision of the local protective legislation.
The franchiser responds by contending that the protective legislation is
not applicable due to the contractual choice of different law. The out-
come depends on whether the forum court considers the protective legis-
lation of the unchosen state to be "fundamental policy" that will apply
despite the contractual choice of law provision. If the chosen law applies
in its entirety, without a fundamental policy exception, the "non-waiv-
able" provision created by the franchisee's legislature has been
neutralized.
For example, in Tele-Save Merchandising Co. v. Consumers Distributing
Co. Ltd.,1 3 the franchise contract between the Ohio franchisee and the
Canadian franchiser chose the law of New Jersey (where the franchiser
had an office) to govern their franchise contract. An Ohio statute re-
quired, among other things, that the franchiser make various disclosures
entire transaction. When the UCC aspects of such a "mixed transaction"
predominate, such a decision may be particularly appropriate.
U.C.C. § 1-301, Reporter's Note a (Proposed Draft, Dec. 2000).
Under current conflict of laws principles, the parties choosing the law of a given "re-
lated" jurisdiction get all the law that jurisdiction has to offer, subject of course, to the
public policy exception. This comports with their likely intent and allows the adjudicating
court to decide the case with one body of interrelated principles.
If, on the other hand, by selecting "unrelated" law one selects only "unrelated" UCC
provisions, the result is a contract whose controlling law is bifurcated between two jurisdic-
tions. This seems unlikely often to be the intent of the parties and will make contract
adjudication under such a regime far more difficult and expensive than it now is. It will
also raise the question of "what is a UCC rule" in some cases and provide litigation oppor-
tunities that do not now exist. It is likely that the drafters will not succeed in drafting a
workable limitation or, if they can, that it will be challenged as being a rule that harms,
rather than enhances, commercial certainty. It seems likely, on balance, that courts will
continue to wrestle with non-UCC law being chosen by the parties and challenged as viola-
tive of fundamental policy of the unchosen state.
112. An excellent treatment of state franchise statutes and the limits on escaping them
through choice of law clauses under current law is Thomas J. Collin, State Franchise Laws
and the Small Business Franchise Act of 1999: Barriers to Efficient Distribution, 55 Bus.
LAW. 1699 (2000). Mr. Collin does not address the effect that proposed UCC § 1-301 might
have on his analysis.
113. 814 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1986).
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and provided that "[a]ny waiver by a purchaser [of the Act's provisions]
is contrary to public policy and is void and unenforceable. '"1 14 The fran-
chisee claimed that the Ohio statute represented "fundamental public
policy" of Ohio and therefore applied notwithstanding the parties' choice
of New Jersey law. Asserting that there were no predominant contacts in
Ohio, that the parties did not have unequal bargaining power, and that
there would not be significant differences in the application of the law of
the two states, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the argument
that the "non-waivable" Ohio statute should be applied.11 5
In contrast with Tele-Save, the court in Wright-Moore Corp. v. Ricoh
Corp. 116 found that despite the contractual choice of New York law, pro-
visions of Indiana's "non-waivable" franchise law applied. The Wright-
Moore court noted that the only connection to New York appeared to be
the fact that Ricoh was incorporated there, whereas Wright-Moore was
physically located in Indiana, the contract was negotiated there, and
much of the performance took part there.117
It is important to note that in both cases, the franchisee's state law was
"mandatory" because it was "non-waivable" and was made "non-waiv-
able" presumably to protect that State's franchisees from perceived
franchiser abuse. Rather than have the franchisee waive the "non-waiv-
able" provision in the franchise contract, the contract simply chose differ-
ent law to govern it, law that did not contain the particular provision. A
simple waiver of the provision would, of course, have been unenforce-
able, but given that the franchise contract chose different law, the fate of
the "non-waivable" provision depended instead on an out-of-state court
judging whether the provision was "fundamental policy." A finding that
it was not "fundamental policy" would make the mandatory provision
ineffective.
This outcome, while unsettling to some, can be understood as a conse-
quence of the fact that different states might have interests in applying
their law to the underlying relationship. Where the chosen state is as
closely-or more closely-related to the contract, it is comparatively easy
to justify a decision which effectively neutralizes the "non-waivable" pro-
vision: had the parties in such a case not specified the law in their con-
tract, the state law without the protective provision might well have been
applied anyway. The certainty that comes with enforcing the choice of
law justifies permitting parties to agree to different law in the first place,
even when their choice effectively erases a mandatory provision of the
unchosen state's law.
Forum courts can, of course, get the "fundamental policy" question
wrong but, if there will be "redress" for a wrong judicial decision on the
question, it must be political rather than legal. A judgment coming from
114. Id. at 1123.
115. See id. at 1124.
116. 908 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1990).
117. Id. at 133.
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another state must be enforced under the Constitution's Full Faith and
Credit Clause even if the result in that case is flat wrong.' 18 We can look
to a final franchise case, Modern Computer Systems, Inc. v. Modern
Banking Systems, Inc.,1 19 to underscore how the operation of our conflict
of laws rules can impact the non-forum state's lawmaking. What followed
the decision was, perhaps, a political response to the case by the Minne-
sota legislature.
Minnesota had a statute governing relationships with Minnesota fran-
chisees and, as in other states, provided that the provisions were not
waivable by contract. In the agreement with the Nebraska franchiser, the
parties chose Nebraska law to govern their relationship. In litigation fol-
lowing the souring of the relationship, the franchisee contended that the
choice of Nebraska law violated the "fundamental policy" of Minnesota
as reflected in its anti-waiver provision. The Eighth Circuit, en banc, dis-
agreed, laying considerable stress on the fact that Nebraska had at least
as many "contacts" with the transaction as did Minnesota a20 and holding
that it would therefore be fair to apply the law chosen by the par-
ties-Nebraska-to the controversy.
The dissent focused more directly than the majority on the choice of
law provision and whether, under the Restatement provision, Minnesota
"[had] a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determi-
nation of the particular issue."'121 Finding both that Minnesota had a ma-
terially greater interest and that it had more contacts with the contract,
the dissent would have rejected the choice of Nebraska law.1 22 While
there is no record of the enforcing court's disposition of this case, it is
clear in retrospect that the Eighth Circuit's opinion on the importance to
Minnesota of its franchise protection was wrong, at least as a political
matter. Following the court's decision, the Minnesota legislature
amended the statute 123 to include a restriction on the franchisee's waiving
the protection through a choice of law clause. 124 As will be developed
118. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908). A discussion of the implications
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in connection with international analogues to domestic
choice of law principles appears infra in Part V.F.1.b.
119. 871 F.2d 734 (8th Cir. 1989).
120. See id. at 739.
121. Id. at 740 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 187 (1971)).
122. See id. at 743.
123. The next year, Minnesota amended the law to provide:
80C.21. Waivers void
Any condition, stipulation or provision, including any choice of law provi-
sion, purporting to bind any person who, at the time of acquiring a franchise
is a resident of this state, or, in the case of a partnership or corporation,
organized or incorporated under the laws of this state, or purporting to bind
a person acquiring any franchise to be operated in this state to waive compli-
ance or which has the effect of waiving compliance with any provision of
sections 80C.01 to 80C.22 or any rule or order thereunder is void.
MINN. STAT. § 80C.21 (1989) (emphasis added). Whether the change in the law will cause
courts in other states to conclude the Minnesota law reflects "fundamental policy" remains
to be seen.
124. Of course, Minnesota could have changed its view and made the franchisee protec-
tion policy "fundamental" following the Eight Circuit's decision or interest groups could
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later, we might anticipate that the instances in which the operation of
choice of law rules cause political friction will increase, perhaps exponen-
tially, under the proposals.
2. Usury Cases
Usury cases have a long history in this area, perhaps because lenders
have clear, direct economic incentives to avoid usury restrictions if it is
possible for them to do so. 125 Choice of a jurisdiction with a higher cap
on interest rates gives a lender an economic benefit, if such a choice of
law is sustained over a challenge that the borrower's mandatory usury
restrictions apply nonetheless. Here, once again, the judicial analysis de-
pends critically on the "contacts" between the chosen state and the con-
tract; in this area, we find that "fundamental policy" receives far less
emphasis. Whether this analysis will hold when lenders can select a state
with no connections (and, presumably, no usury restrictions) will be a
difficult question under the proposals.
The paradigm facts are simple. The lender chooses the law of a state
with high-or no-usury limits and, when the borrower defaults, her de-
fense is that the lender violated an otherwise-applicable usury restric-
tion-a mandatory rule of the unchosen state.
Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co.,126 a 1927 case antedating wide-
spread use of contractual choice of law clauses, established the now well-
established rule that a provision in a contract for the payment of interest
will be held valid if it is permitted by the law of either the place of con-
tracting, the place of performance, or any other place with which the con-
tract has any substantial connection.127 Many jurisdictions follow this
traditional rule that sufficient contacts with a state permitting the interest
charged are essential to enforcement is followed in many jurisdictions. 128
In Seeman, the plaintiff argued that the choice of law provision for repay-
have simply pressured the legislature for preferential treatment following the decision. If
analyzed in terms of interest group politics, it is very difficult (if not impossible) to speak of
legislation in terms of "public policy." Cf. O'Hara & Ribstein, supra note 84 ("Emphasiz-
ing states' interests and powers is misguided from this perspective because political leaders
cannot be expected to maximize social welfare.").
125. Credit card companies have located in South Dakota so that the rates they charge
across the United States will avoid challenges on the basis of usury. In Smiley v. Citibank,
517 U.S. 735 (1996), the Supreme Court held that state usury laws were preempted by the
National Bank Act. Significantly, however, banks must physically locate in South Dakota
to avail themselves of its law. See id. at 737.
126. 274 U.S. 403 (1927).
127. See id. at 407.
128. See, e.g., Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co., 642 F.2d
744 (5th Cir. 1981); Jett Racing & Sales, Inc. v. Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp., 892 F.
Supp. 161 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Superior Funding Corp. v. Big Apple Capital Corp., 738 F.
Supp. 1468 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re United States Mach. Tools, Inc. v. First Union Commer-
cial Corp., 59 B.R. 470 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1985); Evans v. Harry Robinson Pontiac-Buick,
Inc., 983 S.W.2d 946 (Ark. 1999); Garner v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 135 Cal. Rptr. 230
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 395 So. 2d 507




ment in Pennsylvania on a loan contract by a Pennsylvania corporation
was used as a way to evade New York usury laws, New York being the
state where the loan was made.129 The interest rates on the loan were
usurious in both Pennsylvania and New York, but the New York legisla-
tion was more restrictive. 130 The Court sustained the Pennsylvania
choice of law provision holding that there were sufficient contacts in
Pennsylvania to conclude that the parties were not simply trying to evade
usury laws of New York by choosing Pennsylvania law. 131 The Court
noted a qualification to its rule: "the parties must act in good faith, and
that the form of the transaction must not 'disguise its real character."'1 32
But this qualification was not to be read too broadly. As the Court said:
The effect of the qualification is merely to prevent the evasion or
avoidance at will of the usury law otherwise applicable, by the par-
ties' entering into the contract or stipulating for its performance at a
place which has no normal relation to the transaction and to whose
law they would not otherwise be subject.133
Generally, the usury decisions that do not enforce a contractual choice
of law provision deal with an individual borrower and a corporation, as
opposed to two corporations.134 The dominant rule in the cases is that a
contractual choice of law provision will not be enforced where the chosen
law has no reasonable relation to the transaction or where it violates a
fundamental public policy of the otherwise applicable law.135 The exis-
tence of contacts and whether the unchosen law is "fundamental policy"
are often connected. In North American Bank, Ltd. v. Schulman,136 the
choice of Israeli law was not enforced because Israel lacked sufficient
contacts with the transaction and the interest rates violated fundamental
public policy of New York, the state where the agreement took place.137
129. See Seeman, 274 U.S. at 404.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 409.
132. Id. at 408.
133. Id.
134. See Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 395 So. 2d 507 (Fla.
1981).
135. See e.g., Turner v. Aldens, Inc., 433 A.2d 439 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981)
(applying of Illinois choice of law provision would violate public policy of New Jersey
where intent of New Jersey RISA statute is to offer New Jersey consumers the protection
of RISA no matter from where the seller deals); Trinidad Indus. Bank v. Romero, 466 P.2d
568 (N.M. 1970) (holding that Colorado interest rates shocked the conscience of the court
and contravened New Mexico public policy with regard to usury); N. Am. Bank, Ltd. v.
Schulman, 474 N.Y.S.2d 383 (Westchester County Ct. 1984) (stating that Israel choice of
law provision not enforced where policy underlying New York usury laws is fundamental
and New York had the most substantial relation to loan agreement); South Dakota ex rel.
Meierhenry v. Spiegel, Inc., 277 N.W.2d 298 (S.D. 1979) ("permitting governing law agree-
ment to control ... would allow a foreign corporation the privilege of conducting its busi-
ness in South Dakota upon more favorable conditions than are afforded to South Dakota
corporations and would provide an effective means of circumventing legislation designed
to protect citizens of South Dakota"); General Elec. Co. v. M. Keyser, 275 S.E.2d 289 (W.
Va. 1981) (refusing to enforce New York choice of law provision because there were not
enough contacts with transaction and it violated public policy of West Virginia).
136. 474 N.Y.S.2d 383 (Westchester County Ct. 1984).
137. See id. at 383.
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In that case, plaintiff was an Israeli bank with a branch in New York, and
the defendants were residents of Westchester County.138 The interest
rates on the loan were usurious in New York, but not in Israel where
usury is not regulated. 139 The court found New York cases holding that
usury laws are a declaration of that state's public policy, even supervening
public policy.140
The court in Schulman further held that, even if the court found no
violation of fundamental public policy, it would still strike down the
choice of law provision because Israel did not have a substantial relation-
ship with the loan agreement, stating that New York, and not Israel, bears
the greatest "governmental interest," or most "substantial relationship"
to this loan agreement.1 41
The majority of courts dealing with usury and contractual choice of law
provisions tend to enforce the choice of law, relying mainly on a finding
that there is a sufficient connection between the law chosen and the
transaction. 142 "Sufficiency" is, of course, a litigated question. In Conti-
nental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc.,143 for example, the Su-
preme Court of Florida enforced the choice of Massachusetts law against
a Florida borrower, where the interest charged was prohibited in Florida
but not in Massachusetts. The court held that the plaintiff, a corporation
organized under the laws of Massachusetts with its only office in Massa-
chusetts, had a sufficient connection with Massachusetts to support a
choice of Massachusetts law.144 The court said that so long as the juris-
diction chosen has a "normal relation" with the transaction, Florida
courts will enforce a choice of law provision. 45
138. See id. at 384.
139. See id. at 387.
140. See id. at 386.
141. Id. at 387.
142. See, e.g., Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse, 274. U.S. 403 (1927); Woods-Tucker
Leasing Corp. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co., 642 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1981); Jett Racing &
Sales, Inc. v. Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp., 892 F. Supp. 161 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Supe-
rior Funding Corp. v. Big Apple Capital Corp., 738 F. Supp. 1468 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re
United States Mach. Tools, Inc. v. First Union Commercial Corp., 59 B.R. 470 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1985); Evans v. Harry Robinson Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 983 S.W.2d 946 (Ark. 1999);
Gamer v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 135 Cal. Rptr. 230 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Continental
Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 395 So.2d 507 (Fla. 1981); Sheer Asset Mgmt.
Partners v. Lauro Thin Films, Inc., 731 A.2d 708 (R.I. 1999). One also sees reference made
to the low standing of usury as a defense in lending settings. See Walter E. Heller & Co. v.
Chopp-Wincraft Printing Specialties, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 557, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (stating
that Illinois law does not violate public policy of New York since usury is not a favored
defense, particularly in the circumstance where a corporation rather than a helpless con-
sumer is involved).
143. 395 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1981).
144. See id. at 508.
145. See id. at 510. In discussing the public policy determination, the Florida court in
Burroughs Corp. v. Suntogs of Miami, Inc., 472 So.2d 1166, 1168 (Fla. 1985), suggested that
courts look to see (1) is the statute riddled with exceptions; (2) is the statute frequently
amended to demonstrate flexibility of the public policy; (3) is it fundamental to the legal
system; (4) does the policy have a limited effect upon a contract insofar as it does not
invalidate the contract, but merely allows the defendant to set up an affirmative defense.
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Courts interpreting the UCC in usury settings hold that parties are free
to avoid usury laws of some interested jurisdiction so long as they do not
evade such laws "at will, capriciously or fraudulently, by selecting the law
of a jurisdiction without a normal relation to the transaction.' 1 46 The
requirement that the parties or their contract must bear "some relation"
to the chosen state "attempts to achieve uniformity in multistate transac-
tions through the principle of party autonomy."'1 47
The "relatedness" analysis is so dominant in usury cases that some
courts do not even discuss public policy in usury cases, but look only to
whether there are substantial relations to the chosen state.148 The Re-
statement (Second) of Conflicts of Law would reject the choice of an un-
related state in a usury case 149 but, of course, this is a restatement of the
current law, not the law of the proposals. Once again, the current cases
beg the question of how courts will analyze usury cases if lenders are
authorized to select the law of unrelated jurisdictions to control their
lending contracts. The difficulties that the proposals bring to this ques-
tion will be explored later. 50
V. PART 4: PROPOSED PARTY AUTONOMY AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE LAWMAKING
A. THE PROPOSED RULES AND THEIR LIMITS
Against the backdrop of current law, we now return to the proposals.
For convenience, UCITA's provision, quoted earlier, 151 reads:
SECTION 109. CHOICE OF LAW.
(a) The parties in their agreement may choose the applicable law.
However, the choice is not enforceable in a consumer contract to the
extent it would vary a rule that may not be varied by agreement
under the law of the jurisdiction whose law would apply under sub-
sections (b) and (c) in the absence of the agreement.
Article l's provision is far more elaborate. It reads, in pertinent part:
SECTION 1-301. TERRITORIAL APPLICABILITY; PARTIES'
POWER TO CHOOSE APPLICABLE LAW.
(a) Except as provided in this section, an agreement by parties to
a transaction that any or all of their rights and obligations are to be
determined by the law of this State or of another State or country is
effective, whether or not the transaction bears a relation to the State
or country designated. In the absence of such an effective agree-
ment, their rights and obligations are determined, except as provided
146. Woods-Tucker, 642 F.2d at 751.
147. Admiral Ins. Co. v. Brinkcraft Dev., Ltd., 921 F.2d 591, 593 (5th Cir. 1991).
148. This focus on the connection of chosen state to the loan agreement predated both
the UCC and the second restatement, instead it stems from the Supreme Court's decision
in Seeman. See Superior Funding Corp. v. Big Apple Capital Corp., 738 F. Supp. 1468
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Sheer Asset Mgmt. Partners v. Lauro Thin Films, Inc., 731 A.2d 708 (R.I.
1999).
149. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 203 cmt. e (1997).
150. See infra Part V.E.
151. See supra note 21, discussing U.C.I.T.A. § 109 (2000).
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in subsection (e), by the law that would be selected by application of
this State's conflict of laws principles.
(b) If one of the parties to an agreement referred to in subsection
(a) is a consumer, the agreement is not effective unless the State or
country designated is either:
(1) the State or country in which the consumer habitually re-
sides at the time the transaction becomes enforceable or
within 30 days thereafter; or
(2) the State or country in which the goods, services, or other
consideration flowing to the consumer are to be received or
are used by the consumer or a person designated by the
consumer.
152
(c) An agreement referred to in subsection (a) is not effective to
the extent that the law of the State or country designated is contrary
to a fundamental policy of the State or country whose law would
otherwise govern. In addition, a court may decline to enforce an
agreement referred to in subsection (a) to the extent that the law of
the State or country designated is contrary to a fundamental policy
of this State.
(d) If the transaction does not bear a reasonable relation to any
country other than the United States, an agreement referred to in
subsection(a) is effective only if it designates the law of a State.
(e) To the extent that the [Uniform Commercial Code] governs a
transaction, where one of the following provisions of the [Uniform
Commerce Code] specifies the applicable law, that provision governs
and a contrary agreement is effective only to the extent permitted by
the law (including the conflict of law rules) so specified:






(7) Sections 9-301 through 9-307
(f) For purposes of this section, a "consumer" is an individual who
enters into a transaction primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes. [Personal, family, or household purposes do not include
152. This version of the consumer exception was developed at a Drafting Committee
meeting held November 10, 11, 2000. The text which it replaced read as follows:
(b) If one of the parties to an agreement referred to in subsection (a) is a
consumer, the agreement is not effective unless the State or country desig-
nated is either:
(1) the State or country in which the consumer habitually resides at the
time the transaction becomes enforceable or within 30 days thereafter; or
(2) the State or country in which the goods, services, or other considera-
tion flowing to the consumer are to be received or are used by the con-
sumer or a person designated by the consumer.
U.C.C. § 1-301 (Proposed Draft March 2000). If an "ineffective" agreement were made
under this provision, the applicable law would be the law which ordinary conflict of laws
principles would supply. Often that would be the vendor's location; thus consumers under




professional or commercial purposes, including agriculture, business
management, and investment management other than management
of the individual's personal or family investments.]153
There are key features common to both statutes. The most important,
of course, is the authorization both statutes give for the parties to choose
"unrelated" law to govern their contract. Both proposals discuss this
change within their Reporter's Notes and Official Comments. These ex-
planations may tend to understate the dramatic change the proposals re-
present. 154 In addition, both statutes address consumer issues, albeit
differently. Further, the Article 1 provision makes explicit reference to
the fundamental policy exception whereas UCITA makes no explicit ref-
erence but probably recognizes it implicitly. Finally, the Article 1 propo-
sal precludes the choice of foreign law in an entirely domestic United
States transaction;155 UCITA's proposal is not so limited.
In discussing the proposals in the context of current domestic and inter-
national law, we will begin by considering the exceptions the proposals
make in permitting a forum court to defer to some of the "mandatory
rules" of another jurisdiction, and the other statutory exceptions to the
broad power granted the parties to choose law. Having discussed the lim-
itations, we will then be in a position to understand the breadth of these
provisions and the impact they may have on the state lawmaking process
in the United States.
153. This subsection may be replaced by a general definition of "consumer" in Section
1-201. See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(lla).
U.C.C. § 1-301 (ALl Council Draft, Nov. 2000). This provision has been in considerable
flux. Its organization changed completely from the November 2000 Draft to a December
2000 Council Draft. That Draft has not been made available to the public as of this writing
and, as a result, this article has used the last publicly available draft, November 2000.
There is, of course, no guarantee that what is finally brought forward will resemble this
text. Given a targeted approval date of Summer 2001, one wonders, as a matter of process,
whether it is not too late for the Drafting Committee to be making substantial changes to
the Proposal. See also supra note 12.
154. As should be clear, both proposed statutes make a sharp break with the past inas-
much as both are very broad and will cover many millions of daily transactions, large and
small. The Reporter's Note to the Article 1 provision has this to say about current law:
b. Contractual choice of law. This section allows parties broad autonomy,
with several important limitations, to select the law governing their transac-
tion, even if the transaction does not bear a relation to the State or country
whose law is selected. This recognition of party autonomy with respect to
governing law has already been established in several Articles of the Uni-
form Commercial Code (see UCC Sections 4A-507, 5-116, and 8-110) and is
consistent with international norms. See, e.g., Inter-American Convention
on the Law Applicable to International Contracts, Article 7 (Mexico City
1994); Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, Article 7(1) (The Hague 1986); EC Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations, Article 3(1) (Rome 1980).
U.C.C. § 1-301, Reporter's Note a (Proposed Draft, Nov. 2000).
155. See U.C.C. § 1-301(d); Reporter's Note b & d (Proposed Draft, Nov. 2000).
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B. THE MANDATORY CONSUMER LAW EXCEPTIONS
Both provisions address consumer transactions and appear to defer to
mandatory consumer law. Their operation is, however, far more compli-
cated than one might expect.
A useful reference point for these provisions is the Rome Convention,
the treaty to which the Reporter's Notes to the UCC provision have re-
ferred,1 56 which operates in a direct, uncomplicated fashion. The Rome
Convention gives greater deference to the judgments of consumers' legis-
latures about consumer protection than does the UCITA proposal. With
its redraft in November, 2000, the Article 1 proposal now tracks the pro-
tection offered by the Rome Convention, a change in the law in the
United States in favor of consumers. Article 5, paragraph 2 of the Rome
Convention provides in part: "[A] choice of law made by the parties shall
not have the result of depriving the consumer of the protection afforded
to him by the mandatory rules of the law of the country in which he has
his habitual residence .... "157 The provision obviously gives effect to
consumer laws that a legislature enacts for the benefit of those who "ha-
bitually reside" there, their residents.
UCITA's protection is different and less deferential to the mandatory
law of the consumers' state. The mandatory consumer rules that cannot
be avoided by a UCITA choice of law clause are not necessarily those of
the consumer's residence but, rather, of "the jurisdiction whose law
would apply under subsections (b) and (c) in the absence of the agree-
ment."'158 Those latter provisions specify the consumer's jurisdiction if
the "contract ... requires delivery of a copy on a tangible medium"'
159
and the vendor's jurisdiction if it is a "contract providing for electronic
delivery of a copy."' 160 While the Rome Convention's approach might be
criticized as exposing Internet vendors to the consumer protection provi-
sions of any jurisdiction in which they sell,161 UCITA's approach may
encourage electronic delivery of software, and invite those who do busi-
ness that way to locate themselves in jurisdictions providing little or no
consumer protection-to become modern-day Liberian tankers.' 62
156. See U.C.C. § 1-301 Reporter's Note b (Proposed Draft, Nov. 2000). UCITA's Of-
ficial Comments have deleted all references to the Rome Convention.
157. Rome Convention, supra note 14, art. 5(2).
158. U.C.I.T.A., § 109(a) (2000).
159. U.C.I.T.A., § 109(b)(2).
160. U.C.I.T.A., § 109(b)(1). Because software is increasingly delivered electronically,
one would expect the proportion of cases in which this provision operates to increase-
perhaps exponentially-over time.
161. See Jane K. Winn & Michael R. Pullen, Dispatches from the Front: Recent
Skirmishes Along the Frontiers of Electronic Contracting Law, 55 Bus. LAw. 455, 481
(1999).
162. Cf. Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Uniformity, Choice of Law And
Software Sales, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 261, 301 (1999). In light of the provision, the
U.C.I.T.A.'s Comment about the consumer provision is mysterious. Comment 2 to
U.C.I.T.A. § 109 states, in part: "The fundamental policy of freedom of contract should
not permit overriding the consumer rule if a state, having addressed the cost and benefits
2001]
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Since its redraft in November 2000, the Article 1 provision appears to
offer U.S. consumers the protection the Rome Convention gives consum-
ers in the European Union. If the new provision survives further redraft-
ing efforts, it will change the domestic conflict of laws rule in UCC
consumer contracts in favor of consumers. It may do so at the expense of
some commercial certainty.
The new draft provision provides that a choice of law in a consumer
contract cannot override a "rule of law" that is "protective of consumers"
that may not be varied by contract. The effect is to give consumers any-
thing in either case law or statutes that is arguably "protective of consum-
ers" regardless of the law chosen in the contract. 163 This is clearly a
change in the rules as articulated in current law; whether it is a change in
fact in the law is an empirical question.
Currently, the law will permit a vendor to select the law of the vendor's
jurisdiction for all of its domestic contracts 164 and, if it does so, it will get
all of the selected law except that which violates the "fundamental policy
of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in
the determination of the particular issue."'1 65 As an empirical matter, it is
unclear whether consumer vendors choosing their own law believe they
are overriding any consumer provisions in consumers' jurisdictions or, if
they think that they are overriding some of the consumer provisions, the
to all parties, determines that the consumer rule is not waivable by contract." U.C.I.T.A.
§ 109 cmt. 2(b) (1999).
One could easily agree with this statement if the state referred to were the consumer's
own state-it would then require deference to the consumer's state law if that law were not
waivable by contract. In the context of contracts involving electronic delivery, particularly
from non-U.S. locations, however, the statement may be incoherent or misleading. As
stated in the text, the mandatory rules will be those of the vendor's location if the vendor
delivers electronically. Texas lawmakers, weighing the costs and benefits to all parties in
Texas, will take very little comfort from another court's deference to the mandatory con-
sumer law of Liberia when the Liberian software vendor makes a contract with the Texas
consumer.
163. The earlier drafts of this exception made the choice of law "ineffective" in many
consumer contracts. If a choice was "ineffective," the law of the contract would be the law
chosen by the enacting jurisdiction's choice of law principles, proposed UCC § 1-301(a),
which (apart from the choice of law) would likely be the jurisdiction of the vendor as the
jurisdiction with the most contacts with the contract.
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 187(2) and UCC § 1-105 both
permit vendors to choose from those jurisdictions with a relationship with the parties or
transaction. The choice of the vendor's own state usually meets either test. See Valley
Juice Ltd., Inc. v. Evian Waters of France, Inc., 87 F.3d 604, 608 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating
under Massachusetts conflicts rules that a choice of the law of a party's state of incorpora-
tion meets the reasonable relation requirement of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 187); A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Smith, 736 F. Supp. 1030, 1036 (D. Ariz. 1989)
(following Arizona choice of law principles the court upheld the selection of Missouri law
because the plaintiff having its primary place of business in Missouri made the state rea-
sonably related to the transaction); see also Elgar v. Elgar, 679 A.2d 937 (Conn. 1996)
(noting that one of the parties being a New York resident made the selection of that state's
law in an antenuptial agreement reasonably related to the contract); Bakhsh v. JACRRC
Enters., Inc., 895 P.2d 746, 747 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995) (selecting Texas as the exclusive
forum for any dispute arising out of a franchise agreement was "fair and reasonable" be-
cause the franchiser had its home office in Texas and was incorporated in Texas).
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1989).
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extent to which they believe that non-selected consumer provisions will
be overridden. To the extent consumer vendors believe that a choice of
law provides any override of other states' consumer protection provi-
sions, the proposed change could trigger opposition from those business
interests. 166
Whatever effect this iteration of the proposal has on applicable con-
sumer law, one can imagine it being challenged as generating a great deal
of potential commercial uncertainty. "Rule of law" and "protective of
consumers" are both undefined and subject to litigation. Moreover, how
will the protective rules of law operate within the context of the law cho-
sen in the contract? Do consumers get the benefit of consumer protec-
tion provisions of the chosen jurisdiction and of their own habitual
residence? If this is so, there might be a disincentive to choosing law in
consumer contracts because by so choosing, vendors may give consumers
cumulative protection that is unavailable otherwise. If the provision does
not dictate a "stacking" of consumer provisions, which ones control?
Presumably the "more protective" ones, but how would a court deter-
mine, for example, which line of unconscionability cases was "more pro-
tective" if the issue were contested? If the trial court applied the wrong
line of cases, would that present an appealable issue under the Proposal?
The proposal, as redrafted, is clearly more protective of consumers
than is current law which does not speak directly to the consumer/non-
consumer dichotomy at all. Its effect may be to reduce the instances in
which consumer vendors attempt to specify the applicable law in their
form contracts. But one might imagine that its survival could be in doubt.
It could garner opposition from consumer vendors and, despite its protec-
tive thrust, might not generate support among consumer representatives
because the provision could easily be deleted in the enactment process.
The fate of the drafters' nod in the direction of consumer protection re-
mains to be seen.167
C. THE FUNDAMENTAL POLICY EXCEFriONS
As developed earlier,168 conflict of laws rules typically permit the fo-
166. One belief that has been articulated is that "consumer vendors know they are
stuck with consumer provisions of the states in which they sell, regardless of what is in the
contract." If this is true, the revised provision merely articulates the law as vendors believe
it will be applied and should trigger no opposition.
167. As will be developed later, if the pro-consumer change in the proposal is designed
to garner consumer support for the entire proposal, the effort may be misguided. Because
the applicable rule depends on what the forum's legislature enacts, this consumer provi-
sion-like other consumer provisions in the UCC-is subject to non-uniform change or
even deletion by an enacting legislature. What is different about this provision is that it is a
conflict of laws rule that will apply to all consumers whose cases are litigated in an enacting
jurisdiction, whether they are citizens of the jurisdiction or not. In that sense, a non-uni-
form amendment has extra-territorial effect on consumers in other states which does not
exist in the case of other non-uniform amendments to the UCC. No consumer can rely on
the provision's protective features unless the consumer protection provision is enacted in
all jurisdictions, something that the UCC's sponsoring organizations cannot guarantee.
168. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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rum court to defer to those mandatory rules which qualify as the "funda-
mental policy" of an unchosen state or country. The 1980 Rome
Convention, for example, permits deference to some of these mandatory
rules if they come either from the "country with which the situation has a
close connection," or the forum. 169
UCITA's deference to the "fundamental policy" of an unchosen juris-
diction (whether it is the jurisdiction that ordinarily would govern, or the
forum) does not appear at all in the black letter of its choice of law provi-
sion. Official Comments to UCITA's choice of law provision suggest only
the possibility that the forum might, in an appropriate case, embrace its
own public policy. 170 "Fundamental public policy" might be imple-
mented through UCITA Section 105,171 but the drafters intend the
breadth of the exception to be narrow.172
169. Article 7 of the Rome Convention is permissive on the forum's recognition of
unchosen mandatory rules. Rome Convention, supra note 14, art. 7.
170. See U.C.I.T.A § 109 (2000).
171. U.C.I.T.A. § 105(b) provides:
(b) If a term of a contract violates a fundamental public policy, the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, enforce the remainder of the contract
without the impermissible term, or limit the application of the impermissible
term so as to avoid a result contrary to public policy, in each case to the
extent that the interest in enforcement is clearly outweighed by a public pol-
icy against enforcement of the term.
U.C.J.T.A. § 105(b) (2000).
172. U.C.I.T.A. §105 comment 3 underscores the intended narrow scope of the public
policy exception when weighed against other policies:
Public Policy Invalidation. Contract terms may be unenforceable because of
federal preemption under subsection (a) of this section or because they are
unconscionable under section 111. In addition, subsection (b) sets out the
legal principle that, in certain circumstances, terms may be unenforceable
because they violate a fundamental public policy that clearly overrides the
policy favoring enforcement of private transactions as between the parties.
The principle that courts may invalidate a term of a contract on public policy
grounds is recognized at common law and in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 178. See, e.g., Livingston v. Tapscott, 585 So. 2d 839 (Ala.
1991); Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 293 N.W.2d 843
(Neb. 1980).
Fundamental state policies are most commonly stated by the legislature.
In the absence of a legislative declaration of a particular policy, courts should
be reluctant to override a contract term. In evaluating a claim that a term
violates fundamental public policy, courts should consider various factors,
including the extent to which enforcement or invalidation of the term will
adversely affect the interests of each party to the transaction or the public,
the interest in protecting expectations arising from the contract, the purpose
of the challenged term, the extent to which enforcement or invalidation will
adversely affect other fundamental public interests, the strength and consis-
tency of judicial decisions applying similar policies in similar contexts, the
nature of any express legislative or regulatory policies, and the values of cer-
tainty of enforcement and uniformity in interpreting contractual provisions.
Where parties have negotiated terms in their agreement, courts should be
even more reluctant to set aside terms of the agreement. In applying these
factors, courts should consider the position taken in the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 178, cmt. b ("Enforcement will be denied only if the
factors that argue against enforcement clearly outweigh the law's traditional
interest in protecting the expectations of the parties, its abhorrence of any
unjust enrichment, and any public interest in enforcement of the particular
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Proposed UCC Section 1-301, on the other hand, is explicit in authoriz-
ing a court to recognize the "fundamental policy" of "the State or country
whose law would otherwise govern. '173 By excluding "public" from the
formulation, the provision may be slightly broader than that found in
UCITA but, as the Reporter's Notes to the Section make clear, the forum
court is to give deference only to very few of the unchosen jurisdiction's
mandatory rules. Those Notes state, in part:
Under the fundamental policy exception, a court should not refrain
from applying the chosen law merely because this would lead to a
result different than would be obtained under the local law of the
State or country whose law would otherwise govern. Rather, the dif-
ference must be contrary to a public policy that is so substantial that
it would not only cause a court to forego application of choice of law
rules that would otherwise have pointed to the state or country that
has that law but also justify overriding the concerns for certainty and
predictability underlying modern commercial law as well as concerns
for judicial economy generally. A fundamental policy will rarely be
found in a requirement, such as a statue of frauds, that relates to
formalities, or in general rules of contract law, such as those con-
cerned with the need for consideration. On the other hand, a rule
that makes the selling of body parts or human embryos illegal may
reflect such a policy. 174
The UCC Article 1 proposal has equivocated on the question whether
the forum court should recognize as "fundamental policy" any of the fo-
rum's own mandatory rules. The November 2000 Draft permits forum
courts to embrace their own mandatory rules.175
term."). In light of the national and international integration of the digital
economy, courts should be reluctant to invalidate terms based on purely local
policies. . . . A term or contract that results from an agreement between
commercial parties should be presumed to be valid and a heavy burden of
proof should be imposed on the party seeking to escape the terms of the
agreement under subsection (b). This Act and general contract law also rec-
ognize the commercial necessity of enforcing standard-form agreements mass
market transactions. [sic.] The terms of such forms may not be available to
the licensee prior to the payment of the price and typically are not subject to
affirmative negotiations. In such circumstances, courts must be more vigilant
in assuring that limitations on use of the informational subject matter of the
license are not invalid under fundamental public policy .... With reference
to contract law policies that regulate the bargain of the parties, this Act
makes express public policy choices. Contract law issues such as contract
formation, creation and disclaimer of warranties, measuring and limiting
damages, basic contractual obligations, contractual background rules, the ef-
fect of contractual choice, risk of loss, and the like, including the right of
parties to alter the effect of the terms of this Act by their agreement should
not be invalidated under subsection (b) of this section. This subsection deals
with policies that implicate the broader public interest and the balance be-
tween enforcing private transactions and the need to protect the public do-
main of information.
U.C.I.T.A. § 105 cmt. 3 (2000), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu//bll/ulc.
173. U.C.C. § 1-301, Reporter's Note c (Proposed Draft, Nov. 2000).
174. Id.
175. U.C.C. § 1-301(c) (November 2000 Draft). This was added to the November 2000
Draft but, at its November 2000 meeting, the drafting committee decided to relegate the
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It is very difficult to predict how the fundamental policy exception will
operate in practice under either the UCITA or UCC proposals. As the
discussion of cases under current choice of law rules should have made
clear,176 the judicial analysis of the "fundamental policy" exception rests
substantially on a comparison of the connections that the chosen and un-
chosen state have to the controversy, independently of the parties'
choice. This, of course, is a reflection of the way we have come to analyze
conflicts of law in the United States: an analysis that, at its base, com-
pares the contacts that contending states have with the underlying
controversy.
The current relatedness requirement and judicial analysis built on it
make it hard to predict what a forum court will do with a case where the
chosen state has no contact with the controversy (other than the fact that
it was chosen), and an unchosen state has obvious contacts with the con-
troversy. The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws is ultimately
based on assumptions that the chosen law will be related to the parties or
their contract and thus may it not be useful for guidance under the pro-
posals. 177 If applied as intended by their drafters, the effect of both the
UCITA and UCC provisions would be to reject most of the mandatory
rules that would ordinarily control the parties and their controversy, sim-
ply because the parties chose different law.178 Whether the gains from
idea to a comment, and this exception appeared in that form in the December 2000 ALI
Council Draft. At an ABA meeting on March 28, 2000, the Article 1 Reporter stated that
this exception was in the black letter. If the provision is in the black letter, it creates
another challenge to a contractual choice of law clause thereby, arguably, creating slightly
more commercial uncertainty. If it is not in the black letter, the provision is unrealistic in
failing to recognize this most fundamental challenge to a contractual choice of law clause.
It is unknown at this point which version will be before the ALI and NCCUSL.
176. See discussion supra in Part IV.B.
177. The most obvious example may be section 203 of the Restatement which would
preclude a choice of unrelated law to escape usury restrictions of a state whose law would
otherwise govern. If lending contracts are subject to the UCC (some large part would
clearly be covered if the lender took a security interest under UCC Article 9), the question
under the Article 1 proposal would be whether usury restrictions resemble the regulatory
rules referred to in the Reporter's Note. If usury restrictions more readily resemble ordi-
nary mandatory rules governing contracts, then they will not be "fundamental policy" and
the intent of the Article 1 proposal is to reverse the case law captured in Section 203 of the
Restatement.
178. The effect is, of course, to undercut the lawmaking process of unchosen states in
discrete situations but, as will be suggested later, it undercuts lawmaking generally, and the
effect extends even to the "private legislative" process of the NCCUSL and ALI that pre-
cedes enactment of the UCC. The NCCUSL and ALI are likened to "private legislatures"
in Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REv. 1783 (1994).
In support of a narrow rendition of "fundamental policy," Reporters' Note f quotes ex-
tensively from Judge Cardozo's opinion in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 120
N.E. 198 (1918). The quotation talks about the diversity in state policy and the importance
of deference to the law of a different state. Loucks supports a broad rendition of public
policy in the context of the proposal, not a narrow one. Judge Cardozo, contrary to the
implications of the use of his words, would not be a supporter of this proposal.
Loucks involved a fatal accident that occurred in Massachusetts. The estate's adminis-
trators brought suit in New York, under the Massachusetts wrongful death statute, a stat-
ute that had no counterpart in New York. The defendant sought dismissal on the grounds
that the Massachusetts statute violated New York's policy against penal statutes. The ques-
tion was whether the Massachusetts statute was to have force in the New York litigation or
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the proposals are worth their costs is the question state legislatures and
other policy makers will have to decide. The justifications for the changes
will be considered below.
D. OTHER LIMITATIONS ON PARTY POWER TO CHOOSE:
INTERNATIONAL V. DOMESTIC V. INTRASTATE CONTRACTS
The idea that parties should have autonomy to choose the law of "un-
related" jurisdictions found its first legislative expression in the Rome
Convention and, as noted above, the Rome Convention is cited as rele-
vant policy on contractual choice of law. The Rome Convention is a
treaty among sovereign nations and is, in that sense, an expression de-
signed to deal with international business transactions. Given the diver-
sity in the laws of the sovereign nations throughout the world and the
concomitant difficulty of learning another party's law in many interna-
tional transactions, it may be sensible to permit the parties to choose a
third state's law, one that may be well-known, easy to decipher, or "neu-
tral. '179 Once a transaction is entirely "domestic," however, the reason
for permitting such an unlimited choice is no longer present.
The Rome Convention sharply distinguishes between international and
domestic transactions. In domestic transactions within member states of
the European Union, the Convention is far more deferential to the ordi-
narily-applicable mandatory rules. Article 3, Paragraph 3 provides:
The fact that the parties have chosen a foreign law, whether or not
accompanied by the choice of a foreign tribunal, shall not, where all
the other elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice
are connected with one country only, prejudice the application of
rules of the law of that country which cannot be derogated from by
whether, to the contrary, the plaintiff's suit was to be dismissed as in violative of New York
public policy. Obviously, the question in Loucks was whether the New York forum ought
to defer to the Massachusetts law, the law that had a substantial connection to the
controversy.
Loucks thus involved-and stands for-the forum's respect for, or deference to, the pol-
icy of the state whose law had a strong connection with the dispute. Judge Cardozo, appro-
priately, opined that the forum's "fundamental policy" ought to be read narrowly in
deference to the sovereignty of the state whose interest in the situation was paramount. In
that sense it follows the spirit of the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause requiring
that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records and
judicial Proceedings of every other State."
In contrast with the facts of Loucks, the Article 1 proposal directs the forum to apply a
chosen law which has (by hypothesis) no connection with the controversy instead of a law
that ordinarily would apply. And, in constructing a narrow "fundamental policy" excep-
tion, the proposal directs courts to disregard most of the mandatory rules of the state
whose law would otherwise control. In that sense, the proposal is inconsistent both with
Loucks and with the spirit of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Because Loucks is a case
standing for judicial deference to the sovereign interests and public policy of a state with a
strong interest in the dispute, in the context of the proposal it actually supports either
complete deference to the law of a state whose law would otherwise govern or a very broad
public policy exception, not a narrow one.
179. See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1972); discussed
briefly supra in the text accompanying note 69.
20011
SMU LAW REVIEW
contract, hereinafter called 'mandatory rules.'180
In addition, in Article 19, the Rome Convention does not require treaty
states with a federal government to permit their citizens to choose law in
their purely interstate transactions.18 1 The UCC and UCITA proposals
are considerably more liberal than the Rome Convention in permitting
citizens of the United States to choose unrelated law in purely domestic
(US) transactions.
The only limit in either proposal that speaks to the international/do-
mestic classifications articulated by the Rome Convention is found in the
UCC Article 1 proposal. In an entirely domestic (US) transaction, it for-
bids the parties from choosing foreign law. 182 No such limit appears in
UCITA; to the contrary, its Official Comments to make clear that parties
can choose foreign law in any domestic, non-consumer transaction.18 3
Both provisions thus permit parties to contracts within their scope to
choose "unrelated law" (and, in the case of UCITA, unrelated non-US
law) even when the parties and all relevant contacts are entirely within
one state. To illustrate the distinction between the two provisions, the
Article 1 proposal forbids two Pennsylvania citizens from choosing the
unrelated law of Kenya for their wholly intrastate transaction, but they
can choose the unrelated law of Arkansas to govern their Pennsylvania
deal. Under UCITA, the law of Kenya (or any place else in the world)
would be an effective choice by the Pennsylvanians unless it were a con-
180. Rome Convention, supra note 14, art. 3, para. 3.
181. Paragraph 19(2) provides: "A State within which different territorial units have
their own rules of law in respect of contractual obligations shall not be bound to apply this
Convention to conflicts solely between the laws of such units." Rome Convention, supra
note 14, art. 19(2).
Similarly, Article 23 of the Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to inter-
national Contracts provides: "A State within which different territorial units have their
own systems of law in regard to matters covered by this Convention shall not be obliged to
apply this Convention to conflicts between the legal systems in force in such units." Inter-
American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts 1994, art. e 23
(Mexico City).
182. See U.C.C. § 1-301(d) (Proposed Draft, Nov. 2000); see also supra note 111.
183. UCITA § 109(c) provides:
In cases governed by subsection (b), if the jurisdiction whose law governs is
outside the United States, the law of that jurisdiction governs only if it pro-
vides substantially similar protections and rights to a party not located in that
jurisdiction as are provided under this [Act]. Otherwise, the law of the juris-
diction in the United States which has the most significant relationship to the
transaction governs.
U.C.I.T.A. § 109(c) (2000). Subsection (b), referred to in § 109(e), specifies which law
controls if the parties do not agree as to applicable law. As Comment 5 points out, "Sub-
section (c) does not apply if an enforceable contract term designates what law applies."
U.C.I.T.A. § 109 cmt. 5 (2000). At the extreme, this means that, in an entirely intrastate
U.S. transaction, the parties can choose the law of a foreign country that does not provide
"similar protections and rights" as UCITA. While this is unlikely in negotiated transac-
tions, it is clearly possible where the vendor chooses the law and the vendee "clicks to
agree" in a modest sized transaction. The difficulties with both proposals in the adhesion
contract setting are discussed infra in Part IV.F.
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sumer transaction. 184
E. THE PROBLEMATIC SCOPE OF THE PROVISIONS
1. Overbreadth
Neither provision applies to all contracts. Each, as indicated above,
has a carve-out for consumer transactions. Both of the proposed rules
define consumer transactions similarly185 and in the way typically found
elsewhere in the Uniform Commercial Code. 186 By differentiating the
mandatory rules governing "consumer contracts," the drafters have typi-
cally identified an important group of mandatory rules, which attempt to
regulate contracts between sophisticated "repeat players" and unsophisti-
cated "one-shotters.' 87
184. Even if it was a consumer transaction, if the UCITA vendor were "located" in
Kenya and delivered software electronically, it could choose Kenyan law in its transaction
with a Pennsylvania consumer.
185. UCITA's definition is:
"Consumer" means an individual who is a licensee of information or infor-
mational rights that the individual at the time of contracting intended to be
used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. The term does
not include an individual who is a licensee primarily for professional, or com-
mercial purposes, including agriculture, business management, and invest-
ment management other than management of the individual's personal or
family investments.
U.C.I.T.A. § 102(15) (2000).
The proposed UCC definition is very similar:
For purposes of this section, a "consumer" is an individual who enters into a
transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. Personal,
family, or household purposes do not include professional or commercial
purposes, including agriculture, business management, and investment man-
agement other than management of the individual's personal or family
investments.
U.C.C. § 1-301(f) (Proposed Draft, Nov. 2000).
186. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2A-103 (Proposed Draft, Nov. 2000) which uses the following
definition for a consumer lease:
(e) "Consumer lease" means a lease that a lessor regularly engaged in the
business of leasing or selling makes to a lessee, except an organization, who
is an individual and who takes under the lease primarily for a personal, fam-
ily, or household purpose, if the total payments to be made under the lease
contract, excluding payments for options to renew or buy, do not exceed
$25,000.
U.C.C. § 2A-103 (Proposed Draft, Nov. 2000) (The $25,000 figure is just a recommenda-
tion. The comment instructs states to choose whatever amount they feel is appropriate.).
U.C.C. § 9-102 (Proposed Draft, Nov. 2000) (governing secured transactions) defines a
consumer transaction as: "(26) "Consumer transaction" means a transaction in which (i)
an individual incurs an obligation primarily for personal, family, or household purposes,(ii) a security interest secures the obligation, and (iii) the collateral is held or acquired
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. The term includes consumer-goods
transactions."
187. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV. 95, 97 (1974). While the proposals require some
deference to otherwise mandatory consumer rules, the applicable consumer rules will not
necessarily have been created by the legislature of the consumer's home jurisdiction. We
will have to look to the foreign vendor's consumer protection laws to protect the U.S.
consumer in UCITA contracts involving electronic delivery.
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What is important to note is the negative implication of these carve-
outs. Outside the consumer context, the forum court is not to defer to
the mandatory rules of the unchosen "home" jurisdiction in any contract
within their scope unless those mandatory rules rise to the level of "fun-
damental policy." Both proposals are far broader, cover far more con-
tracts, and (by sheer force of numbers of contracts implicated) are less
deferential to the ordinarily-governing law of other jurisdictions than any
widely-known conflict of laws rules anywhere.
Apart from their consumer limitations, both provisions have a scope
that is limited in other ways. UCITA's limited scope is "computer infor-
mation transactions,"' 88 but the Act has very complex provisions dealing
with excluded contracts, 189 mixed contracts, 190 and the power of parties
to opt into UCITA by contract in mixed contracts. 191 The reach of this
proposed statute has engendered great controversy and is beyond the dis-
cussion here, 192 but in an increasingly information-driven economy, the
provision will cover a very large number of contracts every day.
The Article 1 provision states a rule for any case subject to the Uniform
Commercial Code, 193 unless displaced by a specified provision elsewhere
in the UCC.194 This means that all sales and leases of goods contracts will
be covered, as will contracts in all the other areas covered by the Uniform
Commercial Code. Thus the provision will be available for a large per-
centage of the staggeringly large number of commercial contracts formed
in our economy every day. There are no size or value limitations. Parties
188. U.C.I.T.A. § 103(a) (2000).
189. See id. § 103(d).
190. See id. § 103(b).
191. See id. § 104.
192. On this question, see, e.g., David P. Neboyskey, A Leap Forward: Why States
Should Ratify the Uniform Computer Information and Transactions Act, 52 FED. COMM.
L.J. 793 (May 2000); Cem Kaner, Why You Should Oppose UCITA, COMPUTER L., May
2000, at 20. See, generally, Pratik A. Shah, The Uniform Computer Information and Trans-
actions Act, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 85 (2000); Pamela Samuelson & Kurt Opsahl, How
Tensions Between Intellectual Property Policy and UCITA are Likely to be Resolved, in
PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK
SERIES 753 (1999) ("The essence of the issue lies in UCITA's seeming invitation for com-
panies to construct their own intellectual property rules through contract, creating a poten-
tial for conflict with intellectual property policy.").
193. See U.C.C. § 1-102 (Proposed Draft, Nov. 2000).
194. Proposed UCC § 1-301(e) provides:
(e) To the extent that the [Uniform Commercial Code] governs a transac-
tion, where one of the following provisions of the [Uniform Commercial
Code] specifies the applicable law, that provision governs and a contrary
agreement is effective only to the extent permitted by the law (including the
conflict of law rules) so specified:
(1) Section 2-xxx [subject to the drafting of Article 2]






(8) Sections 9-301 through 9-307.
U.C.C. § 1-301(e) (Proposed Draft, Nov. 2000)
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to every commercial contract from the sale to a carpenter of a screw-
driver to the large-scale business liquidation sale will be able to choose
unrelated law to cover their transaction.
The model on which both provisions are based, projected by the Re-
porters' Notes and Comments, is the "party autonomy" model. This
model is, of course, based on the idea that two parties come together,
negotiate a transaction, and freely agree to it. Since at least the 1930's,
policymakers have recognized that this paradigm is not suited to mass
produced transactions where contracts, both consumer and non-con-
sumer, are created on forms prepared by a business for repeated use with
its customers. 195 These forms are not designed to be read, discussed, or
amended. Indeed, if customers actually took the time to read and under-
stand the forms governing their everyday transactions, commerce would
slow considerably. 196 The inclusion of small, everyday business transac-
tions within the scope of both proposals' choice of law provisions is se-
verely at odds with party autonomy in fact.
Vendors' forms function to allocate risks within a transaction. The like-
lihood that a given form recipient will actually understand the risk alloca-
tion performed by a given provision on the vendor's form varies with (1)
the size of the transaction and (2) the complexity of the term itself. For
example, we could expect a customer to see and understand a non-ob-
scure, clearly-stated disclaimer of liability in a relatively small transaction.
Similarly, we might expect a customer to understand the risk-shifting ef-
fect, if any, of a choice of law provision in a $1 million transaction. The
costs to a non-drafter of discovering the meaning of a given, non-negoti-
ated contract term depends on the complexity of the term; the amount of
resources one can rationally dedicate to learning terms in a form contract
is a function of the size of the transaction. Smaller transactions can carry
fewer discovery costs than larger contracts. 197 Because a choice of law
clause incorporates the entire contract and related jurisprudence of a
given jurisdiction into the contract, it is, perhaps, the most complex and
obscure kind of provision one could find in a contract. Only in extremely
large negotiated contracts, or in form contracts where the vendor can
spread these research costs (or "legal overhead") over millions of trans-
actions, can we expect the kind of intelligent choice envisioned by the
"party autonomy" idea. There is virtually no chance that a recipient of a
form contract in a small to medium-sized commercial transaction will un-
derstand what it means to the transaction that "the law of South Dakota
195. See, e.g., Frederich Kestrel, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Free-
dom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 630 (1943); Karl Llewellyn, Book Review, 52
HARV. L. REV. 700 (1939); Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, 55 HARV. L.
REV. 198, 222 (1919).
196. They would come to a "screeching halt," in the words of Professor Ian Macneil.
Ian Macneil, Bureaucracy and Contracts of Adhesion, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 5, 5-6 (1984).
197. See Edward L. Rubin, Types of Contracts, Interventions of Law, 45 WAYNE L.
REV. 1903, 1910 (2000); William J. Woodward, Jr., "Sale" of Law and Forum and the
Widening Gulf Between "Consumer" and "Nonconsumer" Contracts in the UCC, 75 WASH.
U. L.Q. 243, 271 (1997).
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governs this transaction."' 198
As if to reinforce the point, the enacted "unlimited choice" provisions
to date (excluding UCITA) 199 have built-in limitations that ensure that
form drafters do not take advantage of their power to specify the applica-
ble law in the form. The least limited stand-alone provision, Delaware's,
is inapplicable "to any contract, agreement or other undertaking, (i) to
the extent provided to the contrary in § 1-105(2) of [the UCC] or, (ii)
involving less than $100,000."200
The recently-enacted provisions in other Articles of the UCC, also
have a narrow scope. UCC Article 4A contains such a rule, but the Arti-
cle involves transactions "overwhelmingly between business or financial
institutions" typically "involv[ing] large amounts of money" where
"[m]ultimillion dollar transactions are commonplace. 20 1 UCC Article
5's permissive rule,202 dealing with letter of credit transactions, once
again applies to typically large transactions among sophisticated parties.
Finally, the choice of "unrelated law" by issuers of investment securi-
ties20 3 is limited in its effect and occurs in a context (securities trading)
heavily overlaid by federal regulation. In each context, we can expect
either the market (operating through sophisticated parties in large trans-
actions) or governmental regulation of the market to limit the advantage
vendors might obtain without the knowledge of their customers through a
choice of law clause.
In contrast to the enacted provisions to date, the proposed choice of
law provisions in UCITA and UCC Article 1 will be available in millions
198. Alan Schwartz and Louis Wilde argue that in competitive markets the market
polices form contracts even if most don't read them because it is assumed that some will
and those who will might spread the word. This, in turn, will create competition among
vendors on contract terms, to the benefit of customers. Alan Schwartz & Louis. L. Wilde,
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Anal-
ysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 660 (1979). Professor Melvin Eisenberg asserts to the con-
trary, that the competition will not ensue because not enough people read form contracts.
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 211, 244 (1995). Others have attacked the Schwartz and Wilde argument as unsup-
ported. See R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother's Keeper: The Inability of an
Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635 (1996);
Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets
the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583 (1990).
In the context of choice of law, Professor Eisenberg's argument, extended slightly,
seems far more plausible. Even if some customers actually read the form and detect the
choice of law clause, a far smaller subgroup will discover if it has an undesirable risk-
shifting effect. In smaller transactions, that number will surely approach zero. A vendor
who can shift legal risk without having that risk reflected in the price customers are willing
to pay gains "unearned" competitive advantage over other vendors.
199. See supra note 10 (states enacting UCITA).
200. 6 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 2708 (1995). New York law says "... any obligation
arising out of a transaction covering in the aggregate not less than two hundred fifty thou-
sand dollars .... N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (McKinney 2000). U.C.C. § 1-105(2)
has a list of U.C.C. provisions that are not to be disturbed by a contractual choice of law.
An example of the proposed amended version is quoted supra in note 194.
201. U.C.C. art. 4A, Prefatory Note (Proposed Draft, Nov. 2000).
202. See id. § 5-116.
203. See id. § 8-110(d).
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of daily, ordinary transactions conducted through vendor forms.
UCITA's rule would enforce the choice of Liberian law in the sale of a
$100 software program from a Texas vendor to a Texas sole practitioner
lawyer. The Article 1 provision would permit a Texas used car vendor to
specify unrelated law in the sale of a used Texas pickup truck to a Texas
farmer. A concrete example might make more apparent some of the dif-
ficulties in application of the "unrelated" choice of law provision in rou-
tine, day-to-day transactions.
In its Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act,20 4 the
Texas legislature has addressed a wide range of business conduct that it
considers antithetical to public policy. The statutory protection may not
be waived except in limited circumstances, 205 and provides for the award
of attorneys' fees for a plaintiff who prevails in a claim under the stat-
ute. 20 6 Most significantly for our purposes, the statute has a definition of
"consumer" that is far broader than that found in UCITA, the proposed
Article 1 provision, or common understanding:
"Consumer" means an individual, partnership, corporation, this
state, or a subdivision or agency of this state who seeks or acquires
by purchase or lease, any goods or services, except that the term
does not include a business consumer that has assets of $25 million
or more, or that is owned or controlled by a corporation or entity
with assets of $25 million or more.20 7
The breadth of the Texas definition means, at a minimum, that the stat-
ute's "consumer" protection provision shelters many small businesses and
individuals who will not be protected by "consumer" provisions in the
UCC and UCITA.208 But because those Texas "consumers" will not be
UCC or UCITA "consumers," the proposed UCC and UCITA provisions
also empower them to choose non-Texas law in their UCC or UCITA
contracts. What would be the effect if our Texas used car vendor chose
Pennsylvania law (which has no comparable attorneys fee-shifting provi-
sion) in its used pickup contract with the Texas farmer and the farmer
204. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41 (Vernon 2000).
205. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42 (Vernon 2000) provides in part:
§ 17.42. Waivers: Public Policy
(a) Any waiver by a consumer of the provisions of this sub-chapter is con-
trary to public policy and is unenforceable and void; provided, however, that
a waiver is valid and enforceable if:
(1) the waiver is in writing and is signed by the consumer;
(2) the consumer is not in a significantly disparate bargaining position;
and
(3) the consumer is represented by legal counsel in seeking or acquir-
ing the goods or services.
206. See id. § 17.50(d).
207. Id. § 17.45(4).
208. The standing of businesses to sue under the statute goes unquestioned in Texas
cases. See, e.g., Arthur's Garage, Inc. v. Racal-Chubb Sec. Sys., Inc., 997 S.W.2d 803 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.); SCI Coatings Southwest, Inc. v. Drawbaugh Corp., 1998 WL
178643 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, no pet.); G. Richard Goins Const. Co., Inc. v. S.B. Mc-
Laughlin Assoc., Inc., 930 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1996, no writ).
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later sought the protection of the Texas consumer provisions? 20 9 It is far
from clear that the Texas statute would continue to operate on this en-
tirely Texas transaction despite the parties'. choice of Pennsylvania law;
the analysis would proceed roughly as follows.
210
If the litigation were conducted in state A, any state (including Texas)
that enacted the Article 1 provision, the state A court would begin by
consulting its choice of law provision, new UCC Section 1-301. Since the
farmer was not a "consumer" under Article l's more narrow definition,
she had the power under state A's new UCC choice of law provision to
choose unrelated law and the choice of Pennsylvania law would be pre-
sumptively enforceable. The hard question would be whether the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (and its fee shifting provision) represented
Texas "fundamental policy" so that it was enforceable by the State A
court under the Article 1 fundamental policy exception, notwithstanding
the choice of Pennsylvania law. The Texas statute's anti-waiver provision
would suggest that it is an important statute but, as the franchise cases
discussed earlier suggest, anti-waiver provisions are not determinative of
the question of fundamental policy.211
209. In the example, since no other state is "related" to the parties' transaction, current
law would limit their choice of law to Texas. See U.C.C. § 1-105 (1995).
210. There has been repeated discussion about limiting the kind of "unrelated" law the
parties might choose. By further limiting the parties' power to choose unrelated law, the
incidence of problem cases such as the one developed here might be reduced. The notion
has emerged in U.C.C. § 1-301, Reporter's Note a (Proposed Draft, Nov. 2000), quoted
supra in note 152. The idea may (1) restrict the parties to choosing another State's unre-
lated UCC, or (2) may limit them to choosing any kind of law, but only to cover the UCC
aspects of the transaction. Such a restriction (whatever it means) creates the kinds of "un-
derbreadth" issues discussed below in this Article. But how would such a restriction apply
to the example in the text? A Texas sale of a pickup is clearly a UCC Article 2 transaction;
unless a service contract were appended to it, it would not be, in any way, a "mixed"
transaction.
Thus, unless the Reporter's Note is read to limit the parties to unrelated states' UCC
provisions only, their choice of Pennsylvania law in this example would include their choice
of Pennsylvania's limits on fraud and other misbehavior covered by the Texas statute.
Under those circumstances, one would have to argue that the Texas law was "fundamental
policy" to obtain more protection than that offered by Pennsylvania. Such an approach
(developed below in the text) would be consistent with that taken by current law: the
choice of a "related" jurisdiction gives the parties all the law of that jurisdiction, subject to
the fundamental policy exception.
The danger of avoiding Texas' mandatory rules is reduced if the parties choosing unre-
lated law under the UCC proposal obtain only the unrelated UCC rules. But such an
approach increases commercial uncertainty. It would mean that parties choosing unrelated
law would (perhaps inevitably) get a mixture of different States' law governing their con-
tract (since many contract defenses such as fraud and duress are matters of non-UCC law)
and predicting the mixture a future court will deliver will be very difficult. Adjudication of
controversies involving such contracts will be more difficult for the courts, and it will be
more difficult for the parties to litigation to predict the outcome of the litigation.
211. In Haynesworth v. The Corporation, 121 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1997), the plaintiffs
challenged the choice of forum and law clauses inserted into their contracts with Lloyds of
London. Part of their argument was that the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act's anti-
waiver provision meant that it would be unreasonable not to apply the Texas law to the
transaction. The court never reached that question, ruling instead that the choice of forum
clause was enforceable and therefore, by implication, that a different court would rule on
that question. Id. at 966. But by noting that other Circuits had held that the choice of
foreign law had displaced the federal securities laws, id., the court may have hinted that the
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Importantly, only if Texas enacted the Article 1 provision and the liti-
gation occurred in Texas would a Texas court decide whether the state's
own consumer statute constituted Texas fundamental policy so that it was
enforceable despite the choice of Pennsylvania law.212 Moreover, as a
strict matter of precedent, the Texas Supreme Court's opinion on that
matter would not control forum courts outside Texas213 nor would an-
other state court's view on this same matter be controlling precedent, one
way or the other, for a Texas court.
Finally, even if Texas wished to avoid the question by not enacting the
proposed choice of law provision in Article 1, the non-action by its legis-
lature would be beside the point because the choice of law rule is binding
in state A, wherever that may be. Texas's simple refusal to enact the
unrelated choice of law rule will not prevent any state A from enacting it,
and will not prevent litigants from litigating their cases in those places
where it has been enacted. Indeed, in a perverse way, by refusing to en-
act the provision, the Texas legislature may cede to the courts of other
states the job of declaring Texas fundamental policy.214
2. Underbreadth
The UCITA provision applies to computer information contracts. The
UCC provision will apply to the very broad range of contracts covered by
the Uniform Commercial Code. Together these categories will comprise
a great many contracts, but not all contracts. The background conflict of
laws rule-which these provisions will partially displace-requires a rela-
tionship between the contract and the chosen law. The proposed rules
require no relationship. This will force courts to confront problems, not
currently encountered, of choosing the correct conflict of laws rule in
"mixed" contracts. The "underbreadth" problem stems from the limited
scope of the proposals and the very different conflict of laws rule that
they state for cases within their scope. The flavor of this problem and the
uncertainty it might generate can be illustrated by the familiar franchise
contract example.
Franchise contracts often include substantial sales of goods from the
franchiser or its agents to the franchisee, and this set of contractual com-
Texas statute would fare no better had the court reached the question. There was no chal-
lenge to the plaintiffs' qualification to sue as "consumers" under the Texas statute.
212. If Texas did not enact UCC § 1-301, presumably the choice of Pennsylvania law
would be unenforceable under its current UCC § 1-105, the court would apply Texas law
notwithstanding the choice, and the court would never get to the "fundamental policy"
question. If, on the other hand, Texas enacted proposed UCC § 1-301, that fact, no doubt,
would be argued either as showing a direct legislative intent to supersede this and all ear-
lier-enacted anti-waiver provisions or as an indication that the Texas legislature in some
sense "consented" to the non-mandatory status of its non-waivable "consumer" law.
213. The Texas authority would, of course, be extremely persuasive, but not binding.
214. Texas' enactment of UCC § 1-301 would be argued to be legislative "consent" to
Texas citizens' avoiding the anti-waiver provisions of the consumer statute by choosing a
different state's law. Texas's refusal to enact § 1-301 deprives litigants of that argument
and, in that sense, may have some indirect influence on the Texas fundamental policy ques-
tion as viewed by other state courts.
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mitments may be set out in the franchise contract. Sales of goods con-
tracts clearly are UCC contracts and will thus be subject to the UCC's
Article 1 rule. Employment, noncompete agreements, confidentiality,
and many other contracts are not subject to the UCC and will continue to
be controlled by the general conflict of laws rule requiring a relationship
between the chosen law and the parties or their contract. Franchise con-
tracts can mix provisions governing subjects that, alone, would be subject
to the UCC and other subjects that, alone, would not be subject to the
UCC. If in such a contract the franchiser chooses "unrelated" law to gov-
ern the contract and the dispute comes to a court with the new UCC rule,
how will a court decide whether or not a relationship with the chosen law
is required in order to make a choice of law enforceable?
Courts could use the kinds of tools they now use to decide whether
given contracts should be treated by Article 2 of the UCC or by general
contract law, such as looking to the "predominant purpose" 215 or the
"gravamen of the action. ' 216 But will it make sense that the law of one
place might control the UCC aspects of the complex contract and the law
of a different place control the non-UCC aspects? Whether the approach
is sensible or not, there will be no precedent for such an analysis at the
outset and it will probably take the courts years to come to a workable
solution. In the interim, lawyers will have difficulty advising clients with
any certainty which jurisdiction's law will control what.
F. JUSTIFICATIONS OFFERED FOR THE PROPOSED CHANGES
1. International Law and the Globalization of Commerce
Globalization has clearly had its influence on contractual choice of law.
This is most evident from the Comments and Reporters' Notes to the
proposed changes in the choice of law rules. Comment 2 to UCITA, for
example, explains:
Contract terms that choose the law applicable to the contract are
routine in commercial agreements. The information economy accen-
tuates their importance because it allows remote parties to enter and
perform contracts spanning multiple jurisdictions and operating in
circumstances that do not depend on physical location of either party
or the information. Subsection (a) enables small companies to ac-
tively engage in multinational business; if the agreement could not
designate applicable law, even the smallest business could be subject
to the law of all fifty states and of all countries in the world. That
would impose large costs and uncertainty on an otherwise efficient
system of commerce; it would raise barriers to entry. 217
The Reporters' Notes to the Article 1 proposal state:
215. See, e.g., Bob Neiner Farms, Inc. v. Hendrix, 490 N.E.2d 257 (I11. App. Ct. 1986).
216. See, e.g., Worrell v. Barnes, 484 P.2d 573 (Nev. 1971). See generally DANIEL KEAT-
ING, SALES: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 12-13 (1998); 1 W. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE SERIES § 2-102:04 (1982).
217. U.C.I.T.A. § 109 cmt. 2 (2000).
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This recognition of party autonomy with respect to governing law
has already been established in several Articles of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (see UCC Sections 4A-507, 5-116, and 8-110) and is
consistent with international norms. See, e.g., Inter-American Con-
vention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts, Article 7
(Mexico City 1994); Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods, Article 7(1) (The Hague 1986);
EC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations,
Article 3(1) (Rome 1980).218
Globalization and the influence of international law are related, but
distinct ideas. The first focus here will be on the question of whether
globalization requires policy makers to permit contracting parties to
choose unrelated law, given that their choices of law will inevitably avoid
some mandatory rules that, by definition, the parties cannot otherwise
avoid by contract. We will then consider separately whether international
conflict of laws norms are appropriately transplanted to the United States
with its distinct history and its strong traditions of federalism and states'
rights.
a. Globalization of Commerce
Increasingly, our goods and services are coming through distribution
mechanisms that originate abroad and have at least one international
contract within the chain of distribution. "Computer information,"
whether it's software, pictures, audio and video clips, or data, is increas-
ingly being delivered electronically from sources that may be physically
located anywhere in the world. The comments to UCITA state that "if
the agreement could not designate applicable law, even the smallest busi-
ness would be subject to the law of all fifty States and all countries in the
world." 219
This section envisions a young, but modern-day Bill Gates in his garage
creating new software for electronic distribution but being snuffed out by
the legal compliance costs that he will face once he decides to distribute
the software. Obviously, UCITA policy makers are projecting the judg-
ment that it is better to allow businesses, particularly start-ups, to choose
unrelated law than it is to subject them to compliance costs in all places in
which they do business. 220
A different approach is to regulate those who do business with one's
constituents or taxpayers and to prevent the use of choice of law clauses
to avoid that regulation. The European Union has done just that in the
Rome Convention's choice of law provision by imposing the mandatory
218. U.C.C. art. 1, Reporter's Notes (Proposed Draft, Nov. 2000).
219. U.C.I.T.A. § 109 cmt. 2.
220. Equally obviously, what will be good for the startups will also be good for the
Microsofts. Under the UCITA provision, the apparent intent is that all information com-
panies, large and small, will not be subject to many of the mandatory rules of places whose
law they do not choose to govern their contracts. The solution to compliance difficulties
for small companies is to reduce compliance costs for all.
20011
SMU LAW REVIEW
consumer law of the consumer's habitual place of residence in all con-
tracts through which value is distributed in that jurisdiction.2 21 Initiatives
in the European Union would further specify the consumer's jurisdiction
as the governing law and the appropriate forum as well.222 While one
might criticize the initiatives as imposing unreasonable compliance costs
on small vendors and thereby either driving them from the market or
raising prices to consumers, 223 one can also see such regulation as a form
of safety net designed to protect the less capable from the harshness of
the marketplace.
Whichever side of this argument one agrees with, however, the UCITA
provision has raised a straw man in this instance. As its own provisions
underscore elsewhere, there is no need to permit choice of unrelated law
to save a vendor the costs of complying with multiple legal regimes. As
under current law, the vendor can choose its own law to govern interstate
and many international contracts224 and UCITA makes this point very
explicit: for UCITA contracts involving electronic delivery (the kinds of
contracts likely referred to in the supporting comment)225 the applicable
mandatory consumer provisions under UCITA are those where the ven-
dor is located, not those of the vendee-consumer's jurisdiction.226
As is generally the law today, under UCITA's provision the electronic
vendor will be stuck with the mandatory consumer provisions of the juris-
diction it chooses to distribute its products from. This avoids compliance
with the law "of all 50 states and of all countries in the world." UCITA's
comments do not make clear why the law should permit that vendor to
select the law of other places to govern its contracts with non-
consumers.
227
Vendors in less technologically-advanced industries who sell their
goods throughout the United States routinely confront differing levels of
221. See Rome Convention, supra note 14, art. 5, para. 2. If the strengthened Article 1
consumer exception remains in the proposal, it will have a similar effect.
222. See Winn & Pullen, supra note 160, at 481.
223. See id. at 488.
224. See supra Part V.D.
225. Where there is physical delivery of the product, the jurisdiction where it is deliv-
ered is the law that applies in consumer contracts in the absence of an agreement.
U.C.I.T.A. § 109(b)(2) (2000). Physical delivery in multiple jurisdictions requires (at least)
some sort of physical distribution system for the electronic merchandise, something a high-
tech startup business is unlikely to have.
226. The choice of the vendor's jurisdiction is probably subject to the "fundamental
policy" exception and, under the current cases, the operation of a non-chosen state's fun-
damental policy would depend in part on the relative strength of the contacts of the chosen
and unchosen states. As the text emphasizes in several places, there is no judicial prece-
dent for measuring "fundamental policy" where the chosen state has no contacts.
227. Since, in many cases, the vendor will not know whether it is selling to a consumer
or a non-consumer, the odds are good that its forms will select one jurisdiction's law to
govern both kinds of contracts. If an "unrelated" law seems more advantageous to the
vendor than its own, the odds are that it will choose that law because it has nothing to lose
in doing so. UCITA's provision does not invalidate the choice of unrelated law for con-
sumer contracts; it merely injects the vendor's mandatory consumer provisions (and only
those mandatory consumer provisions) into the contract. The statute provides no apparent
incentive for the vendor to choose any law but that which is most beneficial to it.
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state regulatory law in the states in which they operate. When the con-
tract concerns sales or leases of goods or other contracts governed by the
UCC, current law generally permits the vendor to contractually choose its
own jurisdiction as the governing law of the contract. While the effect of
doing so is to avoid some of the mandatory rules that might otherwise
apply, a vendor seeking advantage from a particular state's law has to
establish "contacts" there to avail itself of the presumably more favorable
law. The proliferation in recent years of mail order businesses gives one a
sense that interstate businesses are, under the current system, able to
start up and cope with differing state regulation as they do business
throughout the United States.
It is, of course, possible that our economic well-being will grow under
the new proposals,228 but there is nothing in the supporting discussions
suggesting that economic growth has suffered under the current rules
governing contractual choice of law.229
b. Consistency with International Conflict of Laws Norms
The Article 1 Reporters' Notes make reference to international norms
as support for the proposed change in the law.230 As should be clear by
now, two of the treaties cited by the Reporter carve out non-international
transactions from their provisions. 231 As such, they offer questionable
support for a broader rule permitting contracting parties to choose unre-
lated law in wholly domestic (US) transactions and, a fortiori, they offer
no support for such a rule for domestic intrastate transactions. Interna-
tional conflict of laws rules are, however, important reference points in
any discussion of contractual choice of law and some have used them to
advocate more party autonomy in the conflicts rules in the United
228. This is, essentially, the contention of those who bring a law and economics analysis
to this problem. See discussion infra Part V.F.2.
229. One could easily make a case that, absent the power to create an enforceable con-
tractual choice of law, the uncertainty in forecasting the applicable law is undesirable from
an economic perspective. Indeed, some of the uncertainty in conflict of laws rules gener-
ally led to the current system permitting a choice of "related" law today. See discussion
supra Part II.A. There is no empirical work and very little scholarly opinion, however,
suggesting that the current rule of limited choice has retarded economic growth. To the
contrary, the rapid process of globalization itself suggests that business has learned to live
with the contractual choice of law rules currently in place.
230. See U.C.C. art. 1, Reporter's Note b (Proposed Draft, Nov. 2000).
231. The cited provision of the third treaty, Article 16 of the Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of Goods ("The Hague 1986"), states as
follows: "In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international
character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of
good faith in international trade." The Hague 1986, Oct. 30, 1985, art. 16, 24 I.L.M. 1573,
1577. The apparent intent in including this provision as supporting the proposal is that
there should be uniformity in choice of law rules for international commerce to flourish. It
is hard to argue with the commercial need for uniformity in choice of law rules. As will be
seen, however, the proposals follow the international model only superficially and the very
different domestic context within the United States strongly counsels caution in transplant-




The focus of this section is on a related question: whether international
conflict of laws norms are appropriately transplanted to the United
States. My contention here is an obvious one: is that our Constitutional
system of state and federal sovereignty is fundamentally different from
the international system and the differences counsel extreme caution
when using international conflict of laws rules as models for rules to gov-
ern relations within the United States.
There is a debate among conflict of laws scholars about whether there
are Constitutional limitations on contractual choice of law.2 33 The gen-
eral discussion here will not attempt to contribute to that debate; indeed,
the mere fact that there is such a debate in the United States underscores
the point that international law is a questionable model for domestic con-
flict of laws policy.
232. The needs of international business contracting are said to demand more party
autonomy. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Internationalization of Contractual Conflicts of
Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 421, 437-38 (1995) (arguing that businesses from differ-
ent countries may so distrust one another's national law that an inability to choose the law
of a "neutral" and unconnected state could be a deal-breaker); Justin P. Fletcher, An Argu-
ment for Ratification: Some Basic Principles of the 1994 Inter-American Convention on the
Law Applicable to International Contracts, 27 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 477 (1999) (allowing
parties to select law of unconnected State is supported by weight of authority, so United
States should ratify the Convention); Friedrich K. Juenger, American Conflicts Scholarship
and the New Law Merchant, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 487, 491-94 (1995) (contributing
factor to the evolution of a new law merchant is international arbitral practices which con-
fer upon arbitrators wide discretion in choosing applicable law); Arthur Rosett, Unifica-
tion, Harmonization, Restatement, Codification, and Reform in International Commercial
Law, 40 AM. J. CoMP. L. 683 (1992) (the engine driving harmonization of American and
European conflicts of law rules in commercial law is essentially political and cultural). Cf.
SCOLES ET AL., supra note 5, at 871-72 who, in commenting on an earlier draft of the UCC
provision, refer to the influence of international norms, but state:
On balance the requirement that the chosen law be connected to the transac-
tion is defensible if applied liberally and practically. Its complete absence
might permit parties to avoid the common, but not fundamental, rules of
contract law of both of their states solely because the interstate nature of
their contract permits the choice of a third law.
Id. at 871-72. The current proposal is more permissive than that which generated this com-
mentary: two parties to an intrastate transaction are permitted under the proposal to
choose the law of any other state. As will be developed, arguments for the harmonization
of choice of law rules with international norms have doubtful applicability in our domestic
context because of the U.S. Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause.
233. Choice of law seems to have everything yet almost nothing to do with the United
States Constitution. The Full Faith and Credit, Due Process, Equal Protection, Privileges
and Immunities, and Commerce Clauses all can easily be read to protect nonforum state
interests, or the interest of nonforum litigants, that are disrupted by parochial state con-
flicts decisions. Yet the Supreme Court rarely intervenes under the Constitution to protect
these interests. See Gene R. Shreve, Choice of Law and the Forgiving Constitution, 71 IND.
L.J. 271 (1996); see also Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law:
The Perspective of Constitutional Generalism, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59 (1981) (stating that
the constitutional debate centers around the extent of and the respective roles of the due
process and full faith and credit clauses of the Constitution); Laycock, supra note 15; James
A. Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 185 (1976);
Louise Weinberg, Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 440 (1982);
Russell Weintraub, Who's Afraid of Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 10 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 17 (1981).
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Instead, one can begin with the most obvious difference between the
relations among nations and the relations among states in the United
States: our state governments are not independent, sovereign nations.
They are, rather, constituent sovereignties within a larger one organized
by the Constitution. The implications of this are myriad and fundamen-
tal. For purposes of conflicts of law, the differences manifest themselves
in the respect or deference constituent states are required to give one
another under our Constitution.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution (hereinafter, the
"FF&CC") is the most obvious Constitutional provision mandating state
deference to one anothers' legal systems. It reads:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such
Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof.2 3
4
The Clause mandates a form of "comity" among States and is designed
to "bind the country together as a single nation. ''2 35 As interpreted by
the courts, the Clause requires states (with very narrow exceptions) to
defer to and enforce the judgments of one anothers' courts.236 Commen-
tators differ on the implications of the FF&CC for conflict of laws juris-
prudence. Some believe it imposes limitations on party choice of
"unrelated law."' 237 The other side of the debate contends that the
FF&CC has a very narrow role in limiting the law that a given court can
apply to a controversy. One conflict of laws authority has stated that the
FF&CC will not limit a court's application of given law to a controversy
"unless there are cogent reasons for mandating a uniform national result
under the public act, record, or judicial proceeding of another State.
Rarely if ever will this standard require choice of one state's law to apply
to a controversy not yet reduced to judgment. '238
Obviously, if the Constitution requires that the law be "related" to the
parties or contract beyond the fact of their choosing it, then it is not
234. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
235. 1 LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1247 n.50 (3d ed. 1999).
236. There is a distinction, of little importance here, between recognition and enforce-
ment of other states' judgments. The execution state's exemption laws may, for example,
limit the value of a sister state's judgment in the enforcing state. See, e.g., Caulley v. Caul-
ley, 777 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. App. 1989), affd in part, rev'd in part, 806 S.W.2d 795 (Tex.
1991). Recognition of foreign judgments (or judicial determinations) has different dynam-
ics. See, e.g., Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident &
Health Ins. Guar. Assoc., 455 U.S. 691 (1982). See generally ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD,
INTERNATIONAL LmGATION AND ARBITRATION 369-70 (1993).
237. See Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Consti-
tution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1945); Laycock, supra note 16; James A. Martin, Constitu-
tional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 185 (1976); Kirt O'Neill,
Contractual Choice of Law: The Case for a New Determination of Full Faith and Credit
Limitations, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1019 (1993).
238. Russell Weintraub, Who's Afraid of Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law,
10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 17, 25 (1981) (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 323
(1981) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
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sound policy for a provision of UCITA or of the Uniform Commercial
Code to reject that requirement. 239 Under such an interpretation of the
Constitution, international law would provide no appropriate model be-
cause there is no Constitution limiting the law that courts can apply to
controversies before them.
My focus here is on the other, potentially more interesting, side of the
debate-that which contends that the FF&CC imposes few or no legal re-
strictions on the policies states might set with respect to contractual
choice of law. If the Constitution provides no limits via the FF&CC, then
it effectively requires states to enforce each other's judgments (provided
they meet the separate requirements of due process) against property and
persons physically within their jurisdiction, regardless of the law that the
adjudicating court applied to the controversy and regardless of how the
adjudicating court interpreted that law. For brevity, I will refer to this
interpretation as the "strong FF&CC." There is no analogy to this in
international law either.
In international law there currently 240 exists no authority that requires
courts of given nations to enforce against property or persons within their
jurisdiction the judgments of other sovereign nations.241 Such enforce-
ment usually occurs, rather, as a matter of "comity"242 and this effectively
means that the enforcing court need never enforce a judgment that would
violate the enforcing court's public policy. 243 Thus, before it acts, the en-
forcing court can consider the policy decisions and implications of the
adjudicating court's judgment (including its decision as to choice of law
and the continued applicability of mandatory rules) and decide whether
they are consistent with the enforcing court's own notions of public pol-
239. My colleague, Richard Greenstein, contends that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
limits a state's power to authorize parties appearing in its courts to select "unrelated" law.
He maintains that the Article 1 provision will be unconstitutional unless uniformly enacted
and, if uniformly enacted, will cease to be "law" in the way we understand it. Richard K.
Greenstein, Is the Proposed UCC Choice of Law Provision Unconstitutional? 73 TEMPLE L.
REV. __ (forthcoming 2001); see also Richard K Greenstein, Critique of Draft Proposal
for a New UCC Choice-of-Law Provision (§ 1-301(a)), in DEREGULATORY CHOICE OF
LAW: THE UPS AND DOWNS OF CHANGING THE CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW ROLE IN
UCC ARTICLE 1 (CLE Materials for American Bar Association Annual Meeting, New
York, 2000, on file with the author). From a commercial law perspective, it would not be
sound commercial policy to enact a provision of dubious Constitutional validity because
the potential Constitutional challenge would result in commercial uncertainty.
240. Negotiations are underway in the Hague to create a regime of international en-
forcement of foreign judgments. See Ronald A. Brand, Due Process, Jurisdiction and a
Hague Judgments Convention, 60 U. PrT. L. REV. 661 (1999). Professor Brand has as-
serted that the United States could not constitutionally become a party to such a treaty. Id.
at 704.
241. In the United States, this rule, its history, and the factors militating for and against
the enforcement of foreign judgments by United States courts is amply discussed in Hilton
v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). See generally Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Judgments
in the United States and Europe, 13 J.L. & CoM. 193 (1994).
242. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163-64 (1895).
243. The Brussels Convention, while requiring enforcement of member states' judg-
ments makes this point explicitly. See infra note 245. The Convention is discussed in Ron-
ald A. Brand, Due Process, Jurisdiction and a Hague Judgments Convention, 60 U. PITT. L.
REV. 661 (1999).
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icy. If an enforcing court thought that the adjudicating court unduly dis-
regarded the enforcing court's mandatory rules, it could on that basis
(and within the discretionary limits of showing comity to the adjudicating
court) refuse to enforce the judgment.
The discretion courts have to refuse to enforce foreign judgments, of
course, permits the enforcing court to protect and advance important pol-
icies it (as sovereign) thinks should apply to those persons and property
affected by its laws.244 This dynamic of international enforcement is ex-
plicit in the Brussels Convention,245 a treaty which adds substantial gloss
to the oft-cited Rome Convention.
In Article 27 of the Brussels Convention, the European Union saw fit
to retain its member states' sovereign power to refuse enforcement of
judgments on the grounds that enforcement would violate the public pol-
icy of the enforcing state.246 A similar provision is included in the New
York Arbitration Convention which requires signatories to enforce arbi-
tration awards unless (among other reasons) they violate the public policy
of the enforcing country.247
The public policy exception to international enforcement of judgments
is an important, consistent feature of the international system. The posi-
tion the EU took in the Rome Convention that (with the limitations
noted) parties can select unrelated law to control their contract must be
read against this earlier provision of the Brussels Convention; the latter
rule is not fully understandable without the context of the former rule.
Transplanting only the unrelated choice rule for domestic use within the
United States can be expected to have a different effect than in the Euro-
pean Union.
The power to deny enforcement of a judgment or arbitral award on
public policy grounds is an important attribute of the sovereignty of the
enforcing state, reserving for the enforcing state the power to advance its
244. Cf. Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985). Mitsubishi
is an arbitration case where the Supreme Court ordered the defendant to submit to arbitra-
tion in Japan as agreed despite the defendant's contention that the plaintiff violated U.S.
antitrust laws and that a Japanese arbitration proceeding would not adequately recognize
those laws. Justice Blackmun said:
Having permitted the arbitration to go forward, the national courts of the
United States will have the opportunity at the award-enforcement stage to
ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws
has been addressed. The [New York] Convention reserves to each signatory
country the right to refuse enforcement of an award where the "recognition
or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that
country."
Id. at 638.
245. 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, 1972 J.D. (L2aa) 32 [hereinafter Brussels Convention].
246. Article 27 provides that a judgment coming from another EU member state need
not be recognized (or enforced under Article 34) "if such recognition is contrary to public
policy in the state in which recognition is sought." As will be discussed in the text, this
limitation on enforcement is critical to an understanding of the Rome Convention and of
its suitability for transplantation to the United States. Id. at 27.
247. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, art. V.2(b), 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
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own views of appropriate public policy in an appropriate case. Moreover,
the prospect of "public policy" scrutiny by an enforcing court counsels
caution for parties in the foreign litigation because they know that if the
result they achieve in the adjudicating court violates the enforcing court's
policies or exceeds the enforcing court's relevant limits, enforcement may
be denied and the litigation victory worthless. 248 This party caution may
in turn work its way through the system in a way that minimizes the fre-
quency with which enforcing courts are confronted with judgments or
awards that violate public policy as perceived by the enforcing court.249
There are, of course, no such dynamics among courts in the United
States and no explicit public policy exceptions in the FF&CC. An enforc-
ing court must enforce a sister state judgment (provided it meets mini-
mum Due Process requirements) even if the judgment is based on
something completely repugnant to its own public policy.250 In the con-
text of contractual choice of law, if an adjudicating court concluded that
the unrelated law was, in fact, agreed to, Due Process considerations of
fairness would likely be met and, by hypothesis, a Constitutional chal-
lenge at trial on the basis of the strong FF&CC would be unavailable.
Enforcement of the resulting judgment would be required despite the ad-
judicating court's disregard of unchosen mandatory rules and despite any
erroneous views either finding or interpreting the fundamental policy of
the enforcing court.
There is nothing new here. These critical differences between interna-
tional and United States law at the judgment enforcement stage are a
feature of our present conflict of laws system. Under the current rules
permitting parties to choose only "related" law, the possibility exists that
the FF&CC will, as happened in Fauntleroy v. Lum,251 occasionally re-
quire a State to enforce a judgment that is repugnant to its own public
policy. The decision in Modern Computer Systems v. Modern Banking
248. Cf. 9 DEBTOR CREDITOR LAW § 37.02 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2000).
249. In developing and shaping a case to be tried under law that differs substantially
from that in the enforcing jurisdiction, the risk-aggressive international litigator may well
flirt with what she regards as the limits of the enforcing jurisdiction's public policy. She is
not likely, however, to go far over that imaginary line if she believes that coercive enforce-
ment of the judgment may be required: to do so would invite a public policy defense that
would seriously complicate eventual enforcement of the judgment. The domestic litigant
need have little fear that a state judgment violating the public policy of the enforcing state
will, on that account, encounter enforcement difficulties.
250. In Faunderoy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908), two Mississippi parties made a gam-
bling contract that was performed in Mississippi at a time when such contracts were de-
clared criminal and unenforceable in Mississippi courts. When the defendant breached,
the plaintiff won an arbitration award, notwithstanding the illegal nature of their contract.
He then sued to judgment on the arbitration award in Missouri, and then returned with the
Missouri judgment to Mississippi for enforcement. The Mississippi Supreme Court ulti-
mately refused enforcement on public policy grounds but was reversed by a closely divided
Supreme Court. Justice Holmes, over a strong dissent by Justice White, made it clear that
public policy was not an element in the enforcement of a sister state's judgment. One can
see the flavor of Justice White's dissent in the opening quotation to this Article.
251. Id.
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Systems,252 the Minnesota franchise case discussed earlier,253 could have
led to the Minnesota court being required to enforce a judgment predi-
cated on a wrong view of the strength of Minnesota's franchisee protec-
tion policy. Had it been a foreign judgment, the Minnesota court could
have refused to enforce it based on its view of its own public policy.
The fact that an enforcing state may be required to enforce a repugnant
domestic judgment under our current system begs the question of what
difference it might make if we were to transfer from international law the
party autonomy model for choosing law without, at the same time, trans-
planting the power of the enforcing court to reject enforcement of sister
state judgments on public policy grounds. The main problem is one of
numbers: the change would substantially exacerbate an unfortunate by-
product of the FF&CC.25 4
The numbers of cases in which enforcing courts will be faced with judg-
ments where the adjudicating court has disregarded the enforcing state's
mandatory rules (whether "fundamental" or not) will rise dramatically
under the proposals. 255 Our current system is one in which the choice of
law rule permits advantage-seeking within the narrow limits imposed by
its relatedness requirement. Removing the relatedness requirement
makes advantage-seeking a much larger enterprise because, with a far
greater number of permissible jurisdictions to choose from, the chances
are far better that there will be more advantageous rules to select. One
would predict that choosing the "best" law will be much more central to
transactional practice than it is today. We should also find far more
choice of law clauses which choose law that deviates from the law that
would otherwise apply (because the advantages will lie elsewhere). This
will be particularly true if the system works the way Professor Larry Rib-
stein and colleagues project through economic analysis256 and jurisdic-
tions begin "competing" with one another to produce favorable law that
more parties will select.
252. 871 F.2d 734 (8th Cir. 1988).
253. The discussion appears supra in Part IV.B.1.
254. The political thrust of the FF&CC, embracing a principle of "comity" among the
states, is arguably violated by both the UCITA and Article 1 proposals. As will be devel-
oped, this political principle is violated because, in essence, forum State legislatures will be
authorizing citizens of unchosen states to disregard many of the ordinarily-applicable
mandatory rules of their own jurisdictions by choosing unrelated law. This is far from the
idea that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis sup-
plied); see also Richard K. Greenstein, Is the Proposed UCC Choice of Law Provision
Unconstitutional? (Manuscript on file with the author). Uniform enactment reduces the
Constitutional problems the proposals bring to our federal system but they then unravel
the political vision articulated by Justice White in Fauntleroy. See id.
255. The situation is actually still more complex than this because the enforcing court is
not necessarily the court whose law would have applied and whose public policy may have
been disregarded. The enforcing court will be in whichever jurisdiction the defendant or
her property are located. But the existence of the defendant or her property in the enforc-
ing jurisdiction raises the odds that, in any given case, it will be the enforcing jurisdiction's
law which would have applied absent the contractual choice of law.
256. See infra Part V.F.2.
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We would thus expect to find more instances in which the law used in
arriving at the underlying judgment differed from the enforcing state on a
matter of fundamental policy, but the enforcing court was required to
enforce the judgment anyway. To give a simple example, in a purely local
New York private lending contract, today's parties are subject to New
York's usury restrictions. 257 Why, if it were possible, would not the well-
counseled New York lender select the law of a place with no such restric-
tions? If that choice were authorized by the UCC2 58 and sustained by an
adjudicating court, and no New York "fundamental policy" were
found,259 New York would be required to enforce the judgment even if it
considered its own usury restrictions to be fundamental policy. The same
would be true for a similar New York-New Jersey lending contract where
both states had usury restrictions and South Dakota had none. Today the
law of South Dakota is not an option; New York's usury restrictions have
some teeth because banks and other lenders must expend the resources
to establish a presence in South Dakota to avail themselves of its differ-
ent attitude to usury. 260 If the UCC provision will apply to such a trans-
action, nothing more than a contract clause would be required to obtain
the same result, and enforcement of a judgment containing usurious in-
terest in New York or New Jersey would be required under the
FF&CC.261
257. See N.Y. BANKINc LAW § 173 (McKinney 2000).
258. It is unclear whether this will be a UCC transaction due to the limited scope of the
UCC. If the transaction itself is subject to the UCC, it is unclear (because of under-
breadth) whether the parties may select an unrelated state law to govern the interest fees
charged. See infra Part V.F.4.
259. Most courts are reluctant to declare usury to be fundamental policy under the
current cases so the situation in the text is a distinct possibility. As will become clear later
in the discussion, however, it will become extremely hard to predict outcomes on funda-
mental policy issues under the proposals because we have neither precedent nor legal tra-
dition for doing so.
260. National credit card companies have, in fact, done that and persuaded the Su-
preme Court that the usury restrictions that other states had enacted for their citizens were
preempted by the National Bank Act in Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735 (1996). Smiley
permits lenders operating out of South Dakota to avail themselves of that state's lenient
attitude to usury when dealing with customers in other states. Note, however, that lenders
do have to establish a presence in South Dakota in order to take advantage of South Da-
kota's laws. That expense of avoiding the New York law will ensure that there is some
non-negligible level of compliance with it. See generally Lawrence Friedman, Two Faces of
Law, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 13 (1984). Allowing parties to avoid the law with a contract provi-
sion will reduce compliance (at least among the legally informed) to nearly zero.
261. Some might argue that, since larger companies can establish offices or subsidiaries
almost anywhere and thereby take advantage of the law of the satellite location (since it
then may be "related"), the law ought to allow businesses to do by contract what they now
have to do through the expense of relocation. A populist variant of the argument is that
changing the law would allow the smaller companies to do what the large companies can
already do (but at some expense) now. Stating the argument in somewhat more negative
terms, one might argue that since some businesses can now avoid regulation that would
otherwise apply by setting up satellites, we should permit all businesses to avoid regulation
by contract so as not to disadvantage the smaller businesses.
Whether the argument persuades depends on whether one thinks that businesses ought
to be able to choose law in order to gain the advantages of "more favorable law" as distin-
guished from simply eliminating uncertainty. The possibility of obtaining advantage
through a choice of law clause is, in my view, an unfortunate but unavoidable implication
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By authorizing choice of unrelated law in all contracts, large and small,
domestic and international, the proposals substantially increase the fre-
quency that this byproduct of the FF&CC will occur. At the political
level of the FF&CC, these proposals will probably increase dramatically
the instances in which otherwise-applicable mandatory rules will be ren-
dered ineffective by the acts of will of parties to contracts. The frequency
of these occurrences could be correspondingly reduced by reducing the
number of contracts in which choice of unrelated law were authorized.
Limiting the change to international contracts would likely reduce the
numbers substantially.262
2. Economic Well-Being
A relatively recent arrival in the debate about contractual choice of law
is that of Professor Larry Ribstein and his colleagues who argue that eco-
nomic efficiency requires the "deregulation" of contractual choice of law.
For UCITA, their argument is that free choice of law will encourage indi-
vidual states to be more responsive to the needs of high-technology.2 63
This will come about as parties "choose" the law most beneficial to their
transaction and as states compete for the resulting legal business.2 64
Eventually, the law may gravitate to one form, effectively in use by all
transactors, and thereby avoid the problems of lack of uniformity that
usually come with state commercial legislation.2 65
of our current conflict of laws rule which is based primarily on the need to remove uncer-
tainty. The fact that some businesses have found ways to avoid regulation through choice
of law rules does not justify extending the "privilege" to all businesses or making the
avoidance process any easier than it now is. To shelter income from creditors, the wealthy
have developed offshore trusts. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d 1228 (9th
Cir. 1999). It does not follow that policy makers should create a low-cost way to accom-
plish the same thing so that, in the interests of equality, everyone can enjoy the "privilege."
Doing so will simply reduce the level of compliance with given legal regulations which, if
one is rich or determined enough, one can nearly always avoid. See generally Friedman,
supra note 260.
Obviously, if one thinks that businesses ought to be able to gain advantage-to com-
pete, as it were-through choice of law clauses, one comes to the opposite conclusion. See
O'Hara & Ribstein, supra note 84.
262. Limiting the change to international contracts does not solve the problem because
our domestic courts are bound to enforce sister-states' judgments regardless of the law
used by the state court to reach its judgment. Thus if the parties chose unrelated Albanian
law in an international contract, and a U.S. court decided the case using that law, its judg-
ment would be entitled to full faith and credit if enforcement were requested in another
state. It is not the law used by the forum, but the identity of the forum (state or foreign
country) that determines whether or not the judgment is entitled to full faith and credit.
263. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Uniformity, Choice of Law And
Software Sales, 8 GEO. MASON L. REv. 261 (1999).
264. Although somewhat obscure, the economic benefits that states presumably will
compete for are those that come with the legal litigation business. That business will come
as parties choose a forum which will enforce the choice of law. Under the proposals, par-
ties may well tend to choose the same law and forum although neither UCITA nor the
UCC proposal requires that.
265. Kobayashi & Ribstein state:
As long as at least one state adopts a UCITA-type law-perhaps a state
seeking to attract software manufacturers-software sellers and their cus-
tomers can contract for application of this law. The law might thereby be-
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Professor Ribstein and his colleagues have reiterated their argument in
many versions.266 It is founded on the proposition that legislators are
often motivated to create "inefficient" laws and the best viable solution,
given this political inevitability, is to permit contracting parties to choose
their own laws to govern their contracts.267 This idea, in turn, relies heav-
ily on "public choice theory," which holds, among other things, that legis-
lators are driven largely by campaign contributions and other economic
motivators supplied by various interest groups.268 Ribstein and his col-
leagues argue that such interest groups can induce legislators to "expro-
priate" wealth from those outside the jurisdiction even when it is
economically inefficient (in a larger sense) to do so. 269 Because, under
these circumstances, it is impossible to determine whether a given law
will be "efficient" or "inefficient," they claim that greater economic bene-
fits will come from permitting the market to decide, by allowing the par-
ties to contracts to decide for themselves. 270 In advancing these
arguments, Ribstein and colleagues have clearly opted for an individual-
ist, market-centered approach to lawmaking that is largely at odds with
traditional, fundamental notions of sovereignty and lawmaking, as ex-
come a standard even if only one state adopts it, just as Delaware law serves
as a standard for corporate law.
Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 263, at 294.
Contrary to Kobayashi & Ribstein's suggestion, it should be clear that non-litigation
economic benefits (such as the influx of high-tech businesses) do not necessarily flow to a
state by its enacting UCITA. Companies need not be located in a UCITA state to take
advantage of any of its provisions. Rather, they need merely to choose UCITA and then
get their litigation into a state whose courts will validate their choice of law. The proposals
operate very differently from Delaware Corporation law which extracts fees from corpora-
tions that elect to become Delaware corporations. No fees will be owing a state whose law
is chosen by the parties under these proposals.
266. Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 262; O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, Interest
Groups, Contracts and Interest Analysis, 48 MERCER L. REV. 765 (1997); O'Hara & Rib-
stein, supra note 83; Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245(1995); Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware, Lawyers, and Contractual Choice of Law, 19 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 999 (1994);1 Francesco Parisi & Larry E. Ribstein, Choice of Law, THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 236 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
267. See O'Hara & Ribstein, supra note 84.
268. See, e.g., Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339
(1988). For full descriptions and critiques of public choice, see Mark Kelman, On Democ-
racy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public
Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson,
Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism and Democratic
Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121 (1990).
269. O'Hara and Ribstein, for example, state:
[L]egislators can increase their campaign contributions and other perks by
brokering wealth transfers that end up favoring the members of some inter-
est groups at the expense of others. The winning interest groups are typically
those who can organize most cheaply and effectively to raise and spend
money, or to mobilize votes and other political resources. Successful interest
groups tend to be those that are best able to prevent some members from
free riding off of expenditures and other political efforts by others. Because
relatively small, homogeneous groups often can more effectively contain free
riding, resulting legislation may fail to serve the interests of even a majority
of voters.
O'Hara & Ribstein, supra note 84.
270. See id.
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pressed by Justice White in Fauntleroy.271
There are some obvious points to make that one might characterize as
political. First, if choice of unrelated law is a solution to the lack of state
law uniformity, it may be a perverse one, proceeding from a view of state
lawmakers as venal and almost exclusively focused on their own material
well-being. Second, as Ribstein and colleagues imply,272 their approach
makes the entire uniform state laws process unnecessary (and perhaps
incoherent) because, as long as parties can choose the "best" law, some
legislature will be there to produce it and contracting parties will eventu-
ally gravitate towards it.273 Third, state legislatures are elected by their
constituents, but under this analysis, voters will not be the real constitu-
ency. Rather, legislators will be legislating for those who bring their liti-
gation or other business to the enacting state. At the same time, they will
be permitting their own constituents to opt out (by choosing other states'
law) of the legal regimes they create to govern those over whom they
have jurisdiction. The discussion that follows will not focus on the politi-
cal points, rather, the focus here will be on the economic assumptions and
implications of these theories if they are implemented in the real world.
Ultimately, these theories hope for the production of better state laws
(and at least some drift in the direction of uniformity) as states respond to
individual decisions to choose their law to the exclusion of other "com-
peting" law. Millions of daily individual decisions will supposedly pro-
duce a "market" for law that will influence what is produced, much as
buying decisions influence the size of cars or the color of beer. Whether
the market will work or not work to create efficient laws depends on
whether enough of the actors in the market are making relatively in-
formed choices, that is, whether they are fairly evaluating the alternative
legal regimes and choosing the law that is "best." It is here that these
economic theories begin to take on water.
As suggested below,274 forming even a partially-informed view of a
271. They admit as much. They state:
Instead of a choice-of-law system that allocates political power among the
states, this article proposes a system based on principles of wealth-maximiza-
tion and individual choice. Emphasizing states' interests and powers is mis-
guided from this perspective because political leaders cannot be expected to
maximize social welfare. Rather, political decision-making is infected by the
agency costs that inevitably follow delegation of power.
Id.
272. Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 263, at 296.
273. Thus, under the proposals, any state's non-uniform commercial code could become
the de facto standard for the United States if enough drafters chose that law rather than
the UCC of other States. This non-uniform commercial code need not have been sub-
jected to the approval process of the UCC's sponsoring organizations, the American Law
Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The
possibility that any commercial code could become the UCC will reduce the importance of
that approval process and, ultimately, the influence of participants in that process on the
"official" UCC thereby promulgated. The possibility that some small state could be "cap-
tured" by special interests and, de facto, produce the commercial law for the entire United
States could generate a movement for the federalization of commercial law.
274. See infra Part VI.B.
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particular state's law could be an enormously complex project. Deciding
whether a given legal regime is "better" than another requires at least
some comparisons of legislation, judicial decisions, civil procedure, and
the quality of the judiciary. Today, with respect to ordinary contracts,275
this legal problem may be manageable because contracting parties in or-
dinary cases have a menu of only a few choices of "related" law from
which to choose. Given these limits to choice, many contracting parties
today may well make their choices primarily to eliminate later litigation
on the choice of law point (a primary reason for permitting the parties to
choose law in the first place), 276 not necessarily to acquire the advantages
that one state's substantive law may have over another's. 277 With today's
limitations, choice of law clauses may well be an afterthought, included
not so much for the advantages of the substantive law chosen, as for the
elimination of a troublesome litigation issue.
However difficult the legal problem of selecting law is regarded today,
it will become far more difficult when contracting parties have fifty or
more jurisdictions to choose from. The change may bring choice of law
clauses to the forefront in contract drafting and, if Ribstein and col-
275. The United States and the United Kingdom differ from the rest of the world by
permitting a corporation to choose where to incorporate without actually locating there.
See Francene M. Augustyn, A Primer for Incorporating Under the Income Tax Laws of
France, Germany, or the United Kingdom, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 267, 279 (1985) (ex-
plaining that in the United Kingdom the place of incorporation does not need be where the
corporation is located); Terence L. Blackburn, The Unification of Corporate Laws: The
United States, the European Community and the Race to Laxity, 3 GEO. MASON INDEP. L.
REV. 1, 57 (1994) (explaining that in the United States the place of incorporation does not
need be where the corporation is located); Roberta Romano, Corporate Law as the Para-
digm for Contractual Choice of Law, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACt
371 (1999).
While this feature of domestic corporate law has been the paradigm for Ribstein and his
collaborators, the incorporation decision is normally a one-time momentous decision, usu-
ally involves enough projected value to support the costs of performing research into com-
peting corporate law regimes, and usually affects widely-scattered investors who are
affected by the choice. Forming a corporation is very unlike making a contract; there are
very few contracts whose dynamics are even remotely comparable. See Romano, supra.
276. See Mark J. Kelsen, Choice-of-Law, Venue, and Consent-to-Jurisdiction Provisions
in California Commercial Lending Agreements: Can Good Draftsmanship Overcome Bad
Choice-of-Law Doctrine?, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1337, 1338 (1990) ("By their nature, con-
tractual choice-of-law provisions are intended to prevent litigation of conflicts-of-law
questions.").
277. To acquire the benefits of a given jurisdiction's substantive law, a contracting party
under today's rules may have to locate there. Given the expense of relocation, the differ-
ences in the law of two states must be significant enough to support both the research and
the costs of relocation. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political &
Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542, 542-60 (1990) (describing the willingness of
corporations through history to both relocate or reincorporate in another state in order to
take advantage of the other state's laws). It may well be that many corporations physically
locate in New York today in part to take advantage of its well-developed commercial law.
Cf. SCOLES, supra note 5, at 872.
Under the proposals, the incentive to physically locate in a given jurisdiction is lost
because the benefits of that place's law could be acquired by simply choosing that place's
law in the contract; locating there would be unnecessary. Under the new incentive struc-
ture of the proposals, New York might receive litigation business (if the contracts chose
New York as the forum as well as the law), but whatever legal incentives its substantive law
now provides to locate there would be lost.
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leagues are correct, will motivate state legislatures to differentiate their
law from the other states (and advertise it) in order to compete.
It is, however, very difficult to conceive of a more complex legal judg-
ment than whether one legal regime will be "better" for a given transac-
tion than another. Coming to a beneficial decision of which law to select
(if it is possible to do so at all) will be the province of experts handling
very large transactions or creating forms that may be used across millions
of mass market transactions which, together, can carry the "cognitive
load. '278 Smaller contracts simply will not "carry" the transaction costs
of learning the law of many jurisdictions that would make a sensible com-
parison of them possible . Given that some comparison of legal regimes
and a reasoned choice among them is essential to obtain the eventual
benefits of the economic model, the law ultimately produced (because
most often selected) will be responsive to the choices made by parties to
transactions that can carry the substantial costs of law-comparison: those
parties who engage in discrete large transactions and those parties who
create form contracts for use by customers without amendment in mass
transactions. 279
As if responding to the economic analysis underlying Professor Rib-
stein's theory,280 all current rules that permit the choice of "unrelated"
law effectively carve out consumer transactions from the rule.281 Profes-
sor Ribstein, on the other hand, considers any such carve-out to be bad
policy. 282 And, indeed, restrictions on choice of law will mean, under his
theory, that "efficient" law will be produced more slowly.283 But, be-
cause "efficient" outcomes require informed choices by both contracting
parties, it seems more likely that the consumer exception is far too nar-
row to permit the eventual production of truly "efficient" law.
Given the impossibility that parties to small transactions will under-
stand the implications of the drafter's selection of a given law to control
the contract, the question becomes whether there are constraints coming
from the market that will limit drafter choices. Some scholars have ar-
gued that because some people read form contracts, suppliers are con-
strained by the market from producing "inefficient" terms in their
forms.2 84 Whatever the merits of that argument when the contract terms
278. This colorful term is used in Karen Eggleston, et al., The Design and Interpretation
of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 91 (2000).
279. Cf. Romano, supra note 274 (which considers the extension of Professor Ribstein's
choice of law analysis to securities and franchise contracts).
280. There is no evidence that the drafters or others involved in the UCC revision pro-
cess are familiar with Professor Ribstein's theories.
281. The "stand-alone" statutes apply to transactions of at least $100,000, see supra note
200; the current UCC provisions apply to funds transfers, securities transactions, and let-
ters of credit, see supra text accompanying notes 200-02; and the UCITA and Article 1
proposals have explicit consumer exceptions.
282. See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 263, at 301.
283. See id. at 302.
284. See authorities cited supra in notes 195-96.
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are disclaimers or other risk-shifting provisions,285 it seems completely
out of place in the context of choice of law. Choice of law clauses are
fundamentally different from any other contract provisions because of
the amount of information they carry that is inaccessible to non-drafters.
The nature and inherent complexity of choice of law clauses make it hard
to believe that any non-drafters will understand such clauses adequately
to discriminate among them in any but very large transactions. Even if a
party receiving a form contract choosing the law of, say, Arkansas took
the time to read the form, 286 the odds are extremely remote that the re-
cipient would expend resources to determine the meaning of the clause.
There are no consumer groups or other services that give parties to form
contracts meaningful information through which they can easily compare
the terms of the form contracts.287 If customers are unable to discrimi-
nate among choice of law clauses, then they will be unable to make
choices on the basis of them, an essential ingredient to market
constraint.288
If, as Professor Ribstein and colleagues argue, legislatures will produce
law to attract business via choice of law clauses, their law production will
likely be responsive to the selections made by parties to very large con-
tracts and to vendors or drafters of form contracts in mass market trans-
actions. Thus, if Professor Ribstein's theory holds, jurisdictions will
compete for vendor business by producing vendor-friendly law. There is
no reason to believe that laws written by massmarket vendors will neces-
285. The argument in that context depends on how many people actually read form
contracts, which is an empirical question, and there is disagreement that enough actually
do. See Melvin Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 211, 244 (1995); R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother's Keeper: The Inabil-
ity of an Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635,
635-36 (1996); Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Eco-
nomics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583 (1990). There is very little empirical data
available on the question.
286. Simply reading a form contract may well be economically irrational. See Edward
L. Rubin, Types of Contracts, Interventions of Law, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1903 (2000).
287. In the nearly infamous recent case of Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d
569, 575 (1998), the court held that a particularly onerous arbitration provision that essen-
tially foreclosed all relief for buyers of Gateway computers was substantively
unconscionable.
While this was a substantial victory for consumers, it is worth noting that Gateway was
willing to permit its clause to find its way into a published judicial decision that one could
anticipate would be widely disseminated. Moreover, Gateway operates in one of the most
intensely competitive markets in the United States and its population of would-be buyers
are sophisticated and extremely communicative.
If the market constrains suppliers' use of onerous terms, one would expect such clauses
not to appear in form contracts in competitive industries with highly competitive customers
or, at minimum, that those who use them will avoid the publicity that accompanies pub-
lished judicial decisions. While this writer is unlikely ever to purchase a Gateway com-
puter, there is little evidence that the Brower case has had any impact on Gateway's sales.
Gateway's willingness to risk letting the case go to judgment suggests its own belief that
there would be little impact.
288. Choice of law clauses presumably affect a vendor's bottom line but there will be no
reason for vendors to reflect the economic differences in choice of law clauses in their
prices because customers will not, by hypothesis, be able to connect a lower price with a
more customer-hostile law.
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sarily be "efficient." Whatever the "true" efficiency of vendor warranty
protection and concomitant limits on disclaimers,289 unconscionability
limits, restraints on penalty clauses, and the like, strong provisions of this
kind seem unlikely in jurisdictions in which mass market vendors indi-
rectly "capture" the lawmakers through choice of law clauses in their
form contracts.
In our current political process, the effect of having the provisions
work as this economic theory predicts, is simply to eliminate non-repeat
players as an influence on state legislation because non-repeat players
will have little or no influence on the choices of law that vendors make in
their form contracts. This is not only implicit political disenfranchise-
ment,2 90 it is an "inefficient" outcome.
There is one final problem with the economic account. Paradoxically,
Professor Ribstein and colleagues do not explain why those with organi-
zation, wealth, or power will exert any less influence on lawmaking under
their theories than heretofore. That is, they do not explain why their sys-
tem will be any less "political" (in their venal sense) than the system we
have today. Indeed, the perverse nature of the political system they de-
scribe may get worse rather than better under their economic model.
They envision state legislatures making their law more "efficient" in
order to draw those who draft contracts to their law. But why would
those with power and influence wait until "better" laws indirectly worked
their way into such a system? There is nothing in these economic theories
which will keep interest groups from approaching a state directly with
campaign contributions, effectively "bribing" a state's lawmakers to con-
struct a legal system more to their liking, and then subjecting others to
that legal system through choice of law clauses.291 This economic analysis
is built on the view that such lawmaking is both prevalent in state legisla-
tures and inefficient, but the theories contain little that will constrain the
lobbying and campaign contribution activity that produces "inefficient"
law. The possibility that the legislature of some state, whose legislators
may work only part time, will effectively create the "uniform" commer-
cial law for the rest of the United States is an unsettling prospect.
3. Uniformity
It seems clear that if the provisions work the way Professor Ribstein
and his colleagues envision,292 the law of one state-the state offering the
289. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-316 (2000).
290. Buyers may "vote" in the market by making their purchases, but if they are unable
to understand vendors' different choice of law clauses, they will be unable to discriminate
among them and therefore cannot "vote" on them in any way that will influence those who
make the laws. The choice of Arkansas law in a Pennsylvania form contract makes Flor-
ida's "butterfly ballot" appear lucid by comparison.
291. Their influence could be exerted in more subtle ways. One author has described a
process where he asserts that the interests of financial institutions effectively "captured"
the ALI/NCCUSL process of developing a redraft of Article 9 of the UCC. See Robert E.
Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783 (1994).
292. See discussion supra in Part V.F.2.
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most "efficient law"-will be selected in many contracts and the indirect
result of this will be de facto uniformity of the law nationally.293 If one
pursues this aspect of their analysis, the development of uniform State
legislation is, at best, an ineffectual way to obtain uniformity. Indeed,
their analysis makes lawmaking as we know it somewhat incoherent
since, if contracting parties can choose the applicable law, lawmakers will
no longer be responsive to voting constituents but, rather, to those per-
sons everywhere in the world who draft (or influence the drafting of)
contracts.
An example may make this more clear. Non-uniform amendments to
the UCC, an implication of the fact that our commercial law is state law,
present a problem of non-uniformity that many think is undesirable in the
Uniform Commercial Code. 294 Permitting the choice of unrelated law
could solve the non-uniform amendment problem, at least for non-con-
sumers. Under the Article 1 proposal, for example, if one state saw fit to
create a particular non-uniform amendment that made sense to con-
tracting parties (or to those who draft form contracts), those parties
would select that state's law and the non-uniform amendment would be-
come the de facto norm nationally. By the same token, a state enacting a
non-uniform amendment unliked by contracting parties or those who
draft form contracts would be, essentially, dead letter for non-consumers
because parties would simply choose a state's Uniform Commercial Code
that did not contain the non-uniform amendment and thereby avoid it.
Ironically, this potential consequence substantially reduces the effec-
tiveness (and perhaps the very meaning) of the Uniform Laws process
itself. As a simple example, the UCC Article 2 Drafting Committee has
vacillated sharply with respect to the Statute of Frauds. This mandatory
rule was absent from early drafts,295 presumably following recommenda-
tions from an ABA Study Committee "that the Drafting Committee care-
fully consider whether to repeal the statute of frauds. ' 296 The most
recent draft includes the mandatory rule that sales contracts over a partic-
ular value must be reflected in a writing.2 97
If the Article 1 proposal remains, then all the hand-wringing about the
Statute of Frauds will have been a substantially wasted effort.298 Judging
by the Reporter's Note, the Article 1 drafters do not consider the Statute
293. See generally Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 263, at 301.
294. See generally F. Stephen Knippenberg & William J. Woodward, Jr., Uniformity and
Efficiency in the Uniform Commercial Code: A Partial Research Agenda, 45 Bus. LAW.
2519 (1990); Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law: A Comparative
Analysis of Common Law and Code Methodologies, in JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS
OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW (Judy S. Krauss & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000).
295. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201 (Proposed Draft, June 1996).
296. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, P.E.B. STUDY
GROUP, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2, PRELIMINARY REPORT 52 (1990).
297. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (Proposed Draft, June 2000). The contract must involve goods
for a price in excess of $5,000 for the requirement to be applicable.
298. The consumer exception in the Article 1 proposal means that avoidance by con-
sumers and those who do business with consumers will be more difficult. In that sense,
UCC mandatory rules will have some bite.
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of Frauds to be "fundamental policy. '299 This means that if the parties
can find and select the law of some state which has enacted a version of
Article 2 without the Statute of Frauds, they will have effectively avoided
whatever policy the drafters had in mind when they included the
mandatory rule within Article 2. The same will probably be true of
nearly all of the now-mandatory rules within the UCC.3°° With the Arti-
cle 1 proposal in place, none of those rules, even if nearly uniformly en-
acted, will necessarily become the uniform law within the United States.
Rather, non-uniform substitutes for those provisions enacted by one or
more states could become the de facto uniform standard if parties widely
chose those versions (rather than the uniform version) in their contracts.
This could result in a form of uniformity for non-consumers and others
permitted to choose unrelated law, but one that would be very difficult to
manage. Reporting services and other publicly-available legal materials
report the laws that are enacted, not those actually used by parties to
contracts. If, say, the Utah "non-uniform" rule on some point became
dominant through use, how would others learn that it was the de facto
standard? Which rule (unused Official UCC rule or dominant Utah rule)
would the law schools teach? Which should the bar examiners test? Law
that is dependent not on widespread public enactment and reporting but,
rather, on widespread private use could be called "uniform" but one won-
ders if it can be called "law" in the sense we now understand it.3 °1
4. Certainty
One of the primary reasons advanced for making these substantial
changes in the choice of law rules is achieving more "certainty" in con-
299. See U.C.C. § 1-301, Reporter's Note f (Proposed Draft, Nov. 2000); see also supra
text following note 173.
300. The proposal specifies those rules of the UCC that may not be avoided through a
choice of law clause. U.C.C. § 1-301(f) (Proposed Draft, Nov. 2000); see also supra note
195. The Reporter's Note describing "fundamental policy" was redrafted for the Decem-
ber 2000 Draft. It stated one example of "fundamental policy":
On the other hand, this Article imposes on parties a non-waivable duty of
good faith in the performance and enforcement of contracts. If the parties
designate the law of a State or country that does not impose a similar obliga-
tion of good faith but, in the absence of such designation, this Article would
apply, a court could conclude that application of the law of that State or
country so as to avoid imposing an obligation of good faith would be con-
trary to a fundamental policy of the State or country whose law would other-
wise govern.
U.C.C. § 1-301, Reporter's Note 3 (Proposed Draft, Dec. 2000). If deleting the good faith
requirement in its entirety might violate "fundamental policy," what about either deleting
"commercial reasonableness" from its definition, cf. U.C.C. § 1-201(22) (Proposed Draft,
Nov. 2000), or permitting the parties to the contract to define the standards for its imple-
mentation? Given the narrow intended ambit of "fundamental policy" specified in the
Reporter's Notes, and the statutory breakout of these particular rules, it is likely that few
of the other now-mandatory rules will be binding on parties who choose other law that
does not have such rules.
301. This is, of course, a direct implication of the economic theories that see lawmakers
as appropriately responsive to the desires of private business interests rather than the will
of political constituents-"the public."
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tracting. It is said that by deleting the "reasonable relationship" require-
ment, we will eliminate one source of uncertainty and thereby achieve
some economic gains.
If uncertainty in contracting had been generated by the question of
whether the law chosen in a contract was "related" to the contract or the
parties, we would expect to see substantial case law parsing when selected
law was-and was not-related to given contracts. Yet, as developed ear-
lier,30 2 there are comparatively few cases. If there is other evidence that
the "relatedness" question is a serious source of uncertainty, it is not evi-
dent in the Official Comments to the UCITA rule or Reporters' Notes to
the Article 1 Proposal.
What is worse, contrary to drafters' hopes for enhanced certainty, there
is good reason to think that certainty and predictability will actually de-
crease under the proposals, at least for the foreseeable future.
Eliminating the requirement that chosen law be "related" to the parties
or transaction may increase certainty by removing that issue from the
analysis. But the sharpness of the break from the conflict of laws rule
operable in non-UCITA and non-UCC contracts will create uncertain
scope issues that do not currently exist.30 3 Equally disturbing, the lack of
relevant precedent or legal tradition will probably make it very difficult
for lawyers to predict whether one provision or another of an unchosen
state's mandatory rules will continue to operate despite the choice of a
different state's law.
As discussed above, 304 the determination of whether otherwise
mandatory rules will continue to operate, despite the choice of different
law, is currently a complex analysis, the outcome of which is difficult to
predict even when parties are limited to selecting "related" law.30 5 Ow-
ing in part to the test laid out in the Restatement, the current judicial
analysis depends in part on a comparison of the connections that the "re-
lated" states have to the parties and their transaction. Under the test, if
the selected state has few contacts, it is more likely a court will find the
other state's mandatory rule to be "fundamental policy" than it will if the
contacts of the two states are evenly divided.30 6
This analysis may be connected at an intuitive level to how we have
come to think about law, jurisdiction, and conflict of laws. Absent a con-
tractual choice of law, the effect a given state's law ought to have on a
given contractual relationship, we think, depends on the connections be-
tween that state and the parties or their transaction.30 7 A state having
302. See supra Part IV.A.
303. See supra Part IV.A for a discussion of this aspect of the scope problem.
304. See discussion of fundamental policy restriction supra Part IV.B.
305. See John Benard Corr, Modern Choice of Law and Public Policy: The Emperor
Has the Same Old Clothes, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 647 (1985) (arguing that the modern
expectation for public policy in choice of law has done little to create a balance between
predictable and fair outcomes).
306. This analysis is evident in the franchise cases discussed supra Part IV.B.1.
307. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1969).
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little "interest" in a given contract or its parties ought to have relatively
less influence on them and their transaction than should a state with a
substantial "interest" in them.
What will a court do with a case where the unchosen state has substan-
tial contacts and the chosen state none? The intuitive pull will be in the
direction of enforcing the unchosen mandatory rule (whatever its charac-
ter) in such a case and current judicial analysis which interrelates funda-
mental policy with a comparison of state contacts might well validate that
intuition. Yet the intent of the two proposals is clearly contrary to such a
judicial analysis: both are clear that the unchosen state's mandatory pro-
visions should have little play even if the unchosen state has an intense
"interest" in the parties or their transaction and the chosen state has
none.
The Comments to the UCITA rule suggest that few mandatory rules of
unchosen states should be operable if the parties have chosen a different
state's unrelated law: the relatedness of the unchosen state's law or the
unrelatedness of the chosen state's law are to have nothing to do with it.
Comments to its choice of law rule refer to the UCITA's more general
provision permitting courts to invalidate terms based on "public pol-
icy."'30 8 Those comments, in turn, discourage courts from enforcing
"purely local policies" and further state that
"[c]ontract law issues such as contract formation, creation and dis-
claimer of warranties, measuring and limiting damages, basic con-
tractual obligations, contractual background rules, the effect of
contractual choice, risk of loss, and the like, including the right of
parties to alter the effect of the terms of this Act by their agreement
should not be invalidated under subsection (b) of this section. '30 9
The intent, clearly, is to leave little room for the mandatory rules of the
unchosen state to operate. The kind of constructive local experimenta-
tion envisioned by Justice White in Fauntleroy is effectively condemned
(unless, of course, contracting non-consumers "choose" to be bound by
them) because forum courts are directed by the proposal to disregard
unchosen local rules. Clearly, while UCITA is state law, the enacting
state's forum is to disregard most other state rules if they are not chosen
by the parties. Put differently, one state's law authorizes parties to disre-
gard the law of the other states.
The Reporters' Notes to the Article 1 Proposal suggest the same out-
come. They state only: "A fundamental public policy will rarely be
found in a requirement, such as a statute of frauds, that relates to formali-
ties, or in general rules of contract law, such as those concerned with the
need for consideration. On the other hand, a rule that makes the selling
of body parts or human embryos illegal may reflect such a policy. '310
308. U.C.I.T.A. § 109 cmt. 2b (2000).
309. Id. § 105 cmt. 3.
310. U.C.C. § 1-301, Reporter's Note c (Proposed Draft, Nov. 2000).
2001]
SMU LAW REVIEW
The lack of both judicial precedent or United States legal tradition for
approaching the fundamental policy issue in this way begs the question of
whether courts will break with the strong intuition expressed by Justice
White at the outset of this Article and approach the matter as the provi-
sions' drafters seem to intend, or whether they will find ways to permit
the mandatory provisions to operate, notwithstanding the parties' choice
of unrelated law.
Once again, we can expect substantial uncertainty for lawyers advising
their clients on the continued operation of mandatory rules despite the
choice of unrelated law in the contract. If, for example, a New York pri-
vate banker wishes to make a loan secured by personal property to a New
York borrower for a New York project and selects the law of South Da-
kota to control their contract, can a lawyer for either party confidently
advise her client that the mandatory usury provisions of New York will no
longer apply? 311 Since UCC Article 9 governs secured lending, this con-
tract is governed (at least in part) by the UCC. Will that fact permit the
parties to select unrelated law to govern the contract more generally, and
the usury restrictions particularly? Assuming that the choice of unrelated
law were permitted by the UCC proposal, would a court enforcing the
choice of South Dakota law also hold that New York's elaborate regula-
tion of such relationships was not "fundamental policy" of New York?
As suggested earlier, 312 courts seem generally hostile to usury restrictions
outside the consumer context but their analysis is heavily centered on the
relationship between the chosen law and the contract. The Restatement
provision dealing with usury would forbid the choice of unrelated law to
avoid usury restrictions. 31 3 Under the Article 1 proposal, where do usury
laws fit in the Reporter's spectrum between rules requiring consideration,
and those prohibiting the selling of human embryos? Lawyers will have
great difficulty giving their clients answers to such questions. Yet clients
will expect answers if they are being charged the legal expenses necessary
to uncover the supposed advantage a choice of particular law was to bring
them.314
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSALS
The UCITA and UCC Proposals confront policy makers with complex
choices. As this Article goes to press, UCITA has been promulgated as a
stand-alone statute by the National Conference of Commissioners on
311. New York limits the interest that may be charged in such transactions and imposes
penalties if the contract sets a higher rate. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 173 (McKinney 2000).
312. See supra Part IV.B.2.
313. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS OF LAW § 203 cmt. e (1969).
314. Certainty in predicting outcomes may also be imperiled once the parties get closer
to a dispute resolution process. Both provisions increase the odds that the forum court will
decide cases using the law of a different jurisdiction, including in many more cases, jurisdic-
tions without U.S. legal traditions. However unpredictable litigation may be at present,
matters will get worse as courts attempt to decide cases using unfamiliar law and legal
traditions. Moreover, such decisions will lack the force of precedent and thereby reduce
whatever predictability common law precedent adds to the law.
[Vol. 54
CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW
Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL"); it could not garner adequate support
from the American Law Institute to retain its status as part of the Uni-
form Commercial Code in the form of Article 2B. 3 15 The Article 1 pro-
posal, on the other hand, remains a proposal which will require approval
by both the NCCUSL and ALI before it can become a part of the UCC.
State legislatures will be asked to enact UCITA and, of course, can
choose not to enact it. But as should be clear, all persons in all states
(and countries) can be subjected to UCITA's choice of law provisions if
vendors specify a UCITA forum in their contracts and then litigate in a
UCITA state. States that oppose UCITA may have to do more than sim-
ply refuse to enact it.
The NCCUSL and ALI will be asked to endorse the Article 1 proposal
and, if they do, state legislatures will then be asked to enact it as part of
the revisions to Article 1 of the UCC. If the proposal survives scrutiny by
both organizations, state legislatures will, again, have the choice not to
enact it, but the extra-territorial effects of other states' enacting it will be
similar to those brought by UCITA.
For policy makers in the NCCUSL and ALI, the important commercial
law question is whether an adequate case has been made to change a
conflict of laws rule when the change represents a sharp break with both
current law and longstanding legal tradition and will create conflicts in
the conflict of laws rules that do not currently exist. Even if uniform
enactment can be obtained, will there be net gains in certainty or, given
the legal traditions and judicial analysis now in place, net losses? If rapid,
uniform enactment proves elusive either in the short or longer term, the
result will be an unprecedented diversity in the state conflict of laws rules
that will be applicable to the vast bulk of commercial contracts involving
people in the United States. Will the commercial consequences of any
such diversity be large or small, tolerable or intolerable? At a different
level, policymakers must confront the question whether the new provi-
sion will undercut the commercial and related lawmaking powers of the
states.
Commercial law consists of thousands of rules that structure the rela-
tions between many contracting parties. Most of those rules are so-called
"default rules"-rules that the parties can alter with a suitable provision
in their contract. But there are also many rules that can be implicated in
commercial contracts that are mandatory rules, that is, rules that the par-
ties cannot contract around and which express some of the regulatory
315. Several motions that were critical of parts of UCC Article 2B were presented at
the American Law Institute's Annual Meeting in May 1998. The first, critical of Article
2B's assent issues, passed. See A.L.I. PROc. 459-72 (1998). A second, dealing with pre-
emption issues raised by Article 2B failed. A.L.I. PROc. 482-85 (1998). A third dealing
with Article 2B's scope was withdrawn. A.L.I. PRoc. 494 (1998). And the fourth, to delete
Article 2B's choice of law provision "split the house." A.L.I. PRoC. 494-505 (1998). The
ALI's attitude towards these parts of Article 2B may have contributed to the proposal's
loss of ALI support.
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goals of contract law.316 One can find myriad examples simply leafing
through the UCC, including the requirements that some contracts be in
writing,317 that contracts not include unconscionable provisions, 31 8 that
"good faith" includes an element of commercial reasonableness, 319 that
penalty clauses are impermissible, 320 and so on. Mandatory rules of this
sort express legislative intent that the parties subject to a jurisdiction's
rules not be able to contract around them.321
For state legislatures, one can thus add to the questions of commercial
certainty those that go directly to a state's lawmaking power, either
through state legislation or through judicial precedent. Because both
proposals envision an adjudicating court's enforcing only narrowly drawn
"fundamental policy" of a state whose law would otherwise apply, they
potentially convert to non-mandatory status all of the state's mandatory
rules that do not rise to the level of "fundamental policy." Does the Stat-
ute of Frauds fit the category? Is a state's particular definition of "good
faith" an expression of "fundamental policy" so that it will adhere to the
parties' contract no matter what law they choose? Will a state court's
liberal precedent on unconscionability count so it cannot be displaced
through the choice of a different jurisdiction's law expressing a different
judicial view of the matter? Reporters' notes to the provision provide
inadequate guidance or suggest a negative answer to all these questions.
Importantly, whatever new power these proposals give to contracting
parties, it will be available only to those parties sophisticated enough to
insist on a different jurisdiction's law in their contracts. One can antici-
pate that this will privilege those with the legal knowledge or bargaining
power to take advantage of the complexities of choice of law rules leaving
the less sophisticated subject to all of "their" state's mandatory rules.
The difficulty with discussing the policy implications of. these proposals
is that they are conflict of laws rules and therefore do not operate in the
same way as ordinary legislation. Thus, to make the text more managea-
ble, the discussion will begin by considering the problems presented by
the proposals in the abstract, without the complications that partial enact-
ment of the proposals bring in our federal system. After that, the focus
will be on the proposals under conditions of partial enactment and on the
additional issues that partial enactment raises.
316. See generally Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory
Role of Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697 (1990).
317. Id. § 2-201.
318. Id. § 2-302.
319. Id. § 2-103(b).
320. U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (2000).
321. The Supreme Court's statement in Seeman is worth emphasizing here:
The effect of the [good faith] qualification is merely to prevent the evasion or
avoidance at will of the usury law otherwise applicable, by the parties' enter-
ing into the contract or stipulating for its performance at a place which has
no normal relation to the transaction and to whose law they would not other-
wise be subject.
Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse, 274 U.S. 403, 408 (1927).
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A. POLICY IMPLICATIONS WITHOUT THE COMPLICATIONS OF
PARTIAL ENACTMENT
We have considered two discrete problems that the proposals generate:
uncertainty produced by the limited scope of the provisions, and uncer-
tainty that may come from the absence of relevant precedent or legal
tradition when evaluating "fundamental policy" questions. As discussed
earlier,322 enactment of either provision in some or all states will set into
place a conflict of laws rule that will have limited application to contracts
within the scope of the provision and will have no applicability outside of
that scope. Outside, parties will confront the current law requiring a rela-
tionship between the law chosen and the parties or contract. It will be
uncertain in many cases whether a given contract is-or is not-within
the scope of the given provision and, therefore, whether the parties may
choose unrelated law. Is, for example, a usurious loan contract a "UCC
contract" and therefore subject to the Article 1 proposal? Would it mat-
ter if the borrower granted a security interest in her goods? Further,
even if the contract is within the scope of the provision, it may also be
uncertain whether the particular legal issue is one that is encompassed by
the choice of law clause, and the power the parties have been given by the
legislation to choose unrelated law. If a particular franchise contract in-
volves substantial sales of goods, for example, and parties choose unre-
lated law, will that choice avoid the unchosen jurisdiction's limitation on
franchisee termination?
The earlier discussion also suggested that uncertainty may be generated
by the lack of precedent for judicial analysis of the fundamental policy
question where the chosen state has no connection with the transaction
and the contending state has substantial connections. 323 The current judi-
cial approach is predicated on a view of law as an expression of governing
power by given jurisdictions with perceived interests to advance. This
view is reflected in the current fundamental policy analysis which is, of
necessity, a comparative one, resting in part on a comparison of the con-
tacts of the chosen and unchosen states. The proposals call for "funda-
mental policy" decisions necessarily omitting any comparison of the
contacts the contending states have with the contract. Given our legal
traditions and intuitions, so vividly expressed by Justice White in Fauntle-
roy, whether our courts will have the ability or willingness to disregard
ordinarily applicable mandatory rules simply because the parties desired
that outcome is a question on which one can only speculate.
These issues of uncertain applicability and predictability are relatively
minor, however, compared with the larger conceptual issues that these
proposals bring, even if they were uniformly enacted by all states. At
their core, these issues concern the impact of the provisions on states'
power to engage in lawmaking as we have traditionally understood it.
322. See supra Part V.E., Part V.F.4.
323. See supra Part V.F.4.
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Giving parties the power to choose unrelated law clearly increases
party autonomy by extending to contracting parties a range of choices in
making their contracts that they do not currently have. Within their re-
spective scopes, both proposals permit non-consumer parties to choose
the law (including the relevant mandatory rules) of any jurisdiction in the
United States or, in many cases, the world. If courts are not required to
engage in a relatedness analysis, one consequence may be somewhat en-
hanced certainty32 4 that the contractually chosen law will be the law that
a court will apply. In addition, if the economic analysis discussed earlier
is sound, there may be economic benefits from moving to a system where
the parties (not their legislatures) choose the law to govern their con-
tracts. 325 Finally, the proposals might remove some impediments to
globalization and international business.
But this power to choose one body of law is also, by implication, the
power to reject a contending body of law. In the context of these propos-
als, and of conflict of law rules generally, the ordinary mandatory rules of
the unchosen jurisdiction cease to operate if the choice of different law is
enforced. Only those unchosen mandatory rules that rise to the level of
"fundamental policy" will continue to be binding notwithstanding the
choice of different law. From a policy perspective, this makes much state
lawmaking very non-traditional in the sense that, once these conflict of
laws provisions are in place, state legislatures will not be creating ordi-
nary mandatory rules for the usual subjects of their lawmaking-their
constituents.
If one focuses on a jurisdiction's normal constituents-defined very
loosely as those who inhabit the jurisdiction's physical boundaries, or are
its citizens, or who pay taxes to the jurisdiction-ordinary mandatory
rules that are now intended to restrict, channel, or simply govern the
commercial activities of those persons will, under the proposals, have less
influence over the state's constituents. 326 They have potential effect only
if the given person did not choose a different law to control her contract.
For any given mandatory rule-for example, that various contracts must
be in writing327-a given constituent can avoid the rule by choosing the
324. The extent that certainty is enhanced depends on the amount of uncertainty re-
moved by the proposals. As developed earlier, there is little evidence that the relatedness
requirement has been a significant impediment to certainty.
325. See supra Part V.F.2.
326. Clearly, the proposals do not render all state lawmaking ineffective. The only
mandatory rules that might be avoided are those arguably implicated by commercial activ-
ity. Yet, there are no clear boundaries to the mandatory rules that parties might argue are
avoided by their choice of a different jurisdiction's law.
It is difficult to know the range of mandatory rules that could be implicated in any given
contract. One would hope, for example, that if a state made some prohibited commercial
activity criminal, that another state's court would take the rule out of the "ordinary" cate-
gory either by construing it to be "fundamental policy" or by holding it not implicated by
the choice of law. Yet one might be reluctant to forecast such an outcome. Usury restric-
tions are often backed up with penalties for their violation, yet courts analyzing the prob-
lem under current law typically consider usury restrictions not to be "fundamental policy."
327. E.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-201, 2A-201 (2000).
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law of a jurisdiction without the rule,328 provided an adjudicating court
does not call the rejected rule "fundamental policy."
Thus, the proposals convert ordinary mandatory rules (i.e., those that
do not rise to the "fundamental policy" level) into non-mandatory rules
that non-consumer parties can "waive" by choosing other law. If the pro-
posals produce the effect projected by the economic analysis discussed
earlier, there will be competitive advantages in choosing one jurisdic-
tion's law rather than another's, and we can expect those who have the
capacity and power to make informed, competitive choices to do so. In-
deed, the proposals open the way to business competition through choice
of law clauses, and one might well expect such competition to be wide-
spread, even vigorous. Yet the power to choose (and correlative power to
avoid) is not universal in the black letter of either proposal: consumers
will not be able to choose unrelated law in their dealings with one an-
other, nor will they be able to choose unrelated law in their dealings with
businesses. In addition, those business persons who do not engage in ei-
ther very large or mass market transactions will lack the resources to
make informed choice of law decisions. They will have their law-selec-
tion decisions made for them by the businesses drafting the contracts.
If lawmaking today is a process of creating rules to shape the activities
of a determinable constituency whose core population is within the juris-
diction,329 the lawmaking process changes under the proposals because
the rules produced will not necessarily govern the jurisdiction's constitu-
ency in the way we now understand it. Rather, a given jurisdiction's ordi-
nary mandatory rules will predictably govern very different groups: 1)
those non-consumers, both within and outside the jurisdiction, who af-
firmatively choose to be governed by them and 2) those consumers and
other constituents who lack the sophistication to choose a different juris-
diction's law and therefore make no choices at all.
328. In the context of the Uniform Commercial Code, a contracting party attempting to
avoid the Statute of Frauds will seek a jurisdiction that has enacted a non-uniform amend-
ment deleting the Statute of Frauds. Curiously, the Article 1 proposal does not require the
choice of law clause to be in writing.
This opens the possibility (unlikely as it may be) that, in answer to a summary judgment
motion based on the Statute of Frauds (UCC § 2-201), the plaintiff will allege that the
parties, in fact, orally agreed to a law without the Statute of Frauds. Whether an affidavit
to that effect will block a summary judgment under the Article 1 proposal is unpredictable
at this point.
329. Professor Ribstein and colleagues, who use corporate law as a paradigm, do not
subscribe to this model but, rather, to the lawmaking model whereby a state creates a law
which it hopes business will find desirable and use. Delaware has prospered economically
under this system, in part, because using Delaware law to incorporate requires incorporat-
ing in Delaware and becoming a "Delaware corporation." Incorporating in Delaware is
not free and the proceeds of Delaware incorporation can "motivate" Delaware to "com-
pete" in its substantive corporation law.
While these proposals may draw litigation to the state to get the choice of law rule; they
will not necessarily provide economic motivation for a state to shape its substantive law to
the liking of parties who "choose" it. Under the proposals, one need not establish a pres-
ence or even litigate in state B to choose its law. It is sufficient merely to litigate in a state
A that permits one to make the choice of state B's law.
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One answer to the possibility of reduced state lawmaking power is
available, but only if all states enact the proposals. This "reciprocity" no-
tion is that, by enacting the proposals, each legislature gives up its author-
ity to subject its own constituents to ordinary mandatory rules. In
exchange, each enacting state gets the certainty that comes with deleting
the relatedness requirement, and the prospect that, just as state A's con-
stituents will be governed by state B's mandatory rules if they so choose,
so state B's constituents will be governed by state A's rules if they so
choose. 330 In the same vein, state A would defer to other state courts in
determinations of which of state A's mandatory rules constituted A's fun-
damental policy, and other states would defer to state A's courts on the
same questions about their laws. All states, being in it together, would
share the benefits and burdens of expanded party choice.
Under this idea, although there might not, in the aggregate, be any
substantial reduction in state lawmaking power, its distribution might
change. Because legislatures would create rules not for their constituents
but for those who chose their law, the legislatures with the most "power"
(in the sense of affecting the affairs of individual people or businesses)
would not necessarily be the most populous or richest states, but would
be those whose law was chosen most often-the ones that were most
"competitive."
Approached in this way, it is obvious that the proposals effectively
transfer political power over ordinary mandatory rules implicated in com-
mercial contracts from those who now exercise it-the voters or constitu-
ents or interest groups in a given locale-to those who will choose the
"best" law through their contracts. 331 Instead of creating mandatory
rules that benefit constituents directly through enlightened policy trans-
lated into law (the viewpoint expressed by Justice White in Faunderoy),
lawmakers will benefit constituents indirectly by creating laws that con-
tracting parties everywhere will find "best" and therefore choose in their
contracts. If the system works this way, it transfers ultimate lawmaking
power in the areas within the scope of the proposals from the political
entity's voting populace to contracting parties throughout the world who
choose a jurisdiction's law in their contracts. The benefits predicted to
come from more certainty in contracting are purchased through this real-
location of power in the political system.
But, to be sure, this transfer of political power over these areas is un-
likely to give us a more "democratic" system even in the loosest sense of
the word: because only those with large or mass transactions can intelli-
330. This expression is obviously overbroad. The only constituents who get this power
in fact are non-consumers who have the sophistication and bargaining power to influence
the choice of law clause in the contract. The remaining non-consumer parties will get
whatever ordinary mandatory rules are specified by those who can make such choices. The
text is using the overbroad statement to keep the text from getting too cumbersome.
331. The economic theory described supra Part V.F.2. contends that the transfer of po-
litical power over mandatory rules to contract-makers is desirable because the current po-
litical system cannot be trusted to produce efficient laws.
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gently choose from the wide array of law that will become available
under the proposals, political power to influence legislatures will likely be
shifted from those who now have it to those with the power to choose
law, rather than to the contracting population more broadly.332
The proposals also alter states' lawmaking powers vis-a-vis those indi-
viduals and businesses within a given jurisdiction who have the power to
choose a different state's law. To some extent, the very idea of "law"
involves a projection of power intended to bind individuals whether they
wish to be bound or not.333 Today, all mandatory rules are clear exam-
ples of the projection of this sort of power in intrastate cases. In inter-
state cases, the power to substitute one set of mandatory rules for another
is severely limited (or made costly) by the relatedness requirement in our
conflict of laws rules. Under the new proposals, this will change because
it will become, essentially, cost free for a contract drafter in a covered
transaction to avoid most of a jurisdiction's mandatory rules. In essence,
the proposals authorize many constituents to easily avoid compliance
with most mandatory rules they find undesirable, thereby reducing the
effect of those rules, and correspondingly, reducing the power of any
given legislature to influence the behavior of a population targeted by the
legislation.
For policymakers concerned with governmental function and sound
legislative policy generally, the question is whether these changes in the
function and power of state lawmakers are desirable or undesirable and,
if undesirable, whether other gains promised under these provisions will
offset any undesirable side effects. Since participation in international
332. Moreover, as discussed earlier in the text, supra Part VI.A, if legislation is simply
the product of interest group pressure, the political power those groups currently have may
be amplified by the proposals. The proposals make it possible for those who draft con-
tracts, or influence the drafting, to concentrate interest group pressure on the lawmaking
processes of one or a small group of state legislatures and, once the resulting law is to their
liking, to choose that law in their contracts. Such direct, concentrated interest group pres-
sure would likely be much cheaper and potentially more effective than the same lobbying
effort in Congress.
333. Whether or not a rule actually achieves its intended effect depends, in part, on the
costs the law imposes on those who would try to avoid it. Businesses, of course, often find
ways around various mandatory rules, but legislatures can make avoidance expensive and
thereby increase the level of compliance with the rules. A jail term will produce more
compliance with usury restrictions than will a nominal fine. See generally Lawrence M.
Friedman, Two Faces of Law, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 13. Conversely, if legislatures make the
avoidance of a given mandatory rule less expensive, the level of compliance will likely go
down.
In the context of choice of law, clearly businesses today can avoid a whole array of
undesirable mandatory rules by relocating or establishing offices in a more desirable juris-
diction. The relatedness requirement essentially imposes this relocation expense on those
who would avoid mandatory rules through choice of law clauses. This expense of avoiding
compliance with ordinary mandatory rules ensures that those rules maintain a given level
of influence within the jurisdiction that created the rules. Reducing the difficulty of avoid-
ing mandatory rules by liberating choice of law will, predictably, reduce the level of com-
pliance with the many mandatory rules that can be implicated in a given commercial
transaction. The fact that some businesses can avoid the rules, if they are determined




trade is often cited as a reason for these proposals, a further question
might be whether a narrower form of the provisions, perhaps applicable
to international contracts (or international contracts larger than a given
size) will be a sounder solution to the perceived problems. 334
B. PROBLEMS OF PARTIAL ENACTMENT: FORUM SHOPPING
AND COMITY
It may be more important in the conflict of laws area than elsewhere
for the uniform laws process to produce proposals that have high pros-
pects of uniform enactment. For if all states do not enact the proposals,
the situation becomes far more complex (and probably far worse than it
is today) owing, again, to the nature of conflict of laws rules.
From a commercial law perspective, the central problem with less than
universal enactment of either proposal is substantially-increased forum
shopping and the attendant uncertainty that comes when litigants en-
counter law that varies with the forum. As discussed earlier, because
conflict of laws rules are state law in the United States, there has always
been the possibility of forum shopping to the extent that the conflict of
laws rules in one state have differed from those in others. Yet, with the
narrow exceptions outlined earlier, all states begin with the same basic
idea: that parties to a contract may not select law that is "unrelated" to
them or their contract. These proposals remove that limitation entirely,
but will do so only in those states that adopt the proposals. With less than
full uniform enactment, the gains the drafters may desire in commercial
certainty will be lost and the partially-enacted proposals will usher in fo-
rum shopping opportunities that have not existed before. With partial
enactment there is the danger that, in any given case,, the litigation will be
brought in the "wrong" jurisdiction and the choice of unrelated law will
become unenforceable in the forum state without the new rule.335 With
partial enactment, contracting parties will find the new rule unreliable
because its application will depend on where the litigation arises, some-
thing that cannot be guaranteed when making a contract.
This undesirable situation might be mitigated, to some extent, by inevi-
table contractual choice of forum clauses which select fora of jurisdictions
that have enacted the provisions. But while the Supreme Court has gone
some distance in making such clauses enforceable even for adhesion con-
tracts, 336 the prospects for enforcement in all cases is probably not as high
334. Such a solution does not solve the problem of avoidance of mandatory rules
through a choice of law clause-that problem already exists in the present system, albeit to
a lesser degree. While enacting narrowed proposals that would extend only to interna-
tional transactions will make the avoidance of mandatory rules somewhat easier than it is
today, the "privilege" of avoidance will be extended only to those in international con-
tracts, a far smaller number of contracts than the number potentially affected by the pro-
posals as written.
335. State courts in states which have not enacted the proposal are likely to retain their
current approach to conflict of laws questions inasmuch as their state legislature has, by
hypothesis, rejected the proposed changes in the law.
336. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
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as businesses would like. 337 From the international business perspective,
partial enactment and the resulting uncertainty in the applicable choice of
law rule will make a situation that is already perceived to be a problem
for foreign contracting parties far worse.338
But partial enactment does not simply create undesirable uncertainty
through the diversity (and concomitant forum shopping possibilities) that
partial enactment would bring to conflict of laws rules. Partial enactment
also raises the prospect of souring interstate relations because the state
A's legislatures will permit the state Bs' constituents to avoid most of the
state Bs' mandatory rules while the state B's legislatures will not permit
them to avoid the rules. Even if these problems are only political, 339 they
may be at least as severe as those that partial enactment would bring to
the desirable commercial certainty in the contracting process. It is useful
first to consider the effect that partial enactment will have on an enacting
state.
1. For Enacting States
To begin with, partial enactment and the forum shopping that will re-
sult suggest that litigation could move from non-enacting to enacting
states (or vice versa) to take advantage of the preferable choice of law
rule.340 While we cannot predict the magnitude of such a change, if litiga-
tion moves to an enacting state, its courts' caseload will increase. This
could have state budget implications (offset, perhaps, by increases in its
lawyer-taxpayer's business), to the extent that public support underwrites
part of the civil justice system.341
As the caseload grows, so will the related litigation business, but any
increase in the litigation business will depend on how "competitive" the
state is with its choice of law rule. That, in turn, will depend in part on
how many other states have the same rule and on whether the state takes
an active role in "selling" itself as a desirable place for litigation. Migra-
tion to a single enacting state will occur to the extent that forum shoppers
find the rule permitting the choice of unrelated law desirable and have
337. Cf. Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (hold-
ing that arbitration clause "chosen" by the parties was unenforceable because it was sub-
stantively unconscionable).
338. One positive consequence of partial enactment could be pressure on Congress to
federalize conflict of law rules, at least for international business cases. Several commenta-
tors have suggested federal intervention in this area to solve the federalism problems that
our current system brings with it. See authorities cited supra note 232.
339. We continue here with the assumption that the provisions are not unconstitutional.
340. It is, for example, widely known that much of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy business
has migrated to Delaware to take advantage of its hospitable climate for those who file
Chapter 11 petitions. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public
Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a "Race to the
Bottom" 4 (manuscript on file with the Author).
341. It is worth noting that, while the litigation business might grow, other kinds of
businesses will not necessarily relocate to an enacting state to take advantage of the new
rule. They can obtain the advantages of the state's rule by conducting their litigation there,




the power to bring and keep the litigation in the enacting state. We can,
however, expect far more contentiousness on forum selection because,
with the rules so different, there will be greater strategic advantage in
forum shopping for both new and old rules.
A state's courts are most directly affected by enactment-a choice of
law rule is a rule for courts. By removing the relatedness issue from
choice of law determinations, the legislature will have somewhat simpli-
fied contractual choice of law disputes and this could save some judicial
effort. Moreover, it seems that contracts may more likely have choice of
law clauses because there will be more competitive advantage in carefully
choosing applicable law from the many available jurisdictions. This, in
turn, could relieve courts from making difficult choice of law decisions in
the absence of such clauses.
Such gains in the work of adjudication may be offset by increases in the
complexity of the individual litigated cases. Litigants will be choosing the
enacting state's forum to obtain its choice of law rule, not necessarily to
obtain the forum's substantive law. If, for example, software vendors find
a more favorable law than UCITA, they will choose that law in their con-
tracts and bring their litigation to Maryland to avail themselves only of
UCITA's choice of law provision. If parties choose to litigate in an enact-
ing state simply for the power to choose yet a third state's law, then en-
acting state courts will be called on to decide cases using law that is
different (maybe far different) than their own. The use of a different
state or nation's law in litigation can add complexity to the litigation. For
example, it will be harder for a Maryland state court to decide a case
where the parties chose Liberian law than if they had chosen the law of
Maryland. Moreover, the quality of the judicial decisions may suffer for
the court's lack of familiarity with the law the parties have required them
to apply. Finally, judicial decisions predicated on a different state or na-
tion's law will lack precedential value either in the forum or in the State
whose law was applied. To the extent these sorts of results follow adop-
tion of the provisions, the lawmaking power of common law judges, and
the predictability of their decisions, will be reduced.
The magnitude of these effects on an enacting state's judicial system
and litigation business cannot be predicted because they depend critically
on how many parties litigate their cases in the state that would not have
done so without the choice of law rule. These effects cannot be known
(or even estimated) in advance.
But enactment could have a slightly more direct effect on a state's con-
stituents by signaling the enacting state's preference for party autonomy
over its own ordinary mandatory rules. If state A's legislature under-
stands the proposals and enacts them, it may thereby signal a belief that a
state's ordinary mandatory rules ought not apply if the parties choose a
different state's law.342 Thus, if enacting state A's own constituents
342. State A is saying nothing directly about the binding nature of its own mandatory
rules on its own constituents since only those who litigate in state A's courts get state A's
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choose state B's law and litigate in state A, state A's courts could read
state A's enactment as embracing a narrow construction of "fundamental
policy." They should probably conclude that very few of state A's
mandatory rules constitute state A's fundamental policy under the new
rule when parties ordinarily subject to A's rules have chosen the law of
state B. When state A's constituents litigate the same claim in enacting
state C, state C's courts should probably also conclude that state A's leg-
islature regards most mandatory rules to be waivable via a choice of law
clause and, therefore, should read few of state A's mandatory rules as
constituting state A's fundamental policy.
Enacting states will presumably weigh the benefits and problems of the
proposals and, if its constituents avoid the enacting state's ordinary
mandatory rules, that is a consequence that, in some sense, an enacting
state's legislature embraced. More troubling consequences will visit non-
enacting states in the partial enactment setting.
2. For Non-enacting States
Once again, whether a given state's constituent can avoid that state's
ordinary mandatory rules by selecting the unrelated law of a different
state depends not on what the constituent's legislature decides, but what
the legislature of the eventual forum state decides. Thus, if New York
refuses to enact the proposals but Delaware does, New York constituents
can avail themselves of the Delaware choice of law rule by going there to
litigate. So, to repeat an earlier example, if a New York private banker
wishes to make a secured loan to a New York borrower for a New York
project at an interest rate that is usurious in New York but not in South
Dakota, it can (if the Article 1 proposal applies) 343 choose South Dakota
law in its loan contract and take its loan default claim to Delaware for
adjudication. If the Delaware court concluded that the New York usury
laws were displaced by the choice of South Dakota law, and not funda-
mental New York policy and entered judgment under South Dakota law
for the loan plus usurious interest, that judgment would be entitled to full
faith and credit in New York, whatever New York may have thought
about its own usury regulation or choice of law rule. 344
rule. Rather, the state A legislature will be signaling that very few of any unchosen state's
rules should rise to the level of "fundamental policy" when contracting parties choose
other law and litigate their claims in state A. Other states will likely read a form of reci-
procity into this. They likely will read state A's enactment as a signal for how state A
wishes its own mandatory rules to be interpreted by other states' courts.
343. It may or may not apply to the usury aspects of a secured loan transaction. See
supra Part V.F.4.
344. As this example might suggest, an implication of non-enactment could be that the
litigation business will go elsewhere, but that may not necessarily be the case. The sharp
difference between New York and Delaware in this conflict of laws rule means that forum
shopping will be important to both parties and will, in many lawsuits, become a more con-
tentious matter than it is now. One can imagine the borrower in this example considering
a preemptive New York declaratory judgment action that the choice of South Dakota law
was unenforceable under the New York choice of law rule, and that the amount of the
lender's claim was not owing on account of usury.
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Thus, enacting states will have created a rule that governs those constit-
uents of the non-enacting states who go to (or are brought to) enacting
states to litigate their claims. Once the litigation is in the enacting state,
the ordinary (i.e., non-fundamental) mandatory rules of the non-enacting
state become inoperable on the substantive claims in the enacting state's
court. The resulting judgment then can return for unconditional enforce-
ment in the non-enacting state under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
While we have assumed throughout that these provisions are constitu-
tional, this outcome would seem to violate the spirit of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause which guarantees full faith and credit to "the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other state. '345 Thus, while
under the assumptions of constitutionality made here the outcome may
present no legal problems, it may present severe political problems.
3. Other Alternatives to Enactment
States have various reasons for creating mandatory rules to regulate
the contracting process and matters related to it and, however one might
regard the quality of such rules, a political entity with the power to create
such rules and make them mandatory did so. But if other states enact
these choice of law proposals, mandatory rules of enacting and non-en-
acting states acquire an uncertain future, one that depends on whether an
enacting state's court with different traditions, and (perhaps) competing
for litigation business, 346 considers the non-enacting state's rules "funda-
mental policy. '347 How might a non-enacting state maintain the integrity
of its own mandatory rules in the face of sister-state enactments of the
proposals? There is no foolproof solution because, ultimately, one state's
legislature cannot control what another state's courts do with the first
state's mandatory rules.
One possibility is suggested by recent developments in two states which
have reacted to this phenomenon, one responding under current law and
one reacting to the enactment of UCITA.
As discussed earlier,348 following the Eighth Circuit's decision in Mod-
ern Computer Systems v. Modern Banking Systems,349 the Minnesota leg-
islature amended the anti-waiver provision in its franchisee protection
statute to make it clear that franchisee waivers through choice of law pro-
visions were void. 350 The apparent intent was to reduce the chances that
345. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (quoting the provision in its entirety).
346. If courts are involved in competing for litigation business, it could affect their rul-
ings. In this case, for example, one could imagine litigants more readily choosing fora
embracing a very narrow view of fundamental policy rather than a broad view. To the
extent courts are motivated by self-interest, the prospect of more business could influence
the direction of the decisions.
347. Once again, this is a feature of current law. The proposals do not create new
problems here; they merely multiply (perhaps by many factors) a problem already present
in our federal system, owing to the peculiar development of our conflict of laws tradition.
348. See supra Part IV.B.1.
349. 871 F.2d 734 (8th Cir. 1989).
350. The amended Minnesota statute is quoted supra note 123.
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another court would hold Minnesota's mandatory franchisee protection
to be other than the fundamental policy of Minnesota.
Developments in Iowa are more recent. Referred to as the "bomb
shelter" provision,351 an Iowa statute makes unenforceable a choice of
UCITA by any citizen of Iowa.352 The obvious intent is to reject the sub-
stantive provisions of UCITA for Iowa's constituents and to prevent
Iowans from nonetheless being governed by UCITA's provisions through
a choice of law clause.
But the mandatory Iowa provision (as well as Minnesota's) is, of
course, merely one state's mandatory law. What becomes of that law if
an Iowa resident "chooses" UCITA through clickwrap in a software con-
tract and the litigation arises in Maryland which has enacted UCITA?
UCITA's conflict of laws rule permits those who litigate in Maryland to
choose the law of any state or country, including state law that contains
UCITA. By enacting UCITA, Maryland's legislature has mandated that
its courts recognize a contracting party's choice of unrelated law and,
consequently, UCITA-not the law of Iowa-will be applicable to the
controversy in this example. Would the Maryland court consider the
Iowa enactment to be "fundamental policy"? UCITA's choice of law
provision, it will be recalled, has no explicit fundamental policy exception
in the black letter,353 and the intended breadth of any fundamental policy
exception that a court might recognize is very narrow.354 It is thus very
unclear whether a Maryland court strictly following this legislative man-
date would reject an Iowan's "choice" of UCITA in a computer informa-
tion contract: the Maryland legislature may have directed its own courts
not to reject such a choice. Those courts are part of the governmental
apparatus of Maryland, not Iowa.
Thus, neither these nor any other "bomb shelter" provisions can be
guaranteed to succeed because they are, ultimately, dependent on the
deference the enacting state's court gives to them. Perhaps enacting state
courts will infer fundamental policy from the directness of these provi-
sions but, if they do not, there is little that the other states can do about it.
The odds of deference by an adjudicating court might be slightly im-
proved, however, if the fundamental nature of a state's mandatory rules
were stated in just those terms.355 Thus, for example, Minnesota could
351. See Memorandum from Jean Braucher, The Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act (UCITA): Objections From The Consumer Perspective (Aug. 15, 2000) (on
file with the author).
352. See 2000 Iowa Legis. Serv. H.F. 2205 (West).
353. See supra Part II.B.
354. The Official Comment to that effect is quoted supra note 38.
355. Cf. Modern Computer Sys., Inc. v. Modern Banking Sys., Inc., 871 F.2d 734 (8th
Cir. 1989). The Modern Computer dissent said:
There exists no clear statement from the Minnesota Legislature indicating
how "fundamental" the public policy set forth in the Minnesota Franchise
Act is. As the majority's decision is merely a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion, it would be subject to reversal if the state legislature were to clearly
indicate that the Minnesota Franchise Act overrides choice of law clauses if
they operate as waivers under Minn. Stat. § 80C.21.
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paraphrase its statute to provide:
It is the fundamental policy of this state that any condition, stipula-
tion or provision, including any choice of law provision, purporting
to bind any person.., to waive compliance or which has the effect of
waiving compliance with any provision of [the franchise law] or any
rule or order thereunder is void.356
A state's amendment of only some of its mandatory rules to declare
them "fundamental policy," however, carries dangers. Selective amend-
ment arguably could show a legislative intent that the mandatory rules
not so treated are not to be considered by other courts as "fundamental
policy." Moreover, it might be politically difficult for a state to embark
on a process of deciding which of its many mandatory rules are "funda-
mental policy" and which are not. Finally, it seems very unlikely that any
selective amendment process would actually catch all the "important"
mandatory rules.
In many ways, however, states may have already decided such matters
of relative importance by making some rules that operate on commercial
contracts mandatory in the first place. Legislators know full well how to
permit parties to change rules or waive them contractually, and the fact
they have not done so might well be regarded as an indicator that
mandatory rules as a class are particularly important (relative to all of a
state's rules) in advancing state policy. If this is a plausible view, then it
might be worthwhile for a state to declare that all of its mandatory rules
constitute "fundamental policy," at least in cases where the chosen law
has no relationship with the parties or their contract. 357
If a state labeled its mandatory rules as a class as "fundamental policy,"
such a labeling would flatly contradict the narrow range contemplated by
the proposals. The non-enacting state B's legislature would have de-
clared state B's fundamental policy very broadly while the enacting state
A's new rule directs its courts to a very narrow view of the ambit of state
B's fundamental policy. Nonetheless, state courts routinely look to the
declarations of sister state courts and legislatures for guidance on sister
state law, and might well be persuaded that the better policy would be to
do so under the new conflicts rule as well. Certainly, including "funda-
mental policy" in non-enacting state B's formulation will make it more
Id. at 743.
356. MINN. STAT. § 80C.21 (1989) (emphasis added); see also supra note 123.
357. One can distinguish cases where the chosen law has some relationship with the
contract as calling for appropriate deference to the policymaking of the related state, which
had contacts with the parties or their contract and, therefore, whose law might have ap-
plied even if it had not been chosen. The case for deference by state B's legislature to
enacting state A's rulings on state B's mandatory rules is far harder to make when the
chosen law interpreted by state A's court has nothing to do either with the State B parties
or their contract. Put differently, State B's mandatory rules could be "fundamental policy"
when compared to State D's whose rules had nothing to do with the parties or their con-
tract. State B's same mandatory rules could be less "fundamental" when compared to the
mandatory rules of State C with which the parties or their contract had contacts. Such an
approach would replicate the judicial analysis under current conflict of laws rules which, at
its core, is a comparative analysis.
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difficult for enacting state A's court to declare something different about
the fundamental nature of state B's rules.
In the final analysis, however, none of the available solutions will relia-
bly protect the mandatory rules of states whose constituents go to enact-
ing states to conduct their litigation. In the partial enactment setting, the
proposals can easily be seen as enacting states' trading of a measure of
the lawmaking power of non-enacting sister states (and themselves) for
the commercial certainty that a narrow interpretation of fundamental
policy is promised to bring.
VII. CONCLUSION
The attempt here has been to illuminate two choice of law proposals
that, due to the complexity of the subject, have received scant attention.
They change the law sharply and fundamentally and, at their core level,
could change the way we view our federal system from the traditional
vision articulated by Justice White in Fauntleroy to something quite dif-
ferent. There are many implications of the proposals that policy makers
might find objectionable and these objections could result in less than
one-hundred percent enactment within the United States. This prospect
of partial enactment brings undesirable consequences that dwarf the
other objections. Apart from substantial commercial uncertainty, the
prospect of partial enactment creates a potential threat to interstate com-
ity embraced in the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause.
If these proposals become law, enacting state legislatures will have
given their courts very difficult choices in many cases: deference to most
mandatory rules of sister state lawmakers-that is, reading "fundamental
policy" very broadly and thereby exhibiting the kind of traditional comity
that underlies our federal system as expressed in the Full and Faith and
Credit Clause-or non-deference through a narrow reading of "funda-
mental policy" in the interest of the claimed commercial certainty. Given
the status of the proposals and the complete absence of judicial precedent
for such a situation, it is very difficult at this stage to know which road
those courts will take.
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